Opinion
08-cr-0894
10-22-2021
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DARRIS HYTE, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Mary M. Rowland, Judge
Defendant Darris Hyte seeks compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). [63]. The Government filed a response in opposition to Defendant's pro se motion. [65]. For the foregoing reasons, this Court denies Defendant's motion [63].
I. Background
On October 30, 2008, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant. [1]. The indictment charged Defendant with possessing a firearm as a felon; possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute; possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking; and possessing a firearm with a removed serial number. [1] at 1-4. On June 10, 2009, Defendant entered a “blind plea” to the third count of the indictment-possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. The Presentence Investigation Report determined that Defendant was a career offender based on previous cocaine offenses. [17] at 1. The Court sentenced Defendant to twenty years in prison and five years of supervised release. [24].
A “blind plea” is a plea of guilt entered without the benefit of a written Plea Agreement with the government.
On March 2, 2020, Defendant filed a motion under Section 404 of the First Step Act, requesting a sentence reduction. [49]. This Court denied Defendant's motion because he did not qualify for a sentence modification under the First Step Act. [62].
Defendant now moves for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). [63].
II. Analysis
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), this Court may grant a defendant's motion to reduce his term of imprisonment after the defendant “has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf” or after 30 days have passed “from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier.” Id. The parties agree that Defendant has properly exhausted his administrative rights. [65] at 3.
Once Defendant has exhausted, this Court may reduce Defendant's term of imprisonment if the Court finds, “extraordinary and compelling reasons to warrant such a reduction.” United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 573 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). If this Court finds such reasons exist, “it then must weigh any of the applicable sentence factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in determining whether to reduce a sentence.” Id. Until the Sentencing Commission updates its policy statement to reflect prisoner-initiated motions for compassionate release, district courts maintain broad discretion in determining what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to warrant a sentence reduction. Id.; see also United States v. Broadfield, 5 F.4th 801, 802 (7th Cir. 2021). Defendant bears the burden to demonstrate such “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” United States v. Newton, 996 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 2021). Here, however, Defendant falls short of raising “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to warrant a sentence reduction.
Defendant argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019) voids his blind plea because this Court accepted the plea without advising him of an element of the offense to which he pled guilty. [63] at 5- 6. In Rehaif, the Court held that charges under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) require the Government to prove both that a defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of people barred from possessing a firearm. Id. at 2200. Thus, if a defendant pled guilty to charges under those sections, the failure for the judge to admonish that defendant as to those knowledge elements might provide a basis for that defendant to void his or her guilty plea. Rehaif fails to apply here, however, because it concerned 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), and Defendant pled guilty to a different charge-possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Thus, the court had no obligation to admonish Defendant under Rehaif when it accepted Defendant's guilty plea.
Defendant also argues that Section 404 of the First Step Act entitles him to a sentence reduction. [63] at 7. Defendant, however, already made this argument in his First Step Act motion, and this Court denied the motion because eligibility under the Act depends upon whether a defendant was convicted of a crack-cocaine offense, and Defendant was not convicted of such an offense. [62].
Next, Defendant contends that his conviction on § 924(c)(1)(A) is invalid because he was not also convicted of an underlying offense. [63] at 7-9. This argument, too, lacks legal merit because a conviction under § 924(c) “does not require a prosecution for or conviction of” a “predicate offense.” Davila v. United States, 843 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 2016).
Finally, Defendant argues that he is “fearful for his life” due to the global COVID-19 pandemic. [63] at 12. At this point in the pandemic, “effective vaccines are available, ” and “[v]accinated prisoners are not at greater risk of COVID-19 than other vaccinated persons.” Broadfield, 5 F.4th at 802. Records from the Bureau of Prisons shows that Defendant has been fully vaccinated. [65-3]. Thus, Defendant's vaccinated status “makes it impossible” to conclude the risk of COVID-19 constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for release. Broadfield, 5 F.4th at 803.
In sum, Defendant has failed to demonstrate “extraordinary and compelling” reasons to warrant a sentence reduction or release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). This Court therefore need not reach consideration of the factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and denies Defendant's motion. See Thacker, 4 F.4th at 573 (outlining the two-step compassionate release analysis).
III. Conclusion
For the stated reasons, this Court denies Defendant's motion for compassionate release [63].