In a multi-defendant case, “[e]xclusions of time attributable to one defendant apply to all codefendants.” United States v. Mallett, 751 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Any motion by a codefendant stops the STA clock for all of the codefendants.
Cisneros need not file a motion for a continuance or formally join Espinosa's motion, because "[e]xclusions of time attributable to one defendant apply to all codefendants." United States v. Mallett, 751 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). The order granting the continuance set July 21, 2015, as the tentative trial date, meaning if no more continuances were granted and trial did not occur on that date, the speedy trial clock would begin running and adding to the non-excluded days. (Docket 42 at p. 2).
Defendant need not file a motion for a continuance or formally join Mr. Harold's motion, because "[e]xclusions of time attributable to one defendant apply to all codefendants." United States v. Mallett, 751 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Prior to the deadline for submitting another continuance motion, Mr. Harold filed a motion toward that end. (Docket 36).
At co-defendant Clemons' request, an order was entered on April 4, 2014 setting Yolanda Clemons's change of plea hearing was for April 11, 2014. (Filing No. 90). A request to enter a change of plea is a "motion" for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act, and the period between the order setting a plea hearing and the date of the hearing is excluded under the Act. U.S. v. Mallett, 751 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, the time from April 4, 2014 through April 11, 2014 is excluded under the Act.
However, motions filed by one defendant in a multidefendant case count as motions filed by all of the defendants, and the reasonable time taken to determine those motions will count as excludable time for all defendants. United States v. Fuller, 942 F.2d 454; see also United States v. Mallett, 751 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “[e]xclusions of time attributable to one defendant apply to all codefendants”)
"To trigger speedy trial analysis, the defendant must allege the interval between accusation and trial has crossed a line dividing ordinary from presumptively prejudicial delay." United States v. Mallett, 751 F.3d 907, 913 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant did not allege his pretrial delay is presumptively prejudicial.
" (Filing No. 113). The time between the request or motion to set a change of plea hearing and the acceptance or rejection of that anticipated plea is excluded in calculating time under the Speedy Trial Act. United States v. Mallett, 751 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2014). And "exclusions of time attributable to one defendant apply to all codefendants."
However, the delay did not stretch far beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim. See United States v. Mallett, 751 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 2014) ("[W]e acknowledge seventeen months is a lengthy delay. But our court, under the Sixth Amendment, has permitted even longer delays."); Cooley, 63 F.4th at 1178 (finding a delay of twenty-nine months to be "lengthy but not extraordinary").
We have held that a delay of one year is presumptively prejudicial. United States v. Jeanetta , 533 F.3d 651, 656 (8th Cir. 2008) ; see also United States v. Mallett , 751 F.3d 907, 913–14 (8th Cir. 2014) ("assum[ing] the nearly seventeen-month delay between [the defendant's] original indictment and trial was presumptively prejudicial"). The government concedes the four-year delay in this case crosses the line from ordinary to presumptively prejudicial.
Unless the testimony is implausible on its face ... we defer to the jury's determination of whether an accomplice is credible." (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Mallett, 751 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir. 2014) (" ‘[W]e do not consider attacks on witnesses’ credibility when we are evaluating an appeal based upon the sufficiency of evidence.’ And ‘[w]e have repeatedly upheld jury verdicts based solely on the testimony of co-conspirators and cooperating witnesses, noting that it is within the province of the jury to make credibility assessments and resolve conflicting testimony.