Opinion
No. CR 10-00823 DLJ
11-02-2011
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. GUSTAVO COLIN LOPEZ, Defendant.
VICKIH. YOUNG, ESQ. Attorney for Gustavo Colin Lopez MELINDA HAAG UNITED STATES ATTORNEY THOMAS COLTHURST Assistant United States Attorney
VICKIH. YOUNG Law Offices of Vicki H. Young
Counsel for Gustavo Colin Lopez
STIPULATION RE CONTINUANCE
OF STATUS DATE; [PROPOSED]
ORDER
It is hereby stipulated between the defendant Gustavo Colin Lopez by and through his attorney of record VICKI H. YOUNG, and the government, through Assistant United States Attorney Thomas Colthurst, that the status date of November 8, 2011, at 9:00 a.m. be continued to November 15, 2011, at 9:00 a.m. The reason for this continuance is that the attorney appointed to render a second opinion on the case has been out on medical leave, and defense counsel needs additional time to make arrangements for the defendant to consult with second counsel by telephone.
Under Title 18 U.S. C. §3161(h)(7)(B)(iv), the continuance is necessary to allow the attorneys for the government and the defense the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation taking into the account the exercise of due diligence. Since the defendant needs additional time to make arrangements to speak with second counsel, the time period from November 8, 2011, through
November 15, 2011, should be excluded.
It is so stipulated.
Respectfully submitted,
VICKIH. YOUNG, ESQ.
Attorney for Gustavo Colin Lopez
MELINDA HAAG
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
THOMAS COLTHURST
Assistant United States Attorney
PROPOSED ORDER
GOOD CAUSE BEING SHOWN, the status date appearance set for November 8, 2011, is continued to November 15, 2011. This Court finds that the period from November 8, 2011, through and including November 15, 2011, is excludable time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §3161(h). The basis for such exclusion is that defense counsel need additional time to make arrangements for the defendant to speak with second counsel by telephone. Therefore the ends of justice served by such a continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a Speedy Trial within the meaning of Title 18 U.S.C §3161(h)(7)(A).
As required by 18 U.S.C §3161 (h)(7)(A), this Court finds that the reason that the ends of justice outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial are the denial of the continuance would unreasonably deny both the attorney for the government and the attorney for the defendant reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).
D. LOWELL JENSEN
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE