United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc.

93 Citing cases

  1. Central Freight Lines Inc. v. U.S.

    No. 08-331C (Fed. Cl. May. 5, 2009)   Cited 7 times

    Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that the parties should be deemed to be in privity of contract because Dispatch acted as an agent of the government when it entered into the SBL contracts with Central Freight, thus obliging the government to pay Central Freight regardless of whether or not it made payment to Dispatch. Ptf.'s Supp. Br. at 8 (citing United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d 1541, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). By way of background, a brief explanation of the contractual relationship between the government and a carrier is in order.

  2. U.S. v. Turner Const. Co.

    827 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 6 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In United States v. Turner Construction Co., 827 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1987), alluded to by the Claims Court, the Government argued "that the certification must not only be submitted in good faith but must reflect the prime contractor's own belief that the submitted claim reflects the amount owed by the government and that to allow the prime to substitute the subcontractor's belief for its own in making a certification would make a sham of the certification requirement, regardless of the merits of the submitted claim, and would render meaningless the prohibition against direct appeals by subcontractors."

    The government appeals from a final decision of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA or board) in Turner Construction Co., ASBCA No. 25714, 86-1 BCA ¶ 18,532 (Oct. 29, 1985), which determined that a certified claim sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the board had been submitted by Turner Construction Company (Turner) and which reinstated the board's prior decision on the merits in Johnson Controls, Inc., ASBCA No. 25714, 82-1 BCA ¶ 15,779 (May 5, 1982), an appeal which had been brought by one of Turner's subcontractors. The prior board decision on the merits had been vacated by this court in United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1983), a prior appeal involving the same claim, following our holding that the board did not have jurisdiction over a direct appeal by a subcontractor. In this appeal, we hold that the board properly assumed jurisdiction of Turner's appeal and affirm the board's granting of an equitable adjustment to Turner.

  3. Ground Improvement Techniques, Inc. v. United States

    618 F. App'x 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015)   Cited 4 times
    In Ground Improvement, the court permitted the substitution of plaintiffs under Rule 17(a)(3) based on its view that the "relevant interests were transferred through [the] bankruptcy proceeding."

    Because a subcontractor ordinarily lacks privity with the government, the Court of Federal Claims generally lacks jurisdiction over claims brought by a subcontractor against the government, though there are some exceptions. See J.G.B. Enters., Inc. v. United States, 497 F.3d 1259, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("A subcontractor typically is unable to seek relief against the United States on a dispute over the contract since it is not a party to the contract and thus lacks privity with the United States."); United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (concluding that the case did not "fall within any recognized exception to the well-entrenched rule that a subcontractor cannot bring a direct appeal against the government"). Whether a contract exists is a mixed question of law and fact, but where "the parties do not dispute the relevant facts, the privity issue reduces to a question of law, which we review de novo."

  4. United States v. Pielago

    135 F.3d 703 (11th Cir. 1998)   Cited 133 times
    Holding derivative use of proffer statement to identify co-conspirator that testified against the defendant did not prejudice defendant

    We do not believe that the two paragraphs, when properly construed, conflict. It is a cardinal principle of contract law that no term of a contract should be construed to be in conflict with another unless no other reasonable construction is possible. See Guaranty Financial Services, Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d 994, 1000 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d 1541, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In this case, paragraph four should be read as qualifying, instead of contradicting, paragraph three.

  5. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States

    838 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)   Cited 12 times
    Finding that "party standing outside of privity by contractual obligation stands in the shoes of a party within privity"

    Limited exceptions to the privity requirement have been recognized when a “party standing outside of privity by contractual obligation stands in the shoes of a party within privity,” such as when a party can demonstrate that it was an intended third-party beneficiary under the contract, see, e.g. , First Hartford Corp. Pension Plan & Tr. v. United States , 194 F.3d 1279, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1999), or when a party can demonstrate that a prime contractor acted as purchasing agent on behalf of the government in contracting with a subcontractor. See Nat'l Leased Hous. Ass'n v. United States , 105 F.3d 1423, 1435–36 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ; United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc. , 713 F.2d 1541, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1983). III

  6. US West Communications Services, Inc. v. United States

    940 F.2d 622 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 24 times
    Recognizing that the legislative history of the Brooks Act indicates that the right to bring a bid protest under that statute did not extend to subcontractors

    S.Rep. No. 1118, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1978) U.S. Code Cong. Admin.News 1978, pp. 5235, 5250, 5251. See United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d 1541, 1548-50 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Nothing in the Brooks Act purports to extend to subcontractors the right to initiate an action before the Board.

  7. Erickson Air Crane Co. of Washington, v. U.S.

    731 F.2d 810 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 107 times
    Holding that the "government consents to be sued only by those with whom it has privity of contract"

    II [12] Standing of Subcontractors It is a hornbook rule that, under ordinary government prime contracts, subcontractors do not have standing to sue the government under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, in the event of an alleged government breach or to enforce a claim for equitable adjustment under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978. United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Putnam Mills Corp. v. United States, 479 F.2d 1334, 202 Ct.Cl. 1 (1973). The government consents to be sued only by those with whom it has privity of contract, which it does not have with subcontractors.

  8. Ferox, LLC v. ConSeal Int'l, Inc.

    175 F. Supp. 3d 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2016)   Cited 12 times

    an] elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative.”). As ConSeal aptly notes, the language of the Agreement “does not provide for manufacture by Ferox or for ConSeal , but rather by ConSeal. ” Def.'s Reply at 3 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, while the Court is cognizant of the principle that the terms of a contract must be interpreted in the context of the entire contract, seeFeaz v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 745 F.3d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir.2014), Ferox's reliance on the Recitals at the beginning of the Agreement in arguing against the Court's finding of a license does not persuade. Ferox contends that the Recital that states “ConSeal desires to access, market and distribute certain Ferox fuel additive products under ConSeal private labels and Ferox desires to enable such access, marketing and distribution” should close the door on any discussion of ConSeal having a right to manufacture the Accused Products. Citing to United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc. , 713 F.2d 1541 (Fed.Cir.1983), Ferox argues that “no contract provision should be ‘[c]onstrued as being in conflict with another unless no other reasonable interpretation is possible.’ ” Pl.'s Mot. at 12 (quoting Johnson Controls , 713 F.2d at 1555 ). Its interpretation is that this Recital controls and negates the inclusion of the word “manufacture” in section 4.1—the first substantive section of the Agreement. ConSeal's interpretation, by contrast, is that this Recital prefaces section 4.2 of the Agreement (which anticipates that Ferox and ConSeal may negotiate future agreements which would govern and provide for the supply to ConSeal of fuel additives manufactured by Ferox ). ConSeal argues that a separate Recital—providing that “ConSeal is involved in the development, manufacture, marketing and distribution of various and sundry fuel additive products and formulations”—prefaces section 4.1 (which contains the language regarding ConSeal's manufacture).

  9. Mcallister Towing & Transp. Co. v. United States

    17 F. Supp. 3d 442 (E.D. Pa. 2014)   Cited 3 times

    McAllister responds that it did have a contract with the Government because Global was acting as the Government's “purchasing agent” for services that were outside the scope of Global's contract with the Government. The Government can be contractually bound to a subcontractor when the prime contractor acts as the Government's purchasing agent. U.S. v. Johnson Controls, 713 F.2d 1541, 1551 (Fed.Cir.1983). For a subcontractor to bind the Government, the following conditions must be met: “(1) [the prime contractor was] acting as a purchasing agent for the government, (2) the agency relationship between the government and the prime contractor must be established by clear contractual consent, and (3) the contract [between the Government and the prime contractor] stated that the government would be directly liable to the vendors for the purchase price.”

  10. Corporate Sys. Res. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.

    31 F. Supp. 3d 124 (D.D.C. 2014)   Cited 7 times
    Discussing when a non-party may bring a breach of contract claim as a third-party beneficiary to the contract

    Pl.'s WMATA Opp'n at 14. The only case on which the plaintiff relies in support of this argument is United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d 1541, 1551 (Fed.Cir.1983), see Pl.'s WMATA Opp'n at 14, but that case is wholly inapposite and, to the extent that it has any bearing on this case, it cuts against the plaintiff. The Johnson Controls, Inc. court found that, in the context of a dispute between a subcontractor and the federal government, a subcontractor was generally not in privity with the government and could not bring suit for breach of contract. 713 F.2d at 1550–51.