Opinion
23-4575
08-01-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JOSHUA ALEXANDER HOVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Terry Michael Meinecke, Julie Carol Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED
Submitted: July 30, 2024
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:23-cv-00056-TDS-1)
ON BRIEF:
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Terry Michael Meinecke, Julie Carol Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Joshua Alexander Hovis pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8). The district court sentenced Hovis to 85 months' imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning the reasonableness of Hovis' sentence, particularly the adequacy of the district court's consideration of one of Hovis' mitigating arguments. Although informed of his right to do so, Hovis has not filed a pro se supplemental brief, and the Government has elected not to file a brief. We affirm.
We review "all sentences-whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the [Sentencing] Guidelines range-under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard." United States v. Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). In conducting this review, we must first ensure that the sentence is procedurally reasonable, "consider[ing] whether the district court properly calculated the defendant's advisory [G]uidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the sentence is free of "significant procedural error," we then review it for substantive reasonableness, "tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances." Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). A sentence must be "sufficient, but not greater than necessary," to satisfy the statutory purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). "Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively [substantively] reasonable." United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
Here, the district court correctly calculated Hovis' advisory Guidelines range, heard argument from counsel, provided Hovis an opportunity to allocute, considered the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and explained its reasons for imposing the chosen sentence. Despite Anders counsel's contention to the contrary, the record reflects adequate consideration of defense counsel's mitigating arguments. Because Hovis has not demonstrated that his term of imprisonment "is unreasonable when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors," he has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness accorded his within-Guidelines sentence. Id. We therefore conclude that Hovis' sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court's judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Hovis, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Hovis requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Hovis. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED