United States v. Kaixiang Zhu, 854 F.3d 247, 254, 256 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that Arthur has not made this showing here.
United States v. Recio , 884 F.3d 230, 236–37 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, we require only a prima facie showing that the "true author" is who the proponent claims it to be. Id . at 237 ; see also United States v. Zhu , 854 F.3d 247, 257 (4th Cir. 2017) ; United States v. Cornell , 780 F.3d 616, 629 (4th Cir. 2015) ; United States v. Hassan , 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014). And the prima facie showing "may be accomplished largely by offering circumstantial evidence that the documents in question are what they purport to be."
“It is up to the jury to decide whether evidence is that which the proponent claims.” United States v. Zhu, 854 F.3d 247, 257 (4th Cir. 2017). “It is the district court's role . . . to serve as gatekeeper in assessing whether the proponent has offered a satisfactory foundation from which the jury could reasonably find that the evidence is authentic.
But Williams' argument that additional witness testimony would exonerate him is "grounded in speculation, and [Williams] cannot satisfy the materiality requirement with speculative evidence." United States v. Zhu, 854 F.3d 247, 255 (4th Cir. 2017). We thus find that the Government's decision not to call additional witnesses did not constitute plain error.
Wellbeloved-Stone contends that the district court should have dismissed the indictment against him because application of the federal child pornography statutes to him exceeded Congress' power under U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 ("the Commerce Clause"). "We review a district court's legal conclusions with respect to a motion to dismiss the indictment de novo." United States v. Kaixiang Zhu, 854 F.3d 247, 253 (4th Cir. 2017). In addition to production of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), the indictment also charged Wellbeloved-Stone with possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2) (2012).
" Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). "It is up to the jury to decide whether evidence is that which the proponent claims." United States v. Kaixiang Zhu, 854 F.3d 247, 257 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Establishing a strict chain of custody is not an iron-clad requirement, and the fact of a missing link does not prevent the admission of real evidence, so long as there is sufficient proof that the evidence is what it purports to be and has not been altered in any material respect.
A district judge's legal conclusions in resolving a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment are reviewed de novo, and factual findings are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Zhu, 854 F. 3d 247, 253 (4th Cir. 2017). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3) allows a defendant to move before trial to dismiss the indictment for failure to state an offense.
Id. at 237; see also United States v. Zhu, 854 F.3d 247, 257 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Cornell, 780 F.3d 616, 629 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014). The prima facie showing "may be accomplished largely by offering circumstantial evidence that the documents in question are what they purport to be."
(quoting United States v. Martinez-Gayton, 213 F.3d 890, 891 (5th Cir. 2000)). “In order to determine if this ‘narrow' exception applies, Vidacak identifies four factors for district courts to consider: ‘1) which party supplied the interpreter; 2) whether the interpreter had a motive to mislead or distort; 3) the interpreter's qualifications and language skills; and 4) whether actions taken subsequent to the conversation were consistent with the statements translated.'” U.S. v. Kaixiang Zhu, 854 F.3d 247, 258-59 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Vidacak, 553 F.3d at 352 (cleaned up)).
Testimony that is merely cumulative or duplicitous is not material. See United States v. Kaixiang Zhu, 854 F.3d 247, 254 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 873)). Finally, materiality exists if there "is a 'reasonable probability' of a different result," or when the barred testimony "'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.'"