Opinion
Criminal Case No. 12-cr-00210-REB
01-15-2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW JARAMILLO, Defendant.
Judge Robert E. Blackburn
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S UNOPPOSED MOTION
TO EXCLUDE TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
Blackburn, J.
The matter before me is Matthew Jaramillo's Unopposed Motion For An Ends Of Justice Continuance Based Upon 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) [#62] filed December 7, 2012. I heard the motion on December 20, 2012. The motion is not opposed by the government. This written order memorializes, confirms, and supplements the findings of fact, conclusions of law, exclusions of time, and orders entered from the bench during the hearing.
"[#62]" is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a specific paper by the court's electronic case filing and management system (CM/ECF). I use this convention throughout this order.
The motion implicates the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174. Specifically, the motion implicates 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) which provides, in relevant part:
The following periods of delay shall be excluded . . . in computing the time within which the trial of any such offense must commence:18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
. . . .
(7)(A) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge . . . at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
The Speedy Trial Act is "designed to protect a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy indictment and trial, and to serve the public interest in ensuring prompt criminal proceedings." United States v. Hill , 197 F.3d 436, 440 (10th Cir. 1999). It requires that a criminal defendant's trial commence within 70 days after his indictment or initial appearance, whichever is later. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1); United States v. Lugo , 170 F.3d 996, 1001 (10th Cir. 1999). Certain periods of delay are excluded and do not count toward the 70-day limit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(9). Specifically, "the Act excludes any period of delay 'resulting from a continuance granted by any judge . . . on the basis of its findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.'" Hill , 197 F.3d at 440-441 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)).
In order for a continuance to qualify as an excludable "ends-of-justice" continuance under section 3161(h)(7)(A), certain prerequisites must be satisfied. Id. at 441. First, I must consider the following factors listed in section 3161(h)(7)(B):
(i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice;18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) - (iv).
(ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established by [the Act];
(iii) Whether, in a case in which arrest precedes indictment, delay in the filing of the indictment is caused because the arrest occurs at a time such that it is unreasonable to expect return and filing of the indictment within the period specified in section 3161(b), or because the facts upon which the grand jury must base its determination are unusual or complex;
(iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the defendant or the Government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
After considering these factors, I must then set forth, "in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, [my] reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Although my findings "'may be entered on the record after the fact, they may not be made after the fact.'" Hill , 197 F.3d at 441 (quoting United States v. Doran , 882 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir.1989)). "Instead, '[t]he balancing must occur contemporaneously with the granting of the continuance because Congress intended that the decision to grant an ends-of-justice continuance be prospective, not retroactive[.]'" Id. (quoting Doran , 882 F.2d at 1516). I have discharged these duties.
My findings were reached at the time of the hearing on December 20, 2012. The intervening holiday period delayed the formal entry of this written order.
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The motion is unopposed. Thus, the foundational and predicate facts averred in the motion are deemed established, and I need not reiterate them here. The motion describes in reasonable detail the various factors and circumstances that counsel believe necessitate the exclusion of time in this case. I adopt and incorporate those facts and the concomitant findings of fact that I entered during the hearing on December 20, 2012.
I was sensitive to and mindful of the teachings of relevant caselaw, including the principles and holdings in United States v. Williams , 511 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Toombs , 574 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Larson, 627 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2010); Bloate v. United States , - U.S. -. 130 S.Ct. 1345, 176 L.Ed.2d 54 (2010); and United States v. Tinklenberg , - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2007, 179 L.Ed.2d 1080 (2011).
Based on the relevant record considered as a whole, I find that it would be unreasonable to expect adequate preparation by the defendant, despite due diligence, for pretrial or trial proceedings within the time initially allowed under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c). I have considered the factors which I must under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i)-(iv). As required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(C), I have not predicated my ruling on congestion of the court's calendar or lack of diligent preparation by counsel. Accordingly, I conclude as follows:
(1) That failure to grant a continuance of trial beyond the time prescribed by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) would likely result in a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i);
(2) That even considering due diligence, failure to grant the motion would deny counsel for the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective pretrial and trial preparation within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv);
(3) That initially not less than sixty (60) days from December 20, 2012, to February 18, 2013, should be excluded from the computation of the time for speedy trial;
(4) That as agreed by the parties, the court should conduct a status conference on February 8, 2013, to consider, inter alia, what, if any, additional time should be excluded for the time for a speedy trial; and
(4) That, therefore, the ends of justice served by granting the motion outweighs the best interests of the public and defendant in a speedy trial within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1. That Matthew Jaramillo's Unopposed Motion For An Ends Of Justice Continuance Based Upon 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) [#62] filed December 7, 2012, is GRANTED consistent with the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the following orders;
2. That initially, sixty (60) days from December 20, 2012, to February 18, 2013, SHALL BE EXCLUDED from the computation of speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74; and
3. That as agreed by all, the court SHALL CONDUCT a status conference on February 8, 2013, commencing at 8:30 a.m. (MST) at which the parties and their counsel shall appear without further notice or order; provided, furthermore, that to the extent necessary, the United States Marshal Service for the District of Colorado shall assist the court in securing the appearance of the defendant.
Done in chambers January 15, 2013, at Denver, Colorado, to confirm, supplement, and explicate the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders entered from the bench during the hearing on December 20, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
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Robert E. Blackburn
United States District Judge