Id. "If both those considerations are met, the statute of limitations 'shall' be suspended." Id.; United States v. Minter, No. 3:12-CR-00004-TCB-RGV, 2014 WL 12792618, at *6 (N.D. Ga. June 17, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 45 F. Supp. 3d 1390 (N.D. Ga. 2014)(holding that Broughton "laid to rest" Defendant's arguments that the government must make additional showings in its § 3292 application, such as that the foreign evidence was necessary to bringing the indictment, and that the evidence could not be obtained by any other means than an official request to the foreign government)(citing Broughton, 689 F.3d at 1273); see also United States v. DeGeorge, 380 F.3d 1203, 1213 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the phrase "the district court before which a grand jury is impaneled to investigate the offense" in § 3292 is "a mere venue requirement specifying the particular court that may issue the tolling order").
Finding no dispositive response to the specific request to identify and interview any of the identified individuals, the Court accordingly cannot find that Cayman authorities took any final action here that would stop the tolling of the statute of limitations. See generally United States v. Minter, 45 F. Supp. 3d 1390, 1399 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (finding that the foreign authority did not take final action when it interviewed only five individuals and the government had requested six interviews); United States v. Ratti, 365 F. Supp. 2d 649, 653 (D. Md. 2005) (no final action when the foreign government did not address specific requests for interviews). Because Weiss has not identified a point at which Cayman authorities made a "dispositive response to each of the items listed in the government's official request," there is no "final action" that would end the tolling period under the MLAT statute.