Opinion
Criminal Action No. 2:14-cr-12
11-17-2014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. JULIE ANN JOHNSON, Defendant.
OPINION/REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING PLEA OF GUILTY IN FELONY CASE
This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge by the District Court for purposes of conducting proceedings pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Defendant, Julie Ann Johnson, in person and by counsel, L. Richard Walker, appeared before me on November 14, 2014. The Government appeared by Stephen Warner, its Assistant United States Attorney. The Court determined that Defendant was prepared to enter a conditional plea of "Guilty" to Count Two of the Indictment.
The Court proceeded with the Rule 11 proceeding by first placing Defendant under oath.
The Court first inquired whether Defendant was a citizen of the United States. Defendant responded that she was a citizen. The undersigned asked Defendant whether she understood that if she were not a citizen of the United States, by pleading guilty to a felony charge she would be subject to deportation at the conclusion of any sentence; that she would be denied future entry into the United States; and that she would be denied citizenship if she ever applied for it. Defendant stated that she understood.
The Court determined that Defendant's plea was pursuant to a written plea agreement, and asked the Government to tender the original to the Court. The Court asked counsel for the Government if the agreement was the sole agreement offered to Defendant. The Government responded that it was not. Defendant was arrested in Florida and initially indicated that she was interested in a transfer of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Crim. P. 20 to enter a guilty plea. However, the United States Attorney's Office would not accept a Rule 20 transfer unless Defendant stipulated that the risk enhancement for the "shake and bake" method of manufacturing methamphetamine applied. A prior plea agreement containing that stipulation was offered, and Defendant did not accept it. The Government indicated that the instant agreement was more favorable because it contained a provision that Defendant could argue that the risk enhancement did not apply. Counsel for Defendant indicated that both plea agreements had been discussed with Defendant, and Defendant agreed. The Court asked counsel for the Government to summarize the written plea agreement. Defendant stated that the agreement as summarized by counsel for the Government was correct and complied with her understanding of the agreement. The Court ORDERED the written plea agreement filed and found the requirements of Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), satisfied.
The Court next inquired of Defendant concerning her understanding of her right to have an Article III Judge hear the entry of her guilty plea and her understanding of the difference between an Article III Judge and a Magistrate Judge. Defendant thereafter stated in open court that she voluntarily waived her right to have an Article III Judge hear and accept her plea and voluntarily consented to the undersigned Magistrate Judge hearing and accepting her plea, and tendered to the Court a written Waiver of Article III Judge and Consent To Enter Guilty Plea Before Magistrate Judge, which waiver and consent was signed by Defendant and countersigned by Defendant's counsel and was concurred in by the signature of the Assistant United States Attorney appearing.
Upon consideration of the sworn testimony of Defendant, as well as the representations of his counsel and the representations of the Government, the Court finds that the oral and written waiver of Article III Judge and consent to enter guilty plea before a Magistrate Judge was freely and voluntarily given and the written waiver and consent was freely and voluntarily executed by Defendant, Julie Ann Johnson, only after having had her rights fully explained to her and having a full understanding of those rights through consultation with her counsel, as well as through questioning by the Court. The Court ORDERED the written Waiver and Consent to Enter Guilty Plea before a Magistrate Judge filed and made part of the record.
The undersigned then reviewed with Defendant Count Two of the Indictment, including the elements the United States would have to prove at trial, charging her with possession of material used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 843(a)(6) and 843(d)(2). The undersigned then reviewed with Defendant the statutory penalties applicable to an individual adjudicated guilty of the felony charge contained in Count Two of the Indictment, the impact of the sentencing guidelines on sentencing in general, and inquired of Defendant as to her competency to proceed with the plea hearing. From said review the undersigned Magistrate Judge determined Defendant understood the nature of the charge pending against her and understood the possible statutory maximum sentence which could be imposed upon her conviction or adjudication of guilty on that charge was imprisonment for a term of not more than ten (10) years; understood that a fine of not more than $250,000.00 could be imposed; understood that both fine and imprisonment could be imposed; understood she would be subject to a period of up to three (3) years of supervised release; and understood the Court would impose a special mandatory assessment of $100.00 for the felony conviction payable on or before the date of sentencing. She also understood that her sentence could be increased if she had prior firearm offenses, violent felony convictions, or prior drug convictions. She also understood she might be required by the Court to pay the costs of her incarceration and supervised release.
The undersigned also reviewed with Defendant her waiver of appellate rights as follows: Ct. Do you understand that you have-you do understand you have a right to appeal your conviction and your sentence to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, is that correct? Def. Yes, sir. Ct. Do you also understand that you may file what is commonly called a writ of habeas corpus motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255? Def. Yes, Judge. Ct. Under your plea agreement, and I want to refer to paragraph 18(a) and (b). First of all, do you understand that you will have under every circumstance the right to file an appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals challenging Judge Bailey's ruling denying your motion to suppress evidence? Def. Yes, sir. Ct. In addition to that, if the District Judge imposes a sentence which is the same as or equal to a Guidelines sentence which has a 22 level or higher, then you can appeal that sentence? Def. Yes, sir. Ct. If it's based on a Guidelines sentence of 21 or lower, then you give up rights to appeal that conviction and sentence except as to Judge Bailey's ruling on your motion to suppress. Def. Yes, sir. Ct. That's your understanding also? Def. Yes. Ct. And you've fully discussed all that with Mr. Walker? Def. I have. Ct. You also in paragraph (b) give up your right to file a writ of habeas corpus type motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255? Def. Yes, sir. Ct. The only thing you reserve in that is the right to file a writ of habeas corpus motion for ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct, is that correct? Def. Yes, sir. Ct. And you don't know of any such prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel as you sit here today? Def. That's correct.
From the foregoing colloquy the undersigned determined that Defendant understood her appellate rights and knowingly gave up those rights pursuant to the conditions contained in the written plea bargain agreement.
The undersigned Magistrate Judge further examined Defendant relative to her knowledgeable and voluntary execution of the written plea bargain agreement, and determined the entry into said written plea bargain agreement was both knowledgeable and voluntary on the part of Defendant. The undersigned then inquired of Defendant regarding her understanding of the written plea agreement. Defendant stated she understood the terms of the written plea agreement and also stated that it contained the whole of her agreement with the Government and no promises or representations were made to her by the Government other than those terms contained in the written plea agreement.
The undersigned Magistrate Judge further inquired of Defendant, her counsel, and the Government as to the non-binding recommendations and stipulations contained in the written plea bargain agreement and determined that Defendant understood, with respect to the plea bargain agreement and to Defendant's entry of a plea of guilty to the felony charge contained in Count Two of the Indictment, the undersigned Magistrate Judge would write the subject Report and Recommendation and would further order a pre-sentence investigation report be prepared by the probation officer attending the District Court. The undersigned advised the Defendant that the District Judge would adjudicate the Defendant guilty of the felony charged under Count Two of the Indictment. Only after the District Court had an opportunity to review the pre-sentence investigation report, would the District Court make a determination as to whether to accept or reject any recommendation or stipulations contained within the plea agreement or pre-sentence report. The undersigned reiterated to the Defendant that the District Judge may not agree with the recommendations or stipulations contained in the written agreement. The undersigned Magistrate Judge further advised Defendant, in accord with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, that in the event the District Court Judge refused to follow the non-binding recommendations or stipulations contained in the written plea agreement and/or sentenced her to a sentence which was different from that which she expected, she would not be permitted to withdraw her guilty plea. Defendant and her counsel each acknowledged their understanding and Defendant maintained her desire to have her plea of guilty accepted.
Defendant also understood that her actual sentence could not be calculated until after a pre-sentence report was prepared and a sentencing hearing conducted. The undersigned also advised, and Defendant stated that she understood, that the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory, and that, even if the District Judge did not follow the Sentencing Guidelines or sentenced her to a higher sentence than she expected, she would not have a right to withdraw her guilty plea. Defendant further stated her attorney showed her how the advisory guideline chart worked but did not promise her any specific sentence at the time of sentencing. Defendant stated that she understood her attorney could not predict or promise her what actual sentence she would receive from the sentencing judge at the sentencing hearing. Defendant further understood there was no parole in the federal system, although she may be able to earn institutional good time, and that good time was not controlled by the Court, but by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
The Court would generally hear the testimony of a Government witness at this point in the hearing to support an independent basis in fact for the guilty plea. In this case, the parties agreed that they would rely on the Statement of the Facts contained Judge Bailey's Order denying Defendant's motion to suppress. (Docket No. 40.) Judge Bailey's Order adopted the Statement of the Facts contained in the undersigned's Report and Recommendation recommending that Defendant's motion to suppress be granted. (Docket No. 35.) Of particular note, the Government stated that the materials described in Count Two were those materials found when the search warrant for Defendant's residence was executed on April 23, 2013.
Defendant stated she heard, understood, and did not disagree with the use of the Statement of the Facts. The undersigned United States Magistrate Judge concludes the offense charged in Count Two of the Indictment is supported by an independent basis in fact concerning each of the essential elements of such offense. That independent basis is provided by the Statement of the Facts.
Thereupon, Defendant, Julie Ann Johnson, with the consent of her counsel, L. Richard Walker, proceeded to enter a verbal plea of GUILTY to the felony charge contained in Count Two of the Indictment.
Upon consideration of all of the above, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that Defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea; Defendant is aware of and understood her right to have an Article III Judge hear and accept her plea and elected to voluntarily consent to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge hearing and accepting her plea; Defendant understood the charges against her, not only as to the Indictment as a whole, but in particular as to Count Two of the Indictment; Defendant understood the consequences of her plea of guilty, in particular the maximum statutory penalty to which she would be exposed; Defendant understood her waiver of appellate rights explained this date; Defendant made a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty to Count Two of the Indictment; and Defendant's plea is independently supported by the Statement of the Facts, which provides, beyond a reasonable doubt, proof of each of the essential elements of the charge to which Defendant has pled guilty.
The undersigned Magistrate Judge therefore recommends Defendant's plea of guilty to Count Two of the Indictment herein be accepted conditioned upon the Court's receipt and review of this Report and Recommendation.
The undersigned further directs that a pre-sentence investigation report be prepared by the adult probation officer assigned to this case.
Defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal Service pending further proceedings in this matter.
Any party may, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, file with the Clerk of the Court written objections identifying the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objection is made, and the basis for such objection. A copy of such objections should also be submitted to the Honorable John Preston Bailey, Chief United States District Judge. Failure to timely file objections to the Report and Recommendation set forth above will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of this Court based upon such report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to counsel of record.
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of November, 2014.
John S. Kaull
JOHN S. KAULL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE