Opinion
Case Number: 1:11-cr-56
11-13-2014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff v. VONDA KELLUM, Defendant
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE
This matter is before the court on Defendant Vonda Kellum's pro se motion to expunge her criminal record in this case. In 2011, Kellum was indicted and pled guilty to the charge of theft of government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. (Doc. 2 at PageID 3.) The Court sentenced Kellum to three years of probation. (See Doc. 21.) Based on the recommendation of her probation officer, Kellum was discharged from probation after only two years. (See Doc 24.) Defendant now asks this Court to expunge this case to improve her chances of obtaining a better paying job.
The legal standard applied to expungement motions has undergone a recent change in the Sixth Circuit. Prior to 2010, the Sixth Circuit had considered federal district courts to be vested with an inherent equitable power "to order the expungement of a record in an appropriate case." See United States v. Wiley, 89 F. Supp. 2d 909, 910 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (citing United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d 391, 393 (6th Cir. 1977)). In United States v. Lucido, 612 F.3d 871 (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth Circuit revisited its position on expungement. Lucido involved the request of a defendant to expunge Federal Bureau of Investigation records related to two separate criminal cases that had resulted in acquittals sixteen years earlier. See id at 872-3. The defendant filed multiple motions with the district court that presided over his criminal cases, and the court denied the defendant's motions on the merits. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit determined the district court lacked jurisdiction in the first place to entertain those motions. Id. at 873. The court identified three possible avenues for jurisdiction and explained why none applied. First, the Sixth Circuit determined that the district court's original jurisdiction over the defendant's criminal cases did not provided a basis for considering the expungement motions because the criminal cases were closed prior to the filing of the motions. Id. at 874. Second, the Court noted that although there are several statutes permitting expungement motions, none applied to the case at hand. Id. Third, the Sixth Circuit addressed the defendant's argument that "once the courts have original authority to address a criminal charge, . . . they retain 'inherent, equitable power' to consider expungement motions filed under their 'ancillary jurisdiction.'" Id. Citing a United States Supreme Court opinion, the Sixth Circuit found that despite the circuit's prior position on expungement, the "ancillary power of the federal courts does not 'stretch' that 'far.'" Id. (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1994), and concluding, at 876, that its prior decision in "Doe cannot be reconciled with Kokkonen because it extends the courts' jurisdiction beyond that provided by the Constitution, by statute and by the limited doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction"). The Kokkonen Court had identified two narrow legitimate forms of ancillary jurisdiction: "(1) to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent," and "(2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees." Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379-80. The Sixth Circuit found that neither category provided jurisdiction in Ludido, 612 F.3d at 876.
That power was narrow and was to be applied only in extreme circumstances. Wiley, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 910.
Several courts have since found, based on Lucido, that they lacked jurisdiction over motions to expunge judicial records. See United States v. Bass, No. 2:89-cr-138-1, 2012 WL 871215, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 13, 2012); United States v. Tippie, No. 3:08CR288, 2013 WL 4782370, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2013); United States v. Childs, No. 2:93-CR-80302, 2011 WL 768068, at *1-3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2011).
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Just this year, the Sixth Circuit further clarified the circumstances in which federal courts may assert ancillary jurisdiction to consider expungement motions:
[F]ederal courts lack ancillary jurisdiction over motions for expungement that are grounded on purely equitable considerations—e.g., motions alleging that the movant has maintained good conduct and that the record of arrest harms the movant's employment opportunities. Ancillary jurisdiction over such motions does not enable a court to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees. But where motions for expungement challenge an unconstitutional conviction or an illegal arrest or are otherwise based upon a constitutional claim, federal courts may have jurisdiction to consider the motion. In these cases, ancillary jurisdiction over motions to expunge may enable a court to vindicate its authority[ ] and effectuate its decrees.United States v. Field, 756 F.3d 911, 915-16 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Based on the foregoing precedent, the Court finds that lacks jurisdiction to consider Kellum's motion. Kellum's underlying criminal case concluded several years ago. She does not allege, nor does the Court find, any statute specifically authorizing expungement under the circumstances present in this case. Finally, Kellum has not identified any ground that would permit the assertion of ancillary jurisdiction. She bases her motion entirely on equitable grounds—specifically, that she has a son with special needs and that she is having difficulty becoming more gainfully employed due to her conviction. While the Court sympathizes with Kellum's plight, this Court lacks power to grant her the requested relief. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to expunge is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Susan J. Dlott
Chief Judge Susan J. Dlott
United States District Court