Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, MICHELE BECKWITH, JUSTIN LEE, CHRISTIAAN HIGHSMITH, Assistant United States Attorneys, Sacramento, CA. Attorneys for Plaintiff, United States of America.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
KIMBERLY J. MUELLER, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, proceeding pro se, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. This Stipulation and [Proposed] Findings and Order are prepared to clarify the exclusion of time from the inception of this case until present.
2. The grand jury returned an indictment against defendant John James Kash on October 3, 2013. Defendant Kash made his initial appearance and was arraigned on the indictment on October 7, 2013. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (the seventy day clock begins to run from the filing of the indictment or from the date the defendant first appeared in court, whichever occurs last). He was initially represented by counsel, Mark Reichel. On a number of different occasions, the case was continued by way of Stipulation and [Proposed] Order. Those continuances will not be detailed here. As a result of the stipulations entered into by the parties, and the findings and orders of the Court, the Court ordered, that the time between October 7, 2013, and September 28, 2015, be excluded from calculation under the Speedy Trial Act."
3. On August 26, 2015, at the Trial Confirmation Hearing, a jury trial was set for November 9, 2015 with the consent of all parties.
4. At the Trial Confirmation Hearing, defendant Kash also sought to clarify all exclusions of time pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 3161 as well as his right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act. Defendant Kash agrees and stipulates that all time from the inception of the case on October 7, 2013 until the Trial Confirmation Hearing on August 26, 2015 is excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it resulted from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweighed the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. The Government agrees and stipulates to the same.
5. Defendant Kash withdraws his prior consent to the exclusion of time through September 28, 2015 (see Doc. 201) and instead agrees and stipulates that time should be excluded from August 26, 2015 through and including September 14, 2015, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and that the excluded time is necessary for the preparation of trial. The Government agrees and stipulates to the same.
6. The parties agree that the effect of this stipulation will be that all time from the inception of the case through and including September 14, 2015 will be excluded pursuant to pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] and that the seventy-day speedy trial clock set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) shall begin to run on September 15, 2015.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
Pursuant to the stipulation of Plaintiff United States and defendant John Kash, it is hereby clarified and ordered that (1) all time from October 7, 2013 through and including September 14, 2015 is excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] as to defendant Kash, and (2) the right to a speedy trial within 70 days pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) shall commence on September 15, 2015.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.