United States v. Lewis

41 Citing cases

  1. Commonwealth v. Doa

    381 Pa. Super. 181 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)   Cited 10 times
    Discussing evidentiary law pre-codification of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence and finding that a witness need not be able to identify the defendant at trial for prior identification to be substantively admitted via the testimony of a police officer

    Other jurisdictions have considered the admissibility of prior identifications generally and have concluded that they are admissible as substantive evidence over a hearsay objection in a wide variety of circumstances. See United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. den. 435 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 1618, 56 L.Ed.2d 66; State v. Kevil, 111 Ariz. 240, 527 P.2d 285 (1974); People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d 621, 7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865 (1960); People v. Trujillo, 189 Colo. 206, 539 P.2d 1234 (1975); State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86 (1986); State v. Freber, 366 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1978); Barriner v.State, 161 Ga. App. 59, 289 S.E.2d 289 (1982); State v. Naeole, 62 Haw. 563, 617 P.2d 820 (1980); People v. Miller, 27 Ill. App.3d 667, 327 N.E.2d 8 (1975); Johnson v. State, 237 Md. 283, 206 A.2d 138 (1965); Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 469 N.E.2d 483 (1984); State v. Harris, 477 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1972); State v. Adail, 555 S.W.2d 672 (Mo.App. 1977); Statev. Draughn, 121 N.J.Super. 64, 296 A.2d 79 (1972) aff'd 61 N.J. 515, 296 A.2d 68; People v. Nival, 33 N.Y.2d 391, 353 N.Y.S.2d 409, 308 N.E.2d 883 (1974); State v. Blackwell, 16 Ohio App.3d 100, 474 N.E.2d 671 (1984); Washington v. State, 568 P.2d 301 (Okla.Cr. 1977); State v. Fennell, 7 Or.

  2. Samuels v. Mann

    13 F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 1993)   Cited 55 times
    Holding that a jury could credit a witness's earlier identification of the defendant over the witness's in-court identification of a different person

    While it is true that at the trial Tarver identified Robert Williams rather than Samuels as the man who held a gun to him, we do not believe that this destroyed the credibility of Tarver's lineup identification. In-court identifications inherently lack credibility, see United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 1251 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 1618, 56 L.Ed.2d 66 (1978). Contemporaneous identifications, on the other hand, generally are given much more credence; indeed, such identifications are considered reliable enough to justify their exclusion from the hearsay rule, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(C), even when the witness is unable to repeat the identification in the courtroom, see Lewis, 565 F.2d at 1252.

  3. U.S. v. Kaquatosh

    242 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D. Wis. 2003)   Cited 15 times
    Expressing concern that Lopez could be construed to "allow admission of any statement naming the defendant (which as a practical matter will be many if not most relevant statements in criminal cases)"

    Therefore, corroboration with the earlier identification should be allowed. See Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 801.13 at 122 (2001) (citing United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 1251 (2d Cir. 1977)); see also United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 562 (1988) ("The premise for Rule 801(d)(1)(C) was that, given adequate safeguards against suggestiveness, out-of-court identifications were generally preferable to courtroom identifications."); United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 996 (2d Cir. 1977) ("The purpose of the rule was to permit the introduction of identifications made by a witness when memory was fresher and there had been less opportunity for influence to be exerted upon him.").

  4. People v. Malone

    445 Mich. 369 (Mich. 1994)   Cited 37 times
    Holding that third-party testimony about a witness' prior statement of identification is not hearsay under MRE 801(d)(C)

    Id. at 996, n 23. See also United States v Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 1251-1252 (CA 2, 1977), cert den 435 U.S. 973 (1978). United States v Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1456 (CA 9, 1985), cert den 474 U.S. 830 (1985).

  5. United States v. Owens

    484 U.S. 554 (1988)   Cited 1,057 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the opportunity for cross-examination is not denied, for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, when a witness testifies about a current belief but cannot remember the reasons for that belief

    789 F.2d 750 (1986). We granted certiorari, 479 U.S. 1084 (1987), to resolve the conflict with other Circuits on the significance of a hearsay declarant's memory loss both with respect to the Confrontation Clause, see, e. g., United States ex rel. Thomas v. Cuyler, 548 F.2d 460, 462-463 (CA3 1977), and with respect to Rule 802, see, e. g., United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 1252 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973 (1978). This case has been argued, both here and below, as though Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) were the basis of the challenge.

  6. Foxworth v. St. Amand

    570 F.3d 414 (1st Cir. 2009)   Cited 94 times
    Holding that codefendant's redacted statement both violated Bruton and constituted Brecht error when other incriminating evidence was scarce and thus it was probable that redacted statement had substantial and injurious influence on outcome

    This paradigm makes good sense: it is designed to facilitate the introduction of eyewitness identifications made "when memory was fresher and there had been less opportunity for influence to be exerted upon [the witness]." United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 1251 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 996 (2d Cir. 1977)). The petitioner offers a closely related argument.

  7. U.S. v. Elfgeeh

    515 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2008)   Cited 86 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a forfeiture was not excessive when the record was silent with respect to the fourth factor but the "other three reveal that the . . . forfeiture . . . is not disproportional"

    Where "[t]here was little, if any, evidence from which a jury could infer that the statement was involuntary," § 3501(a) "does not require that the jury be specifically charged on voluntariness." United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 1253 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 1618, 56 L.Ed.2d 66 (1978). Here, there is no suggestion that the court excluded any relevant evidence as to voluntariness, but little such evidence was presented.

  8. U.S. v. Salameh

    152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998)   Cited 805 times
    Holding that photographs were properly admitted to establish relationship among conspirators

    A prior identification is admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C), regardless of whether the witness confirms the identification in-court. See United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 950 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 1251-52 (2d Cir. 1977). A prior identification will be excluded only if the procedure that produced the identification is "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that [the defendant] was denied due process of law."

  9. U.S. v. Simmons

    923 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1991)   Cited 249 times
    Holding that, in heroin possession and distribution case, the fact that the prosecutor's references to the "collapsed veins of junkies" and "swollen arms," were "blunt and to the point" was "not a basis to find them improper"

    A prior identification is generally admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(C) regardless of whether there has been an accurate in-court identification. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 562-63, 108 S.Ct. 838, 844-45, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988); United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 1252 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 1618, 56 L.Ed.2d 66 (1978). Such an identification will be excluded on constitutional grounds only when it is "'so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that [the defendant] was denied due process of law.'"

  10. United States v. McLernon

    746 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1984)   Cited 156 times
    Holding that defendants' right to discovery was satisfied by inspection of master lists and the relevant demographic data about the general pool from which the grand jurors were selected, and thus defendants were not entitled to the names, addresses, and demographics of the individual grand jurors who returned indictments against them

    Credibility was the real issue and it was satisfactorily submitted to the jury. As in the case of United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 1253 (2d Cir. 1977)cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 1618, 56 L.Ed.2d 66 (1978): This was the same court that had earlier decided United States v. Berry, 518 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1975), a case relied upon by the majority.