Opinion
No. 2:17-cr-00053-JAM
05-29-2020
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT LAUTENSLAGER, Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE
Robert Lautenslager ("Defendant"), a prisoner serving his sentence at the United States Penitentiary, Atwater ("USP Atwater"), a Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") facility located in Merced County, California, moves for reduction of his term of imprisonment under the federal compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Mot., ECF No. 269. The Government filed an opposition, ECF No. 272, to which Defendant replied, ECF No. 276. After consideration of the parties' briefing on the motion and relevant legal authority, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence. /// ///
I. BACKGROUND
On April 3, 2018, Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). See Change of Plea, ECF No. 111. On November 19, 2019, Defendant was sentenced to one year and one day of imprisonment. See Judgment, ECF No. 241. Defendant began his period of incarceration on January 21, 2020. BOP Public Information of Inmate Data, Ex. 1 to Opp'n at 2, ECF No. 272-1. His projected release date is November 27, 2020. Id. at 3.
As a result of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) global pandemic, on April 7, 2020, Defendant sent a request for home confinement to the USP Atwater Camp Administrator over the Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System ("TRULINCS"). TRULINCS Request, Ex. A to Mot., ECF No. 269-1. Defendant was informed he should instead lodge this request with his Unit Team. Id. Defendant then filed a request for home confinement with his case manager based on the Attorney General's March 26, 2020, and April 3, 2020, directives to the BOP, and pursuant to § 12003(b)(2) of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security ("CARES") Act. Inmate Request to Staff, Ex. 2 to Opp'n, ECF No. 272-1. Defendant's case manager responded to his request on May 14, 2020. Response to Inmate Request to Staff, Ex. 3 to Opp'n, ECF No. 272-1. The response confirms receipt of Defendant's request and informs Defendant that it has been taken into consideration. Id. On May 1, 2020, and May 12, 2020, Defendant's counsel submitted letters to the Warden and Executive Assistant requesting home confinement pursuant to the CARES Act. See Counsel Follow-Up Requests, Ex. B to Mot., ECF No. 269-2.
Defendant now requests this Court reduce his sentence and release him in advance of his projected release date. Mot. at 7. Defendant contends he is at risk of contracting, and experiencing serious complications from, COVID-19 if he remains at USP Atwater because he suffers from high blood pressure, sinus infections, and panic attacks. Id. at 17.
II. OPINION
A. Legal Standard
Generally, a court may "not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824-25 (2010). However, the First Step Act (FSA) modified 18 U.S.C. Section 3582 to grant federal courts such authority under certain exceptions. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Before requesting a modification with the court, a defendant must submit a request for release with the BOP and subsequently exhaust the available administrative remedies. Id. A defendant exhausts the administrative remedies by either (1) administratively appealing an adverse result or (2) waiting for thirty (30) days to pass. Id. Only then may a defendant, or the Director of the BOP, file a motion for modification. Id.
The court can modify the term of imprisonment after considering any relevant factors set forth in Section 3553(a), and if it finds, in relevant part, that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Sentencing Commission defines "extraordinary and compelling reasons" to include reasons related to (a) the medical condition of the defendant, (b) the age of the defendant, (c) certain family circumstances, and (d) other specific reasons. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, Application Note 1. The defendant bears the initial burden to put forward evidence that establishes an entitlement to a sentence reduction. United States v. Sprague, 135 F.3d 1301, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1998).
B. Exhaustion Requirement
As a threshold matter, a defendant must generally exhaust his administrative remedies before a court can address the merits of a motion for compassionate release. See United States v. Kesoyan, Case No. 15-CR-00236, WL 2039028 at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2020). Defendant argues he has met the exhaustion requirement because more than thirty days have passed since he sent his request to his case manager. Mot. at 9. However, the Government argues Defendant has failed to meet the exhaustion requirement because his requests only ask that he be permitted to spend the remainder of his sentence in home confinement. Opp'n at 3-4. It does not seek termination or reduction of Defendant's sentence. Id. The Government contends that the request therefore did not trigger the administrative remedies exhaustion period. Id. The Court agrees.
Over TRULINCS, Defendant "formally request[ed] to be immediately considered for early home confinement." Ex. A to Mot. Similarly, Defendant's request to his case manager asks that he be "considered/evaluated/re-evaluated for early and immediate Home Confinement." Ex. 2 to Opp'n. Meanwhile, Defendant's counsel, in her follow-up requests, asks that Defendant "be released to home confinement." Ex. B. to Mot. In response, Defendant's case manager references a request for "review for Home Confinement" and informs him that his "request was received and has been taken into consideration." Ex. 3 to Opp'n. His case manager goes on to explain that the BOP has been actively working to determine which inmates are presently eligible for a transfer to home confinement. Id.
Defendant has therefore only asked that the BOP consider a transfer to home confinement. Nowhere does Defendant request that the duration of his sentence be reduced or terminated entirely. Nor does the BOP's response broaden the scope of Defendant's request. And the Court's recent decision in United States v. Eddings, Case No. 9-CR-00074 (E.D. Cal. March 22, 2020) is inapposite. In Eddings, the exhaustion requirement was met because the Warden also treated the defendant's request for home confinement as a request for sentence reduction sentence. See Eddings Opp'n at 4, ECF No. 326; see also Exs. 5-6 to Opp'n, ECF Nos. 326-5, 326-6. Accordingly, the Court was able to rule on defendant's motion to reduce sentence. See Eddings Order at 4-5, ECF No. 345. Not so here. Defendant's case manager only recognized a request for transfer to home confinement. See Ex. 3 to Opp'n. The scope of Defendant's request was not gratuitously expanded by the BOP as it was in Eddings. As a result, Defendant has not met § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement and the Court cannot reach the merits of this claim.
Moreover, the Court does not have the authority to grant the relief Defendant originally sought from the BOP via an avenue other than § 3582(c)(1)(A). Beyond § 3582(c)(1)(A), only the Attorney General has the discretion "to modify the method of imprisonment from a BOP facility to home confinement." United States v. Perez-Asencio, Case No. 18-CR-3611, WL 626175 at *4 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (citing 34 U.S.C. § 60541); see also Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 331(2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)) ("When a court sentences a federal offender, the BOP has plenary control, subject to statutory constraints, over the place of the prisoner's imprisonment." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
III. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: May 29, 2020
/s/ _________
JOHN A. MENDEZ,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE