Opinion
20-10235
10-25-2022
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER R. LAWRENCE, Defendant-Appellant.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted October 21, 2022 [**] San Francisco, California
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California William B. Shubb, Senior District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 2:17-cr-00228-WBS
Before: S.R. THOMAS and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and MCSHANE, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Christopher R. Lawrence appeals his 168-month sentence for sex trafficking of a child under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2) and distribution of methamphetamine to a person under 21 years of age, under 21 U.S.C. § 859(a). Prior to trial, Lawrence offered an open plea to Count I of the original indictment, charging a single count of sex trafficking. The district court rejected Lawrence's plea because it did not contain an admission to the elements of force or coercion. At trial, the jury was deadlocked as to this count and it was ultimately dismissed. Instead, Lawrence was convicted on Counts II and III of a superseding indictment for crimes relating to a separate victim. We affirm the district court's sentence.
We review factual determinations of acceptance of responsibility for clear error. United States v. Luong, 965 F.3d 973, 990 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. McKinney, 15 F.3d 849, 852 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994)). We review de novo claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Heishman v. Ayers, 621 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2010). We review a district court's sentencing decision under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-51 (2007).
First, Lawrence claims that the district court erred by denying him a sentence reduction under section 3E1.1's "rare situation" exception. Section 3E1.1(a) provides for a two-point offense level reduction if a defendant "clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense." U.S. Sent'g Guidelines Manual section 3E1.1(a) (U.S. Sent'g Comm'n 2021). The Application Notes in § 3E1.1, provide that in "rare situations" a defendant who is convicted at trial may nevertheless "clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct." U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2. However, a defendant who contests factual guilt at trial will be eligible for the sentence adjustment only if he shows sincere remorse. United States v. Garrido, 596 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting McKinney, 15 F.3d at 853).
Lawrence did not clearly demonstrate remorse or acceptance of responsibility for his crimes. The crime that Lawrence attempted to plead guilty to (Count I) was dismissed at trial and was related to a separate victim. At no point before or during trial did Lawrence show remorse for his conduct relating to Counts II and III. And while Lawrence stated at sentencing that he "was not proud" of what he had done, he did not specifically address the conduct or victim underlying Counts II and III and he at times disclaimed responsibility by claiming he "was in a fog" and "not fully aware." The sentencing judge "is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility . . . [and] is entitled to great deference on review." U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.5. After examining Lawrence's behavior throughout the disposition of his case, the court decided that Lawrence had not accepted responsibility and properly declined to apply the sentencing adjustment.
Second, Lawrence argues that his trial counsel's decision not to request a section 3E1.1 adjustment at sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are "generally inappropriate on direct appeal." United States v. McKenna, 327 F.3d 830, 845 (9th Cir. 2003). Such claims may only be heard on direct appeal "(1) when the record . . . is sufficiently developed to permit review and determination of the issue, or (2) when the legal representation is so inadequate that it obviously denies a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Id. (quoting United States v. Ross, 206 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2000)). Because neither situation applies in this case, this court declines to review Lawrence's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Finally, Lawrence claims that the district court abused its discretion by failing to credit, or even acknowledge Lawrence's attempted open plea at sentencing. "[A] correctly calculated Guidelines sentence will normally not be found unreasonable on appeal." United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Here, the district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range and properly considered Lawrence's allocution, his defense counsel's arguments, and the relevant § 3553(a) factors before sentencing Lawrence to 168 months, which was within the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range. We find no abuse of discretion with the district court's decision.
AFFIRMED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
The Honorable Michael J. McShane, United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.