Opinion
18-4835
06-26-2023
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARLAND MAYNOR, Defendant-Appellant.
Brent Evan Newton, Gaithersburg, Maryland, for Appellant. Erek L. Barron, United States Attorney, Christina A. Hoffman, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED
Submitted: September 30, 2022
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, Senior District Judge. (1:17-cr-00280-RDB-1)
ON BRIEF:
Brent Evan Newton, Gaithersburg, Maryland, for Appellant.
Erek L. Barron, United States Attorney, Christina A. Hoffman, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
ON REHEARING
PER CURIAM
A jury convicted Marland Maynor of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the district court sentenced Maynor under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), to the mandatory minimum term of 180 months' imprisonment. Maynor appealed, challenging the propriety of the ACCA enhancement. We affirmed.
Maynor then petitioned for rehearing, asserting in part that he was entitled to relief under Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191, 2195-97, 2200 (2019) (holding that § 922(g) offense requires proof that defendant knew of his prohibited status). We granted the petition and directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing Rehaif's impact on Maynor's conviction.
Before briefing commenced, the Supreme Court issued Greer v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 2090 (2021), which substantially clarified the Rehaif issue in this case. As a result, Maynor's counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), conceding that Greer forecloses Maynor's Rehaif claim. Maynor disagrees, arguing in a pro se supplemental brief that he can establish Rehaif error. Because we conclude that Maynor cannot establish that the unpreserved Rehaif error affected his substantial rights, we affirm.
"In felon-in-possession cases after Rehaif, the Government must prove not only that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, but also that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm." Greer v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 2090, 2095 (2021). Because Maynor did not challenge the knowledge-of-status element in the district court, plain error review applies. Id. at 2096. For a defendant to prevail under this standard, we must find that "(1) an error was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Comer, 5 F.4th 535, 548 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy the third plain error prong in the Rehaif context, the defendant must "make[] a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon." Greer, 141 S.Ct. at 2100. "When a defendant advances such an argument or representation on appeal, the [appellate] court must determine whether the defendant has carried the burden of showing a 'reasonable probability' that the outcome of the district court proceeding would have been different." Id.
Though previously convicted of several felony offenses, Maynor contends that, at the time he was arrested on the instant felon-in-possession charge, he believed he was no longer a felon because he had fully served his prior sentences. And there is a modicum of support for this claim: during his arrest, Maynor told a police officer that he was permitted to carry a firearm since he was not on probation or parole. According to Maynor, this statement demonstrates that he believed-albeit mistakenly-that he was not a felon.
But even assuming that Maynor's statement is sufficient to satisfy his initial burden under Greer, we discern no reasonable probability that the outcome of Maynor's trial would have been different. First, Maynor admitted at trial that he is not authorized to carry a weapon. Further, he disavowed his claim that he thought he could possess a weapon simply because he was not on probation or parole. This testimony clearly undercuts the statement Maynor made at his arrest. Moreover, Maynor has a long and serious criminal history, including a conviction for attempted first degree murder, for which he received a 10-year prison sentence. In our view, Maynor's many prior felony convictions, coupled with his trial testimony, make it highly unlikely that Maynor could have convinced a jury that he was ignorant of his felony status. See Greer, 141 S.Ct. at 2097 ("Felony status is simply not the kind of thing that one forgets." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court's judgment.[*] This court requires that counsel inform Maynor, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Maynor requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Maynor.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
[*] Rehaif does not bear on the ACCA issue that initially prompted this appeal; accordingly, we affirm the application of the ACCA enhancement for the reasons set forth in our prior opinion. United States v. Maynor, 776 Fed.Appx. 126, 126-27 (4th Cir. 2019), reh'g granted, judgment vacated, 826 Fed.Appx. 287 (4th Cir. 2020).