Opinion
7:22-CR-12 (WLS-TQL-1)
02-08-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. JAIME LOZANO-VALLES, Defendant.
ORDER
W. LOUIS SANDS, SR. JUDGE
Recently, the Court granted Defendant's Unopposed Motion to Reschedule Change of Plea Hearing (Doc. 62) because of Defense Counsel's upcoming surgery and Defendant's desire to proceed with the hearing with the undersigned Counsel. (Doc. 63).
In doing so, the Court also finds it necessary to exclude the time lost under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 caused by the continuance. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D), (h)(7)(A)-(B).
The relevant provisions of the Speedy Trial Act provide:
(h) The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in computing the time within which the trial of any such offense must commence: (1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to- . . . (7)(A) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this paragraph shall be excludable under this subsection unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. (B) The factors, among others, which a judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph in any case are as follows: (i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice. . . .
(iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the defendant or the Government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
Because of Defense Counsel's upcoming surgery in February and his recovery time thereafter estimated to be for about a minimum of four (4) weeks, as explained by Defense Counsel. (Doc. 62), the Court finds, sua sponte, that the ends of justice will be served by continuing the trial of this matter and finds that such continuance outweighs the best interests of the public and the Defendant in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)-(B).
Accordingly, the trial in the above-styled matter is CONTINUED to the Valdosta Division May 2024 term and its conclusion, or as may otherwise be ordered by the Court. The time lost under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, is EXCLUDED pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) for any delay resulting from continuance of the trial in this case. Furthermore, the time lost under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, is EXCLUDED pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) because the Court has continued the trial in this case after determining that the failure to grant a continuance would likely result in a miscarriage of justice and/or would deny Counsel the reasonable time necessary, in the exercise of due diligence, to effectively prepare for a hearing or a trial in this case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i), (iv).
SO ORDERED.