Opinion
2:19-cr-8-NR
09-08-2022
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ROSS LANDFRIED and DAVID CURRAN, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
J. NICHOLAS RANJAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
On June 14, 2022, at the conclusion of a six-day trial, a jury convicted Defendants Ross Landfried and David Curran of conspiring to distribute certain synthetic cannabinoid controlled substances, and also convicted Mr. Landfried of conspiring to launder drug trafficking proceeds. ECF 3532. Before the verdict, and at the close of the government's case, the Court denied Defendants' oral motions for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a).
Presently before the Court are Defendants' renewed motions for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29(c) and Mr. Landfried's motion for new trial under Rule 33(a). For the following reasons, the Court denies the motions.
I. Defendants' Rule 29(c) motions for judgment of acquittal.
A “Rule 29 judgment of acquittal is a substantive [judicial] determination that the prosecution has failed to carry its burden.” United States v. John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186, 200 (3d Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). A defendant “challenging the sufficiency of the evidence” pursuant to Rule 29 “bears a heavy burden.” Id. (cleaned up). That's because in deciding whether to grant a motion for acquittal, “the trial court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and draw all reasonable inferences in the [g]overnment's favor.” United States v. Rodriguez-Mendez, No. 17-15, 2021 WL 6143581, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2021) (Haines, J.) (cleaned up). In this role, the reviewing court “must be ever vigilant ... not to usurp the role of the jury by weighing credibility and assigning weight to the evidence, or substituting [its] judgment for that of the jury.” United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). “The jury's verdict must be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable juror, and the verdict must be upheld as long as it does not fall below the threshold of bare rationality.” Rodriguez-Mendez, 2021 WL 6143581, at *1 (cleaned up).
A. The Court denies Mr. Landfried's motion.
Mr. Landfried asks this Court to “set aside the jury's verdict due to insufficient evidence to support a finding of [g]uilt at Count 1 and Count 2.” ECF 3585, p. 1. Although couched as a challenge to his convictions at both Counts, Mr. Landfried focuses his arguments on Count 2. See id. pp. 1-7; ECF 3550. Specifically, he argues that the government presented “insufficient evidence to prove a money laundering conspiracy because [it] failed to show that the money involved in the transactions, or planned transactions, represented proceeds of unlawful activity.” ECF 3585, p. 1. But that's not true. The government presented plenty of circumstantial evidence that the jury could have used to reasonably conclude that Mr. Landfried knew that the funds coming in and out of his BOP account, and the accounts of his accomplices, contained proceeds of unlawful activity (i.e., proceeds of the conspiracy to distribute paper soaked in synthetic cannabinoid controlled substances). United States v. Davis, 373 Fed.Appx. 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Direct evidence of an agreement is not necessary as each element of a criminal conspiracy may be proven entirely by circumstantial evidence.” (cleaned up)).
For example, a cooperating witness testified that, while working for Mr. Landfried's drug trafficking operation in prison, he would receive and send out disguised drug payments from his inmate account. ECF 3576, 38:8-23. These payments would be sent out to unknown women in Pittsburgh. Id. 38:24-39:2. Mr. Landfried would direct him when and where to send the payments. Id. 39:3-5.
Agent Kevin Petrulak, a Special Agent for the Internal Revenue Service, supported this testimony by describing that Mr. Landfried personally had several suspicious transfers from his BOP inmate account. ECF 3577, 124:7-137:4. Some of these transfers were to his brother Noah Landfried and described as being for “Child Support,” despite neither Ross nor Noah Landfried having any children. Id. at 130:10-131:12. Others were simply described as “Gifts” or for “Education Material.” Id. at 132:17-134:13. But the transfers were almost always for the same amount ($450), which fell just below the minimum threshold needed for additional scrutiny and BOP approval. Id. at 129:9-18. These transfers took the form of treasury checks, and many of those checks were deposited by Noah Landfried. Id. at 129:19-21, 136:812.
Finally, Detective Eric Harpster further linked this financial activity to money laundering by testifying about texts sent by Kristen Pappas to Noah Landfried regarding depositing money into Ross Landfried's BOP account as payment for drugs. ECF 3577, 211:7-213:7. Indeed, Noah Landfried considered Ross Landfried “the diamond in the rough” for his scheme to distribute drugs through prisons. Id. at 29:18-24. Noah Landfried's only concern was that “Ross is having too much fun in there” and “[h]e cares more about the money than he does about coming home[.]” Id. at 30:9-12.
Mr. Landfried fixates on the claim that the government “did not present any evidence that any specific incoming transaction into Mr. Landfried's or Mr. Lawson's BOP account were the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity.” ECF 3585, p. 6. Aside from being mistaken about the evidence, as the text messages between Ms. Pappas and Noah Landfried demonstrate that some incoming money to Ross Landfried represented proceeds of unlawful activity, Ross Landfried is too focused on one side of the transaction. Plenty of evidence was offered regarding the improper source of the funds involved in various outgoing transactions.
The same holds true for the drug trafficking conspiracy, to the extent that Mr. Landfried is also resuscitating his challenge to the knowledge element of that charge.
The trial evidence established that all K2 paper that was seized at a prison and that was linked to Noah Landfried contained a controlled substance. ECF 3640, 171:25172:3. Those acting in concert with Noah Landfried knew that the paper being mailed to them contained a controlled substance because of the cost, the drastic effects it had on users, and the great efforts taken to conceal it. See, e.g., ECF 3575, 155:25-156:18; ECF 3575, 185:3-186:12; ECF 3576, 34:14-35:23; ECF 3577, 26:2-30:17. Ross Landfried even admitted to a fellow inmate that he knew that some of the K2 paper he was distributing contained fentanyl. ECF 3575, 194:1-9.
From this and other evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Mr. Landfried knew that some or possibly all the K2 paper he agreed to distribute contained a controlled substance and that he helped orchestrate disguised financial transactions to facilitate and profit from that distribution.
B. The Court denies Mr. Curran's motion.
Mr. Curran argues that the “evidence presented at trial against [him] did not directly establish a conspiracy.” ECF 3584, p. 1. Mr. Curran complains that instead, the government relied on “circumstantial evidence and inference.” Id. But “the [g]overnment may prove the existence of a conspiracy entirely through circumstantial evidence.” Rodriguez-Mendez, 2021 WL 6143581, at *2 (citations omitted).
The government presented sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer, as it did in its verdict, that Mr. Curran and Noah Landfried engaged in a conspiracy to distribute K2-soaked paper. Such paper was valuable (ECF 3575, 68:1-69:6, 71:6-18), and Noah Landfried had an established method of sending K2 paper to his inmate co-conspirators disguised as legal mail so that it would escape detection at prisons and could later be sold (ECF 3577, 216:3-4). Mr. Curran was the intended recipient of one such package. Tr. Ex. 29. That package, which was seized, appeared on the surface to be legal papers from an attorney-precisely Noah Landfried's standard operating procedure. Id.
Once that package was seized, Mr. Curran registered a phone number that he claimed belonged to “Bro Lil.” Tr. Ex. 18. Noah Landfried was sometimes called “Lil Bro”-a strikingly similar moniker. ECF 3577, 19:14. The address associated with “Bro Lil” belonged to a residence owned by Noah Landfried's family (Tr. Ex. 18) and used by Noah Landfried to produce K2 paper in 2017 (ECF 3575, 207:8-217:14). Mr. Curran stresses that the government did not introduce evidence that he actually called the phone number associated with “Bro Lil.” ECF 3623, p. 3. Such a call was unnecessary, however, to create a logical inference that Mr. Curran knew the owner of that number and that he may have wanted to contact that number to report that the package had been seized.
But that's not all. Nicholas Green, Mr. Curran's former cellmate and associate at FCI-McDowell in 2017 and 2018, testified that he obtained K2 paper from Mr. Curran and had knowledge that Mr. Curran also distributed it to other inmates. ECF 3575, 138:23-147:5. Mr. Green added that Mr. Curran told him that his supplier was a childhood friend named “Noah.” Id. at 149:21-150:5. This “Noah” would send the K2 paper in the mail and there would be certain markings on the K2 paper or the envelope that would reveal to Mr. Curran that it was K2 paper and not regular paper. Id. at 150:6-25. Mr. Curran also told Mr. Green that this paper was “fronted” to him-meaning that Mr. Curran did not have to pay for it in advance. Id. at 154:1017. Such testimony “could have allowed [the jury] to establish the following: there was a lengthy relationship between [Mr. Curran and Noah Landfried], an established method of payment, standardized transactions, and a mutual level of trust[.]” UnitedStates v. Pryor, 771 Fed.Appx. 508, 510 (3d Cir. 2019).
Given this evidence, the Court cannot say that the jury's verdict fell below the standard of bare rationality. “It is well-settled that witness credibility determinations must be made by the jury.” Rodriguez-Mendez, 2021 WL 6143581, at *2 (citing United States v. Lewis, 284 Fed.Appx. 940, 942 (3d Cir. 2008)). The jury in this case could have found the testimony of the case agents and Mr. Green credible, and that determination was rational considering all the evidence. See id. As a result, the Court “is satisfied that there was more than sufficient evidence presented at trial from which a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the [g]overnment proved that [Mr. Curran] was a member of a conspiracy, that the object of that conspiracy was to distribute [synthetic cannabinoid controlled substances], and that [Mr. Curran] himself conspired to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute, [synthetic cannabinoid controlled substances].” Id.
Mr. Curran's motion for judgment of acquittal is denied.
II. Mr. Landfried's Rule 33(a) motion for a new trial is denied.
Rule 33(a) permits a court to “vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). Ultimately, the decision lies within the Court's discretion. United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 325 (3d Cir. 2007).
“In considering a motion for new trial, this Court must exercise great caution in setting aside a verdict reached after fully-conducted proceedings, and particularly so where the action has been tried before a jury.” Rodriguez-Mendez, 2021 WL 6143581, at *3 (cleaned up). Further, “a district court may order a new trial only if it believes that there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred- that is, that an innocent person has been convicted.” Id. (cleaned up).
Mr. Landfried argues that he is entitled to a new trial “due to prosecutorial misconduct in violation of [his] due process rights.” ECF 3583, p. 1. According to Mr. Landfried, that “misconduct” took two forms, but neither warrants a new trial.
First, Mr. Landfried claims that the government “knowingly presented false testimony, and failed to correct the false testimony.. .when [it] elicited testimony from Detective Harpster ... that during the course of the investigation into the K2 prison paper conspiracy none of the K2 paper seized from a prison contained only synthetic cannabinoids that were non-controlled substances.” Id. Mr. Landfried's argument here is flawed because it misconstrues Detective Harpster's actual testimony.
Detective Harpster acknowledged that it was “possible that the K2 paper could contain no controlled substance,” but that it was unlikely given his experience. ECF 3575, 69:18-70:12. He then clarified that all the paper seized at a prison facility “that was linked to Noah Landfried” had at least one controlled substance in it. ECF 3640, 171:25-172:3. That testimony appears to be true from the record. Mr. Landfried points to DEA Exhibit 30 as proof that this testimony was false. But that exhibit has nothing to do with Detective Harpster's testimony because the paper tested in that exhibit was not linked to Noah Landfried during the trial or otherwise. Neither the sender nor the addressee was a known customer of Noah Landfried. ECF 3610, p. 3. This makes sense, considering that the paper tested in that exhibit was a funeral memorial announcement dated December 6, 2016-a month before Noah Landfried was even released from FCI-Otisville in New York. Id. Regardless, defense counsel had an opportunity to challenge Detective Harpster's truthfulness on crossexamination if he believed this testimony to be false. Considering all that, “and the otherwise overwhelming evidence of [Mr. Landfried's] guilt, the [C]ourt is satisfied that the interest of justice does not require a new trial” on this basis. United Statesv. Murphy, No. 09-82, 2010 WL 3585432, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2010) (Diamond, J.).
Second, Mr. Landfried argues that the government impermissibly shifted the burden “during [its] closing rebuttal argument in violation of [his] due process rights.” ECF 3683, p. 6. It did so, Mr. Landfried claims, by suggesting to the jury that he had an obligation to present evidence. Id. Mr. Landfried, however, is mistaken.
In his closing, counsel for Mr. Landfried suggested that money Mr. Landfried received and transmitted while incarcerated at USP-Lee came from gambling, selling stamps, or some other endeavor separate from selling K2 paper. ECF 3580, 172: 3
(“And so you heard how different inmates were trying to make money through stamps. And I submit to you Ross Landfried was involved in gambling in one manner or another.”). In rebuttal, the government embraced its burden, making it clear that Mr. Landfried “ha[d] no burden,” but observed that no evidence supported counsel's argument that Mr. Landfried's money in his BOP account came from gambling or some other activity. Id. at 220:10-16, 221:2. In making that observation, though, the government did not shift the burden of proof or comment on Mr. Landfried's failure to testify:
[D]efense counsel also suggested to you that there's some other reason for the money that was on Mr. Landfried's books, suggesting that the prosecution is hiding something from you. Members of the jury, if there was a legitimate basis for why that money was on Mr. Landfried's books, I submit to you that there would be records to support that. There could be someone outside of this courtroom who could explain what those transactions are. You've not heard any of that. If Mr. Landfried got all of that money from gambling, that means he never lost.Id. at 221:21-222:6.
To begin with, Mr. Landfried did not object to this statement, and so “[u]nless it would be plain error not to order a new trial, failure to object to improprieties in a prosecutor's closing argument at trial precludes the grant of a new trial.” United States v. Steele, No. 14-110, 2015 WL 13427632, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2015) (citing United States v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d 1282, 1296 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 664 Fed.Appx. 260 (3d Cir. 2016)).
It would not be plain error to deny Mr. Landfried's request here. The government was allowed to point out the failure of the defense to support its arguments with evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Keller, 512 F.2d 182, 186 (3d Cir. 1975) (“It is perfectly proper to comment on the failure of the defense to call a potentially helpful witness[.]”); United States v. Sotomayor-Teijeiro, 499 Fed.Appx. 151, 155 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he prosecutor's remarks simply reminded the jury that all the evidence they heard regarding the source and purpose of the money was that it was related to drug dealing, and urged to draw the conclusion that drug trafficking occurred. In other words, the prosecutor did not shift the burden to the defense, but rather argued that the government had satisfied its burden[.]”); United States v.Stewart, 378 Fed.Appx. 201, 205 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Although a prosecutor cannot suggest that the defendant has the burden to produce evidence, a prosecutor may focus the jury's attention on holes in the defense's theory.” (cleaned up)).
For these reasons, and because there is no basis for the Court to conclude that “an innocent man has been convicted,” Mr. Landfried's motion is denied. Rodriguez-Mendez, 2021 WL 6143581, at *3 (cleaned up).
* * *
AND NOW, this 8th day of September, 2022, it is ORDERED that Defendants' motions for judgment of acquittal (ECF 3550; ECF 3551; ECF 3585) and Mr. Landfried's motion for new trial (ECF 3553; ECF 3583) are DENIED.