Brock urges a different conclusion, directing our attention to United States v. Liscano , No. 02 CR 719-16, 2021 WL 4413320 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2021). In Liscano , the district court concluded that the government's "admission that the [defendant's] offenses no longer support a life sentence" because of subsequent developments in the law could constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for purposes of § 3582(c)(1)(A) sentencing relief.
Id. at 465-66 (quoting United States v. Liscano, No. 02 CR 719-16, 2021 WL 4413320, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2021)). Instead, “[j]udicial decisions, whether characterized as announcing new law or otherwise, cannot alone amount to an extraordinary and compelling circumstance allowing for a sentence reduction.”
Several federal courts, including this one, have considered sentencing disparities both within and outside of the stash house context when granting compassionate release. See United States v. White, 2021 WL 3418854, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2021); United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 286 (4th Cir. 2020) (affirming sentence reduction based on length of defendants' sentences and the disparity between their sentences and those that Congress deemed appropriate in the First Step Act); United States v. Liscano, 2021 WL 4413320, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2021) (Durkin, J.) (“Adding to this injustice is that Liscano was among the least culpable members of the eleven-person conspiracy, and yet he was the only member to receive an above-guideline sentence and is only one of two still incarcerated to this day”); United States v. Conley, 2021 WL 825669, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2021) (finding, inter alia, “compassionate release was warranted based on the injustice and unfairness of a prosecution and resultant sentence” in a false stash hose conviction). Judge Kennelly, in his recent decision Logan, determined that continued imprisonment based on now-disavowed stash house stings constituted on its own an extraordinary and compelling reason under section 3582(c)(1)(A), sentencing disparities aside.
This final point distinguishes Defendant's case from the defendant in United States v. Liscano, No. 02-CR-719-16, 2021 WL 4413320, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2021). See ECF No. 1625-1 at 24 (arguing similarity between Defendant's case and Liscano).
Defendant's case law does little more. The decision in United States v. Liscano, 02 CR 719-16, 2021 WL 4413320 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2021) has been expressly disavowed by the Seventh Circuit. See United States v. Bock, No. 22-1148, --- F.4th ---, at *6 (7th Cir. 2022).
Defendant attempts to avoid this conclusion by relying on Judge Durkin's decision in United States v. Liscano, 02 CR 719-16, 2021 WL 4413320 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2021). There, Liscano received the same life sentence as Defendant under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) because of two previous felony drug convictions.
And the Court has found several examples where other district courts have been persuaded by the argument Brown is making here. See United States v. Spates, No. 10-30082, 2021 WL 1828110, at *3 (C.D. Ill. May 7, 2021) (applying Ruth and reducing defendant's term from 240 months to 188 months); United States v. Millbrook, No. 06-40033, 2020 WL 7260929, at *3 (C.D. Ill.Dec. 10, 2020) (reducing defendant's sentence under the First Step Act because his prior Illinois drug convictions no longer served to enhance his sentence); United States v. Harris, No. 99-cr-30083, R.123 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2021) (reducing defendant's sentence because, under Ruth, defendant would face a 240-month statutory maximum instead of the 360-month term he had received); United States v. Liscano, No. 02 CR 719-16, 2021 WL 4413320, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2021) (applying the First Step Act and Ruth in finding defendant “whose predicate offenses included possessing a baggy of cocaine at the age of 18 and mere residue a few years later” did not deserve “the same life sentence as Joaquin ‘El Chapo' Guzman”). Nevertheless, extraordinary and compelling circumstances are lacking in this case.
And while it is true that courts have, on occasion, granted compassionate release to defendants whose sentences would have been drastically different under current law, the decisions in those cases make clear that changes in the legal landscape were among numerous other considerations that collectively led the courts to conclude that the defendants’ circumstances were indeed extraordinary. See, e.g.,United States v. Liscano , No. 02 CR 719-16, 2021 WL 4413320, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2021) (granting motion by defendant serving a life sentence the government conceded was "erroneously imposed" pursuant to enhancements it admitted it would not seek today); United States v. Conley , 2021 WL 825669, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2021) (granting motion by defendant who was prosecuted and convicted as the result of a "tawdry" sting operation) (quotingUnited States v. Lewis , 641 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 2011) ); United States v. White , 2021 WL 3418854, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2021) (same); United States v. Rollins , ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2021 WL 1020998, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2021) ("[t]he sheer rarity of Rollins's astonishingly long 106½-year sentence combined with his rehabilitation" qualified as extraordinary and compelling circumstances). Carr's circumstances are far less remarkable and do not warrant departure from the general rule that § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) does not "serve as the authority for relief from mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by Congress," Thacker , 4