Opinion
21-20060-JAR
07-27-2023
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. KAABA MAJEED, YUNUS RASSOUL, a.k.a. YUNUS RASSOULL, JAMES STATON, a.k.a. ADAM WITHROP, RANDOLPH RODNEY HADLEY, DANIEL AUBREY JENKINS, DANA PEACH, ETENIA KINARD, a.k.a. ETENIA KINNARD, and JACELYN GREENWELL, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JULIE A. ROBINSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Defendants in this matter filed several motions for pretrial disposition. This Memorandum and Order addresses the motions asserting constitutional challenges to the statute charged in the Indictment, 18 U.S.C. § 1589. Before the Court are Defendant James Staton's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 162); joined by Defendants Kaaba Majeed, Randolph Rodney Hadley, Daniel Aubrey Jenkins, Etenia Kinard, and Jacelyn Greenwell; Defendant Greenwell's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 151); and Defendant Jenkins's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 161). The Government filed a response in opposition to these three motions.The Court heard oral argument on these motions on June 26, 2023. Having fully considered the briefs and the parties' oral arguments, the Court is prepared to rule on the motions to dismiss. As explained more fully below, the Court denies Defendants' motions to dismiss challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1589.
I. Background
On October 20, 2021, the Government filed an eight-count Indictment against Defendants Kaaba Majeed, Yunus Rassoul, James Staton, Randolph Rodney Hadley, Daniel Aubrey Jenkins, Dana Peach, Etenia Kinard, and Jacelyn Greenwell. Defendants Peach and Rassoul are not involved in the motions to dismiss for constitutional challenges addressed by this Memorandum and Order.
The Court includes by reference the factual background included in the Memorandum and Order addressing the motions to dismiss on the basis of the statute of limitations and preindictment delay, the motion for bills of particulars, and the motions to sever. The Indictment charges all Defendants with one count of conspiracy to commit forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1589. Defendants are also charged in the Indictment with substantive violations of the forced labor statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589. The substantive charges include aiding and abetting allegations under 18 U.S.C. § 2.
II. Standards
“An indictment is sufficient if it sets forth the elements of the offense charged, puts the defendant on fair notice of the charges against which he must defend, and enables the defendant to assert a double jeopardy defense.” An indictment may not be challenged based on the strength or weakness of the government's case, but only on whether the allegations, if taken as true, support an indictment. A very narrow exception to the rule against probing the factual underpinnings of an indictment exists when undisputed facts establish that, “as a matter of law, the government is incapable of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The motions to dismiss now before the Court assert facial and as-applied challenges under the First, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments. A facial challenge asserts that “no application of the statute would be constitutional.” In such cases, “a plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by ‘establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,' i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.” An as-applied challenge, on the other hand, acknowledges that a statute can be applied in a constitutional manner in some cases, but asserts that the statute's application to the plaintiff's concrete case is unconstitutional. However, “the line between facial and as-applied relief is a fluid one, and many constitutional challenges may occupy an intermediate position on the spectrum between purely as-applied relief and complete facial invalidation.”
III. Discussion
A. First Amendment Challenges
Staton and Greenwell assert facial challenges to the forced labor statute under the First Amendment. Staton argues that the forced labor statute violates the First Amendment by restricting freedom of speech; both Staton and Greenwell argue that it violates the First Amendment by restricting freedom of association. These First Amendment challenges are based on both overbreadth and vagueness. When there is a facial First Amendment challenge to a statute based on overbreadth, “the challenger must show that it ‘prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.'” When there is a First Amendment facial challenge based on vagueness, the challenger must show that the statute “threatens to chill constitutionally protected conduct.”
At the outset, the Government contends that any facial challenge to the Forced labor statute based on the First Amendment is inappropriate because, as the Seventh Circuit found, “the action criminalized by § 1589 ‘knowingly providing or obtaining the labor or services of a person' is sufficiently removed from anything protected by the First Amendment that [the court] must evaluate it as-applied.” The Government also asserts that any as-applied challenge to the Forced labor statute is premature given the limited record before the Court. As explained above, the Tenth Circuit has held that “[a]s to whether the claim at issue is properly viewed as a facial or as-applied challenge, the label is not what matters. Facial challenges and as-applied challenges can overlap conceptually.” Thus, for the purpose of deciding these motions to dismiss, the Court considers both the facial and as-applied challenges together.
1. Freedom of Speech