Opinion
21-1402
06-06-2022
United States of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Terrance Lamont Mason, Jr. Defendant-Appellant
Unpublished
Submitted: January 11, 2022
Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa
Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM
In December 2019, Terrance Lamont Mason, Jr., pled guilty to one count of unlawfully possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). At sentencing, Mason argued his past conviction for possessing marijuana in violation of Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(d) did not qualify as a controlled substance offense under United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("Guidelines" or "U.S.S.G.") § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The district court disagreed and concluded Mason's conviction did qualify, thus establishing a base offense level of 20. The district court later sentenced Mason within the advisory Guidelines range. Mason appeals, arguing the district court wrongly concluded his prior conviction was a controlled-substance offense. After de novo review, see United States v. Williams, 926 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir. 2019), we conclude Mason's conviction under Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(d) is a controlled substance offense for purposes of § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, then United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa, now Chief Judge.
The Guidelines establish a base offense level at 20 for 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) convictions if "the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of . . . a controlled substance offense[.]" U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The Guidelines define a "controlled substance offense" as "an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the . . . possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).
Mason first argues his past marijuana-possession conviction does not qualify as a "controlled substance offense" because, at the time of his conviction, Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(d) defined marijuana to include hemp, which is not a Schedule I "controlled substance" for purposes of federal law. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) and (16)(B)(i), see also 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(10) . Alternatively, Mason argues that because Iowa Code § 124.401(1) includes inchoate offenses and § 4B1.2(b) does not, the Iowa statute is similarly overbroad. Precedent forecloses both arguments.
Controlled substance offenses under § 4B1.2(b) "include state-law offenses related to controlled or counterfeit substances punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." United States v. Henderson, 11 F.4th 713, 718 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642, 654 (7th Cir. 2020)). Iowa Code § 124.401(a)(1) meets these requirements. See United States v. Scott, No. 21-3371, 2022 WL 1233083, at *1 (8th Cir. Apr. 27, 2022) (holding that a conviction under Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(d) was a controlled substance offense for purposes of § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and holding Henderson foreclosed the same hemp-based argument). Contrary to Mason's claim, "[t]here is no requirement that the particular substance underlying the state offense is also controlled under a distinct federal law." Henderson, 11 F.4th at 718. Mason's alternative argument-that Iowa Code § 124.401(1) is overbroad because it includes inchoate offenses and § 4B1.2(b) does not include them-is also foreclosed by precedent. See United States v. Brown, 1 F.4th 617, 620-621 (8th Cir. 2021) (holding Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(d) is a controlled substance offense and rejecting the defendant's aiding and abetting argument).
We therefore conclude the district court did not err by increasing Mason's Guidelines base offense level pursuant to § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.