Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, VINCENZA RABENN Assistant United States Attorney, Fresno, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
ERIN SNIDER, Counsel for Defendant EDUARDO SANCHEZ MENDOZA.
STIPULATION TO EXCLUDE TIME UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
GARY S. AUSTIN, Magistrate Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. The defendant made his initial appearance on April 27, 2015. During that appearance the court scheduled a status conference for May 4, 2015 at 1:00 p.m.
2. The following day, on April 28, 2015, the court held a detention hearing as to the defendant. During that hearing the government provided defense counsel with initial discovery materials. Based on the discovery provided, the parties agreed to waive time and have the status conference set out to June 1, 2015 at 1:00 p.m. for review of discovery materials and other defense preparation. However, the court did not issue an explicit order excluding time during this hearing.
3. As such, by this stipulation, the defendant now moves exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act until the status conference currently scheduled for June 1, 2015.
4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has provided initial discovery to defense counsel, which includes reports of investigation, photographs, and other documents.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review discovery and consult with her client.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 28, 2015 to June 1, 2015 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
5. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.