Opinion
3:02-CR-26-KAC-DCP
07-26-2022
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. CHARLES ALLEN LEQUIRE, Defendant.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
KATHERINE A. CRYTZER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Defendant Charles Allen LeQuire filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) due to his medical conditions, age, post-sentence legal developments, and need to care for his ailing mother [Doc. 53]. Under Standing Order 21-09, the Court appointed counsel to represent him. See Standing Order 21-09. Counsel reviewed Defendant's case and determined that “no additional pleadings will be filed at this time” because “Defendant has filed a well-presented motion” [Doc. 58]. The United States opposes his motion to reduce his sentence [Doc. 61]. Because the relevant factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) do not support a modification, the Court denies Defendant's request to reduce his sentence.
I. Background
On June 3, 2002 in the instant case, Defendant pled guilty to witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) [Doc. 24]. That same day, Defendant also pled guilty to five (5) counts of the Superseding Indictment in case number 3:02-CR-10 in this Court [Doc. 73 in Case Number 3:02-CR-10]. The Superseding Indictment charged Defendant with two (2) counts of armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), and two (2) counts of using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) [Doc. 38 in Case Number 3:02-CR-10]. Defendant committed the two (2) armed robberies while on federal parole for convictions for RICO conspiracy and conspiracy to violate explosives laws [“Presentence Investigation Report” (PSR) ¶¶ 71, 72. The charge in the instant case arose when Defendant sought to “prevent a government witness against him from testifying” at his trial for the charges in the Superseding Indictment by “either kidnapping or murder[ing]” the witness [Id. ¶¶ 14, 16].
The PSR in this case was not docketed, but it is on file with the Court.
The Court sentenced Defendant for both cases at the same time. Defendant had a total offense level of thirty-four (34) with a criminal history category of VI because of his status as a career offender [Id. ¶¶ 59, 77]. Defendant's criminal history includes three (3) assault convictions [Id. ¶¶ 64, 68, 69]. And while incarcerated on his prior federal convictions, he amassed several infractions, including assault, possessing a dangerous weapon, and possessing drugs [Id. ¶ 72]. Defendant's aggregate guideline range was 682 to 747 months' imprisonment [See Id. ¶¶ 60, 98]. On July 12, 2002, the Court sentenced Defendant to 720 months' imprisonment, followed by five (5) years of supervised release [Docs. 31 in Case Number 3:02-CR-26; 81 in Case Number 3:02-CR-10]. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) expects Defendant to complete his term of imprisonment on November 8, 2054. See Inmate Locator, Federal Bureau of Prisons, available at https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (accessed July 26, 2022).
Defendant now moves the Court to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) [Doc. 53]. In support of his request, Defendant, who is fifty-eight (58), argues that his various “chronic and degenerative” health conditions-including, among others, “deteriorating eye sight,” “degenerative disks [sic],” “hypothyroidism,” and “osteoarthritis”-“are best treated outside prison” [Id. at 1-2]. He also argues that he has “taken and passed” “over 30 courses” and that he has an “almost non existant [sic] recidivism rate” because of his age [Id. at 2-3]. Defendant submitted a request for compassionate release to the warden at his BOP facility, and BOP timely denied the request [Docs. 53 at 1; 55 at 3].
The United States opposes Defendant's motion because Defendant “has not shown any sentence reduction would be consistent with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3582(c)(1)(A)” [Doc. 61 at 1]. The United States argues that Defendant has not demonstrated “that his medical conditions have substantially diminished his ability to care for himself or perform activities of daily living” [Id. at 7]. Additionally, the United States asserts the “number and nature of his disciplinary infractions-40 separate incidents in less than 20 years-undermine his claim of recidivism” [Id. at 9]. And the United States asserts that the Section 3553(a) factors weigh against his release, specifically the seriousness of his convictions and the length of time remaining on his sentence [Id. at 10].
II. Discussion
Generally, a district court “does not have the authority to change or modify [a] sentence unless such authority is expressly granted by statute.” United States v. Thompson, 714 F.3d 946, 948 (6th Cir. 2013). 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) provides narrow circumstances under which the Court may reduce an incarcerated individual's sentence. As a threshold matter, the individual must have “fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the [individual's] behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). If that threshold requirement is met, a district court may reduce a sentence where the Court finds that (1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction,” (2) “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,” and (3) the Section 3553(a) factors, to the extent they apply, support a reduction. United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 518 (6th Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted). The “district courts may deny compassionate-release motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and do not need to address the others.” Id. at 519.
Because consideration of the Section 3553(a) factors is dispositive, the Court begins its analysis there. Defendant's conduct in the instant convictions was violent and dangerous. During the first armed robbery, Defendant “carr[ied] a short-barreled shotgun” that he “pointed” at the bank tellers [PSR ¶¶ 6-7]. And during the second armed robbery, Defendant “pointed [a] gun” and “threatened to shoot one of the tellers” [Id. ¶ 10]. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Defendant committed both offenses just two (2) months after his release from federal custody [See Id. ¶¶ 6, 9, 71, 72, 75]. While in jail before his trial for the armed robberies, Defendant asked an individual to “either kidnap[] or murder[]” a government witness who intended to testify against him [Id. ¶¶ 14, 16]. Defendant still has approximately 387 months to serve on his sentence [See Docs. 31 in Case Number 3:02-CR-26; 81 in Case Number 3:02-CR-10]. See Inmate Locator, supra. Any sentence reduction at this time would be inconsistent with the seriousness of these offenses and need to specifically deter Defendant from criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2).
Here, Defendant has satisfied the threshold exhaustion requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) [See Doc. 55 at 1, 3].
And Defendant's extensive history of criminal activity further underscores the grave threat that he poses to the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C). By age twenty eight (28), he had been convicted of RICO conspiracy for his involvement in an enterprise that “smuggl[ed] large quantities of cocaine and marijuana into the United States” and conspiracy to violate explosives laws for his involvement in “plans to bomb a nuclear power plant, an east coast airport, a dam, a United States Naval vessel and the electrical towers” [PSR ¶¶ 71, 72]. As a result of his predicate felonies, he has been classified as a career offender [Id. ¶ 57]. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Even while incarcerated, Defendant has incurred more than forty (40) disciplinary sanctions, furthering underscoring both his complete disrespect for the law and that a continued term of imprisonment is needed to deter him [See Doc. 61-2]. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B). The history and characteristics of Defendant preclude a sentence reduction, and the public still requires protection from any potential further crimes of Defendant, regardless of his age. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C).
Having considered all of the Section 3553(a) factors, a modification of Defendant's sentence is not appropriate. Because the Section 3553(a) factors do not support a modification, the Court need not specifically address the other prerequisites listed in Section 3582(c)(1)(A). See Elias, 984 F.3d at 519. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's “Request for (3582) Compassionate Release” [Doc. 53].
IT IS SO ORDERED.