Opinion
22-4293
01-19-2023
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. SHANI GWYNN LATHAM, Defendant-Appellant.
Mark A. Jones, BELL, DAVIS &PITT, P.A., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Craig Matthew Principe, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED
Submitted: January 17, 2023
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:19-cr-00409-WO-2)
ON BRIEF:
Mark A. Jones, BELL, DAVIS &PITT, P.A., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Craig Matthew Principe, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM
Shani Gwynn Latham appeals the district court's judgment revoking her supervised release and sentencing her to one year and one day of imprisonment. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the district court properly concluded that Latham violated the conditions of supervised release and whether Latham's sentence is unreasonable. The Government has declined to file a brief. Although notified of her right to file a pro se supplemental brief, Latham has not done so. We affirm.
To revoke supervised release, the district court need only find a violation of a supervised release condition by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); United States v. Dennison, 925 F.3d 185, 191 (4th Cir. 2019). We "review[] a district court's decision to revoke a defendant's supervised release for abuse of discretion," its underlying factual findings for clear error, and unpreserved challenges for plain error. Dennison, 925 F.3d at 190. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Latham's supervised release.
"A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release." United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). "We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable." United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). "When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is unreasonable at all." United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). "A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines' nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors." Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207 (footnote omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the court states a proper basis for concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2006). "A court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed." Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if a sentence is either procedurally or substantively unreasonable is a determination then made as to whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656-57 (4th Cir. 2007).
We conclude that Latham's sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court imposed a within-policy-statement-range sentence, considered the relevant statutory factors, and gave sufficiently detailed reasons for its decision. Specifically, the court emphasized that, despite having resources available and being pregnant, Latham continued to possess and use drugs.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's revocation judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Latham, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Latham requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Latham.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED