Opinion
No. CR19-4054-LTS
2020-07-10
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Gabriel MATA-BECERRA, Defendant.
Shawn Stephen Wehde, US Attorney's Office, Sioux City, IA, for Plaintiff.
Shawn Stephen Wehde, US Attorney's Office, Sioux City, IA, for Plaintiff.
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before me on a motion (Doc. No. 25) filed by Gabriel Mata-Becerra to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop that resulted in his arrest. The Government has filed a resistance (Doc. No. 32). I held a hearing on the motion on July 9, 2020, at which the Government presented testimony from Wyoming State Trooper Joseph Dellos and video evidence from the dash-cam in Dellos' patrol car.
By agreement of the parties, Dellos testified via telephone.
II. BACKGROUND
On April 21, 2019, Dellos was on routine patrol in Laramie County, Wyoming, parked on the median to observe traffic near mile-marker 368 on Interstate 80, a four-lane divided highway. At some point, he pulled into the eastbound lanes and accelerated to a high rate of speed. Dellos testified that he did so in order to investigate a vehicle that had just traveled past his then-stationary location. He testified that the vehicle at issue was not the same vehicle that he stopped several minutes later, which turned out to be the vehicle Mata-Becerra was operating. However, at the time of the hearing Dellos could not recall what vehicle he had decided to investigate, or why.
While pursuing the target vehicle and driving in the left lane, Dellos came upon a different vehicle, also traveling in the left lane, that was directly behind a commercial semi-truck. He estimated that there were about one to one-and-a-half car-lengths between the car, an Infiniti sedan, and the truck. After slowing down and observing the situation for several seconds, Dellos concluded that the Infiniti sedan was following the truck too closely, in violation of Wyoming law. Dellos testified that the truck then completed passing a vehicle that was in the right lane and started to move into the right lane in front of that vehicle. He explained that the truck's movement gave him a better line of sight concerning the respective positions of the Infiniti sedan and the truck and confirmed his belief that the Infiniti sedan had been following far too closely. As such, he activated his patrol car's lights to initiate a traffic stop of the Infiniti sedan. The driver, who turned out to be Mata-Becerra, promptly complied by moving into the right lane, in front of the semi-truck, and then pulling over and stopping on the right-side shoulder.
During the stop, Dellos informed Mata-Becerra that he had been stopped for following too closely and asked for his driver's license and registration. After further discussion, Dellos asked Mata-Becerra to consent to a search of the vehicle and its contents. Mata-Becerra gave his verbal consent. The search revealed four plastic bags filled with what appeared to be methamphetamine. Dellos placed Mata-Becerra under arrest, charging him with violations of Wyoming's controlled substance laws and driving with a suspended license. Dellos issued a warning, but not a citation, for following too closely in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-210(a).
Mata-Becerra challenges only the traffic stop, not the validity of the consent.
On August 21, 2019, a Grand Jury in this district returned an indictment charging Mata-Becerra with conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. Doc. No. 1. A jury trial is scheduled to begin on July 28, 2020.
III. DISCUSSION
Mata-Becerra argues that the drugs discovered during Dellos' search should be suppressed because the preceding traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He contends that his traffic stop was an illegal seizure because Dellos did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop his vehicle. Specifically, he contends that Dellos did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that he violated Wyoming's law prohibiting following another vehicle too closely.
"The Fourth Amendment guarantees the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ " Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 809, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). A traffic stop constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, id. at 809–10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, but it is a reasonable seizure "if it is supported by either probable cause or an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred." United States v. Washington , 455 F.3d 824, 826 (8th Cir. 2006). "Any traffic violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic stop." United States v. Adler , 590 F.3d 581, 583 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Wright , 512 F.3d 466, 471 (8th Cir. 2008) ). Thus, "as long as an officer objectively has a reasonable basis for believing that the driver has breached a traffic law," he or she may conduct a traffic stop. United States v. Gordon , 741 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Coney , 456 F.3d 850, 856 (8th Cir. 2006) ).
Mata-Becerra argues that Dellos' subjective observations of the distance between his vehicle and the semi-truck were insufficient to raise reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that he violated Wyoming law. He contends that Dellos' view of the distance could have been greatly distorted because he saw the two vehicles while approaching very quickly and from behind, rather than from the side. He also argues that Dellos' observations lacked objective evidence that has supported reasonable suspicion and probable cause in similar cases, such as United States v. Perez , 200 F.3d 576 (8th Cir. 1999), in which an officer used a stopwatch to time how closely a defendant's vehicle followed another. Although I agree with Mata-Becerra that estimating the distance between two vehicles is more difficult when the observer is behind the vehicles, rather than viewing them from a perpendicular perspective, this fact does not automatically discredit Dellos' observations. Dellos' testimony, which is supported by the video evidence, indicates that he was close enough to the two vehicles to observe the distance between them, even from behind. Dellos also explained that as the semi-truck moved into the right lane, his view of the relative positions of the two vehicles was enhanced, confirming his observation that Mata-Becerra's vehicle had been following too closely. This, too, is supported by the video evidence. I find Dellos to be a credible witness and accept his estimate that Mata-Becerra was following the semi-truck at a distance of one to one-and-a-half car lengths.
While I was not able to visibly observe Dellos' demeanor, as he testified via telephone, I note that he answered questions directly, both on direct and cross examination, and readily agreed with defense counsel about certain factual matters that were helpful to Mata-Becerra. Dellos was neither evasive nor argumentative. Nothing about the tone, manner or substance of Dellos' testimony gave rise to any reason to doubt his credibility.
This finding raises the issue of whether Dellos' observation of the situation formed a reasonable basis for him to believe that Mata-Becerra violated the Wyoming statute in question, which states:
The driver of a vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.
Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-210(a). If so, then the traffic stop was a reasonable seizure. Mata-Becerra contends that evidence of an objective, more-definite nature was necessary, such as the stopwatch discussed in Perez. In that case, the Eighth Circuit noted that a Nebraska State Trooper had used a stopwatch to measure the separation between two vehicles, calculating an interval of 1.18 seconds. 200 F.3d at 578. The court concluded that this evidence established probable cause to stop the defendant for following too closely. Id. at 579. However, the court did not state that objective, stopwatch-based evidence is required to establish probable cause in a following-too-closely situation, only that it was sufficient in that case. Id. at 579–80. Mata-Becerra cites no authority, and I have located none, holding that a traffic stop for following too closely is invalid if a stopwatch is not utilized.
While Wyoming law is not binding when it comes to applying federal constitutional standards, I find that the relevant decisions of the Wyoming Supreme Court are instructive in this situation. In Robinson v. State , 454 P.3d 149 (Wyo. 2019), the Court stated that "there are various ways a law enforcement officer can develop reasonable suspicion that a vehicle is following too closely." Id. at 158. The Court rejected the defendant's challenge to the "two-second rule" while also citing, with approval, previous decisions finding that an officer's observation of the number of car lengths between two vehicles was sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion supporting a traffic stop. Id. (citing Phelps v. State , 278 P.3d 1148 (Wyo. 2012), and Yoeuth v. State , 206 P.3d 1278 (Wyo. 2009) ). Thus, as Dellos observed the situation on a Wyoming highway, he was entitled under Wyoming law to use his own observations of the two vehicles to determine whether Mata-Becerra was following the semi-truck more closely than was reasonable and prudent.
The Court explained that "[t]he two-second rule generally requires that a driver stay far enough behind the vehicle he is following so at least two seconds elapse between the times the vehicles pass a fixed point." Id. at 157. The Eighth Circuit has described the rule in a similar manner. See, e.g., United States v. Andrews , 454 F.3d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 2006).
I find no binding authority that would change this analysis under federal constitutional law. In Andrews , the Eighth Circuit remanded a district court's order suppressing evidence in a following-too-closely case, stating:
Trailing a vehicle by only 30 feet while going 74 miles per hour is quite obviously not reasonable and prudent. We also believe that an interval of 168 feet would have justified the police stop that occurred here ...
454 F.3d at 921 . Here, Dellos noted that the speed limit at the location of the incident was 80 miles per hour and acknowledged that Mata-Becerra was driving below that speed, at roughly 70 miles per hour, while travelling behind the semi-truck. At 70 miles per hour, a vehicle is traveling about 102 feet per second. Based on Dellos' observation that Mata-Becerra was within one to one-in-a-half car lengths of the semi-truck, the interval between the two vehicles could have been no more than 40 feet. At interstate speeds, a law enforcement officer's observation of this short of an interval creates a reasonable basis to believe that the driver of the second vehicle is following more closely than is reasonable and prudent.
70 miles equals 369,600 feet. Travelling at 369,600 feet per hour equates to 6160 feet per minute, or 102.67 feet per second.
Even using 20 feet as an estimate of a car length, which is generous, one-and-a-half car lengths would be just 30 feet.
In short, the video evidence and Dellos' testimony, which I find to be credible, establish that there were specific and articulable facts that "based on ‘the totality of the circumstances, [and] in light of the officer's experience,’ " gave rise to probable cause to believe that Mata-Becerra committed a traffic violation. See United States v. Polite , 910 F.3d 384, 387 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Stigler , 574 F.3d 1008, 1010 (8th Cir. 2009) ). Therefore, the traffic stop was a reasonable seizure and Mata-Becerra's motion to suppress must be denied.
Mata-Becerra's counsel raised several issues that could have served as defenses if Mata-Becerra had been prosecuted for violating Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-210(a). For example, Dellos agreed that some consideration should be made if one driver pulls into the other driver's lane, directly in front of the other driver. Here, however, the issue is not whether the State of Wyoming could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mata-Becerra violated Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-210(a). The issue is whether Dellos had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred. He did.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, defendant Gabriel Mata-Becerra's motion (Doc. No. 25) to suppress is denied .