"[W]e decline to impose a procedural requirement that a district [court] . . . must compare and contrast the defendant under consideration with a similar offender who has been sentenced by another federal [court]." Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting United States v. McElderry, 875 F.3d 863, 864 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)). We often vacate and remand based on sentencing disparities when there are "unusual circumstances."
"When a single defendant asserts on appeal that a similarly situated co-conspirator was sentenced differently, and both sentences are within the range of reasonableness, there is no principled basis for an appellate court to say which defendant received the 'appropriate' sentence." United States v. Fry, 792 F.3d 884, 893 (8th Cir. 2015); see United States v. McElderry, 875 F.3d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 2017).
Moreover, "[w]hen the argument is, as in this case, that the district court's sentence created unwarranted disparities with the sentences imposed on . . . unrelated offenders by . . . different judges, there is no principled basis for an appellate court to say which defendant received the 'appropriate' sentence." United States v. McElderry, 875 F.3d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Although sentencing-disparity arguments are properly raised to the district court, ‘we decline to impose a procedural requirement that a district judge ... must compare and contrast the defendant under consideration with a similar offender who has been sentenced by another federal judge.’ " United States v. McElderry, 875 F.3d 863, 864 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). "When the argument is, as in this case, that the district court's sentence created unwarranted disparities with the sentences imposed on ... unrelated offenders by ... different judges, there is no principled basis for an appellate court to say which defendant[s] received the ‘appropriate’ sentence."
Likewise, Hill's reliance on national statistics of sentences imposed by different judges provides an appellate court "no principled basis ... to say which defendants received the appropriate sentence." United States v. McElderry, 875 F.3d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2003, 201 L.Ed.2d 262 (2018). The district court expressly considered the sentences imposed on other conspirators, noted significant ways in which Hill was not similarly situated for sentencing purposes, and granted a substantial downward variance from the advisory guidelines range.
Thus, McElderry’s reliance on § 3553(a)(6) on appeal is misplaced.United States v. McElderry, 875 F.3d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 2017), quoting United States v. Fry, 792 F.3d 884, 893 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2003, 201 L.Ed.2d 262 (2018).Heim is essentially asking this court to compel the district court to disagree with a guidelines provision as a matter of sentencing policy because other sentencing judges have done so.
When different judges arrive at different reasonable sentences for similar offenders, there is no principled basis for an appellate court to say that only one of the sentences is appropriate. See United States v. McElderry , 875 F.3d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). In this case, the district court noted Reif’s youth and acknowledged the hardship of addiction during adolescence, but reasonably concluded that other factors such as the seriousness of the offense and the need for deterrence warranted a longer sentence than what Reif proposed.
"When the argument is, as in this case, that the district court’s sentence created unwarranted disparities with the sentences imposed on ... unrelated offenders by ... different judges, there is no principled basis for an appellate court to say which defendant[s] received the ‘appropriate’ sentence." United States v. McElderry, 875 F.3d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 2017), quoting United States v. Fry, 792 F.3d 884, 893 (8th Cir. 2015). Here, the district court’s justifications for imposing a 540-month sentence "rest on precisely the kind of defendant-specific determinations that are within the special competence of sentencing courts."
Thus, Harvey’s reliance on § 3553(a)(6) to establish an abuse of discretion based on sentencing discrepancies between district judges "is misplaced." United States v. McElderry, 875 F.3d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-8348, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 2003, ––– L.E.2d ––––, 2018 WL 1640066 (U.S. May 14, 2018). Harvey’s request to subpoena numerous PSRs in Probation Office files is contrary to the "longstanding judicial view that confidentiality should be maintained."