Opinion
Misc. No. 21-mc-074 (FAB)
2023-08-25
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiffs v. Kendell LANG, et al., Defendants
Philip A. Doyle, United States Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs. Kendell Lang, Del Mar, CA, Pro Se.
Philip A. Doyle, United States Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs. Kendell Lang, Del Mar, CA, Pro Se.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BESOSA, Senior District Judge.
Defendant Kendell Lang ("Mr. Lang" or "the defendant") filed a "Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Vacate Judgment; Complaint for Damages" on July 27, 2023, (Docket No. 151), requesting the Court to declassify his tax debt as "seriously delinquent," vacate the judgment issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of California ("S.D. Cal.") (Docket No. 1), and vacate the Final Disposition Order (Docket No. 143) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), and 60(b)(4) ("Rule 60(b)"). Defendant also attached a complaint to his motion alleging violations of his constitutional rights and of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. section 621 et seq., and requesting an award of damages. (Docket No. 151.) On August 9, 2023, Plaintiff United States of America ("the government" or "the United States") filed a "Memorandum in Opposition" to Mr. Lang's motion. (Docket No. 153.) For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is DENIED. (Docket No. 151.) His complaint is also DISMISSED. Id.
I. Factual Background
On July 25, 2008, S.D. Cal. entered a judgment in favor of the government and against Mr. Lang in the amount of $437,812 for unpaid income taxes. (Docket No. 1.) On February 19, 2021, the United States registered the judgment issued by S.D. Cal. against Mr. Lang in this Court (Docket No. 1) and began garnishment proceedings in Mr. Lang's name against garnishee Fusion Properties Management Group, Inc. ("Fusion Farms").
On July 15, 2022, Fusion Farms and the government entered into a settlement (Docket No. 140) and agreed to a Final Disposition Order (Docket No. 143) regarding future payments on the writ of garnishment. Subsequently, the government and Mr. Lang negotiated a settlement of the remaining judgment debt. (Docket No. 151. Ex 2.) The government alleges, however, that Mr. Lang ultimately violated this agreement by failing to make required payments in the time allowed. Id. As of the date of this order, both parties agree that Mr. Lang's tax debt is classified as "seriously delinquent" pursuant to 26 U.S.C. section 7345, which the defendant claims has barred him from renewing his passport and pursuing employment abroad. (Docket No. 151 p 2.)
II. Discussion
A. Certification of Tax Debt as Seriously Delinquent
Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. section 7345, if the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or "Commissioner") certifies that a taxpayer has "a seriously delinquent tax debt," the certification shall be transmitted "to the Secretary of State for action with respect to denial, revocation, or limitation of [the taxpayer's] passport." The IRS is responsible for notifying the taxpayer of the certification. 26 U.S.C. § 7345(d).
Generally, a "seriously delinquent" tax debt is a federal tax liability that has been assessed, exceeds $50,000 (adjusted for inflation), and is unpaid and legally enforceable. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7345(b)(1), 7345(f)(3). Section 7345(e)(1) permits a taxpayer who has been certified as having a "seriously delinquent" tax debt to petition a United States district court or tax court to determine "whether the certification was erroneous or whether the [IRS] has failed to reverse the certification." If the Court finds that a certification was erroneous, it "may order the Secretary [of the Treasury] to notify the Secretary of State that such certification was erroneous." 26 USC § 7345(e)(2). The statute specifies no other form of relief. See Ruesch v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 25 F.4th 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2022); See also Adams v. Commissioner, Case No. 1527-21P, 160 T.C., slip op. at 8 (Jan. 24, 2023).
Mr. Lang does not directly petition the Court to determine whether the seriously delinquent certification was made in error. He argues, however, that his tax debt should be decertified in light of the approximately $250,000 supposedly recovered by the IRS to date. (Docket No. 151, p 3.) This argument lacks merit. Even taking into consideration the money recovered by the IRS, Mr. Lang's tax debt is significantly above the $50,000 threshold. In any event, the Court cannot evaluate the certification because Mr. Lang has failed to provide any evidence of error or of any agreement with the IRS that should lead to the decertification of his debt as seriously delinquent.
B. Request to Vacate Judgment
A court may set aside a judgment in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) ("Rule 60(b)"). Rule 60(b)(6) provides that "the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding . . . [for] any other reason that justifies relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b) motions typically serve as a basis for relief before the court that rendered judgment, not the court where a judgment has been registered. See Indian Head Nat. Bank of Nashua v. Brunelle, 689 F.2d 245, 251 (1st Cir. 1982). The exceptions to this rule are narrow. Registering courts have only entertained Rule 60(b) motions on the grounds that a judgment was void because the rendering court lacked personal jurisdiction, or, in limited circumstances, because the challenge presented in the Rule 60(b)(6) motion could have been brought as an independent equitable action. Id. at 251.
Defendant's motion to vacate the judgment does not meet either of those conditions. Thus, this action must be filed in the rendering court, not in this Court. Indeed, this Court has already said as much in a prior ruling in this very case. (Docket No. 27) ("Any motion to vacate the judgment must be filed in the Court which entered the judgment, in this case, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.")
Because Mr. Lang's motion to vacate must be filed in S.D. Cal., the Court does not address the merits of the defendant's argument that the IRS interfered with his ability to pay back taxes.
The defendant's other Rule 60(b) request, that the Final Disposition Order be found void pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), also lacks merit. Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), a judgment is void "only if the court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction or in circumstances in which the court's action amounts to a plain usurpation of power constituting a violation of due process." United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990)(emphasis in original). The defendant argues that the Final Disposition Order is void because the United States and Mr. Lang entered into a settlement agreement "outside the Final Disposition Order, without notifying the court." (Docket No. 151 p 14.) This argument does not address either the Court's jurisdiction or allege a violation of due process. Moreover, the government rightly distinguishes the Final Disposition Order between the United States and Fusion Farms, and the judgment against Mr. Lang. The settlement and subsequent Final Disposition Order (Docket Nos. 140 and 143) resolved the garnishment proceedings against Fusion Farms but did not claim to settle the judgment issued by S.D. Cal. against Mr. Lang himself. Accordingly, reconsideration is inappropriate.
C. Defendant's Request for Judgment Against the United States
To commence an action for judgment against the United States, Mr. Lang must initiate a new civil action (Fed. R. Civ. P. 3) and must complete proper service of process (Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c), and 4(i)). In his motion, Mr. Lang failed to satisfy these conditions, therefore the complaint is DISMISSED. Consequently, the Court need not address the merits of Mr. Lang's claims. The defendant may not attach a new complaint to what is, in essence, a Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
III. Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons defendant Kendall Lang's motion to vacate is DENIED, and his complaint is DISMISSED. (Docket No. 151.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.