Opinion
3:16-cr-00351-MO
11-18-2021
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. AKIAZ MARQIEZ KING, Defendant.
OPINION & ORDER
MICHAEL W. MOSMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter comes before me on Defendant Akiaz Marqiez King's Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release [ECF 138]. For the reasons below, I DENY the motion.
BACKGROUND
In October 2017, King was sentenced to 19 months in prison and three years of supervised release after pleading guilty to interstate transportation for purposes of prostitution. J. & Commitment [ECF 62], Given King's previous time served, he was released from custody two months later and began his term of supervised release. After violating the terms of his probation, King was placed on house arrest and his term of supervised release was continued. Order Continuing Supervised Release Term [ECF 86], That term of supervised release is set to end on February 20, 2022, but King asks that I end his supervised release immediately.
DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, I need not consider this motion because King has filed it pro se despite having representation of counsel. See United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1193 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A criminal defendant] has no absolute right to serve as co-counsel after electing to be represented by an attorney.”); see also United States v. Gallardo, 915 F.Supp. 216, 218 n.l (D. Nev. 1995) (“a person represented by an attorney cannot file pro se motions”), aff'd., 92 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1996). King is represented by counsel, Order Appointing Counsel [ECF 120], and therefore cannot file pro se motions.
Though I need not consider King's pro se motion, I also find that it fails on the merits. A criminal defendant bears the burden of showing early termination of supervised release is justified. See United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 559 n.9 (9th Cir. 2006). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), in deciding whether to terminate a term of supervised release, a court must first look at sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In the supervised release context, pertinent sentencing factors include “the nature of [the defendant's] offense and his character.” United States v. Smith, 219 Fed.Appx. 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2007).
King's current federal conviction is for a serious sex trafficking offense. Furthermore, his criminal history is lengthy. It includes attempted murder, assault, and multiple firearms offenses. Supervision Rep. [ECF 143] at 1. As such, I find the sentencing factors in § 3553(a) weigh against early termination of supervised release.
After reviewing the relevant sentencing factors, a court may “terminate a term of supervised release... if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). In determining whether justice demands an early termination of supervised release, a court has “discretion to consider a wide range of circumstances.” United States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2014).
King claims he needs early release so that he can help his mother look for a place to live out of state and better “take care of everyday responsibilities.” Mot. to Terminate Supervised Release [ECF 138] at 1-2. He also protests his current placement in home detention, which he describes as a “true hardship.” Id. at 2. But King has not sought permission from the probation office to attend to his mother's health or other community needs, Supervision Rep. [ECF 143] at 2, and King waived his right to a hearing on his placement in home detention, Modification of Supervision Conditions [ECF 130] Ex. 1. These relatively minor inconveniences-which King has either consented to or failed to discuss with the Probation Office-do not outweigh the significant sentencing factors at play.
Nor does King's conduct justify early termination. King describes his probation as one in which he has had few problems and limited police contact. Mot. to Terminate Supervised Release [ECF 138] at 1. But this characterization is overly generous. Among other infractions, King has violated the conditions of his probation by refusing to submit to searches, leaving the state district without permission, and associating with known felons. Supervision Rep. [ECF 143] at 1-2.1 therefore find that “the conduct of the defendant” does not justify termination of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).
CONCLUSION
Because I find that the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and King's post-release conduct caution against termination of supervised release, I DENY King's Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release [ECF 138].
IT IS SO ORDERED.