Opinion
Case No. 04-80335
01-31-2017
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT KEATHLEY, Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE MONEY JUDGMENT At a session of said Court, held in the U.S. Courthouse, Detroit, Michigan on January 31, 2017 PRESENT: Honorable Gerald E. Rosen United States District Judge
Through the present pro se motion, Defendant Robert Keathley requests pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) that the Court set aside a $1 million money judgment entered against him on February 14, 2007. In support of this motion, Defendant contends that he lacked notice and an opportunity to be heard as to the entry of this judgment, and that the Court lacked the legal authority to enter this judgment. In addition, while the money judgment in question was entered many years ago and has never before been challenged, Defendant notes that a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) for relief from a void judgment is not subject to a strict time limit, but instead must be brought "within a reasonable time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
The Court readily concludes that Defendant has failed to identify a basis for relief from the February 14, 2007 money judgment. As the Government correctly points out in response to Defendant's motion, Defendant's claim of lack of notice prior to the entry of this judgment is wholly without merit. Rather, the $1 million judgment was expressly disclosed on the record at Defendant's June 26, 2006 plea hearing, (see Gov't Response, Ex. 4, 6/26/2006 Plea Hearing Tr. at 10), and Defendant explicitly agreed to the entry of this judgment when he signed his Rule 11 plea agreement, (see Gov't Response, Ex. 5, Rule 11 Plea Agreement at 5, 18). Faced with this evidence, Defendant has abandoned his claim of lack of notice in his reply brief in support of the present motion.
This leaves only Defendant's contention that the money judgment against him should be set aside as entered without the proper legal authority. Yet, even assuming this is so, the law is clear that a judgment is not "void" within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(4) simply because "it is or may have been erroneous." Northridge Church v. Charter Township of Plymouth, 647 F.3d 606, 611 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As explained by the Sixth Circuit, "the fact that a . . . judgment may violate a federal statute . . . does not render the judgment 'void' under Rule 60(b)(4)." Northridge Church, 647 F.3d at 611-12. Accordingly, whatever the merit of Defendant's contention that the money judgment against him was entered in violation of the law, Rule 60(b)(4) does not provide an avenue for relief from this purportedly erroneous judgment.
This is an extremely dubious proposition, given that the two cases relied upon by Defendant in support of his motion both were reversed on appeal. See United States v. Day, 416 F. Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C. 2006), rev'd in relevant part, 524 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Croce, 334 F. Supp.2d 781 (E.D. Pa. 2004), rev'd, 209 F. App'x 208 (3d Cir. Dec. 22, 2006). While Defendant identifies additional cases in his reply brief that purportedly call into question the Court's authority to enter a money judgment against him, none of the cited cases support this contention, and most of these rulings affirmatively refute it. --------
Accordingly,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion to set aside money judgment (docket #424) is DENIED.
s/Gerald E. Rosen
United States District Judge Dated: January 31, 2017 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or counsel of record on January 31, 2017, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Julie Owens
Case Manager, (313) 234-5135