Mr. Vanholten received one of these unusually long sentences as a de facto punishment for not cooperating. See United States v. Kupa, 976 F.Supp.2d 417, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd, 616 Fed.Appx. 33 (2d Cir. 2015). At sentencing, the Government cited his refusal to cooperate as the reason it stuck with the enhanced mandatory life sentence.

The use of a prior felony information in this manner, despite its obvious effectiveness in this case, departs from Congress's intended purpose of allowing federal prosecutors the flexibility to "carefully cull from the large number of defendants with prior drug felony convictions the hardened, professional drug traffickers who should face recidivism enhancements upon conviction." United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (footnote omitted), aff'd, 616 F. App'x 33 (2d Cir. 2015). It was never intended as a tool to coerce a guilty plea.

Specifically, Mr. Banks contends that "[t]here was no suggestion that Congress enacted § 851 so prosecutors could use their . . . discretion to trigger enhanced punishments as a tool to strong-arm federal defendants into pleading guilty or to punish those who exercise their right to a trial." United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 427 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd, 616 F. App'x 33 (2d Cir. 2015). The government contends that Mr. Banks' assertions are flawed because he was able to exercise his due process right by going to trial, precedent states that due process is not offended by the possibilities of increased punishment, and Mr. Banks has shown no actual vindictiveness.