Opinion
23-cr-20396-BLOOM
03-11-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. NATHAN HARRIS, Defendant.
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT
BETH BLOOM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Nathan Harris's Motion to Dismiss Indictment, ECF No. [17] (“Motion”), filed on February 2, 2024. The Government filed a Response in Opposition (“Response”), ECF No. [21], to which Defendant filed a Reply in Support (“Reply”), ECF No. [24]. The Court has considered the Motion, the record, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
According to the Indictment, on or about July 3, 2023, Defendant “knowingly possess[ed] a firearm and ammunition in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce” despite having previously been convicted of a felony. See ECF No. [1]. Defendant was accordingly charged with possession of a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Defendant seeks dismissal of the Indictment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3). Defendant contends the Indictment must be dismissed because § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment, either on its face or as applied to Defendant. Defendant argues the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) makes clear the Second Amendment protects his right to bear arms despite his status as a convicted felon. The Government responds that the Eleventh Circuit squarely held that felons do not have a right to possess firearms in United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010), and that Bruen did not overrule this holding. The Government also argues that even if Bruen did overrule Rozier, § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on felon-firearm possession is constitutional under Bruen. Defendant replies that Bruen overruled Rozier because it demonstrates Rozier misapplied the Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). With Rozier inapplicable, Defendant argues the Government fails to show § 922(g)(1) is consistent with America's historical tradition of firearm regulation.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss an indictment is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b). A defendant may challenge an indictment on various grounds, including failure to state an offense, lack of jurisdiction, or constitutional reasons. See United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2012). “Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) an indictment may be dismissed where there is an infirmity of law in the prosecution; a court may not dismiss an indictment, however, on a determination of facts that should have developed at trial.” United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1354 (11th Cir. 1987). Further, “[t]he sufficiency of a criminal indictment is determined from its face.” United States v. Critzer, 951 F.2d 306, 307 (11th Cir. 1992). “The indictment is sufficient if it charges in the language of the statute.” Id. “Constitutional requirements are fulfilled ‘by an indictment that tracks the wording of the statute, as long as the language sets forth the essential elements of the crime.'” Id. at 308; see also United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 760. The indictment's allegations are assumed to be true and are viewed in the light most favorable to the government. See Torkington, 812 F.2d at 1354.
III. DISCUSSION
As noted above, Defendant asserts a facial and as applied challenge that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment. Defendant contends § 922(g)(1)'s permanent ban on a felon possessing a firearm or ammunition runs afoul of the Second Amendment's guarantee that “the right of the people to keep and bear arms[] shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. Defendant specifically argues § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the two-step test articulated by the Supreme Court in Bruen. The Government responds that Bruen did not overrule the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Rozier that § 922(g)(1)'s felon-firearm ban does not violate the Second Amendment, and that § 922(g)(1) is nonetheless constitutional under Bruen.
In Heller, the Supreme Court upheld a Second Amendment challenge to a District of Columbia law banning the private possession of handguns. The Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment guarantees law-abiding citizens the right to possess handguns in the home for self-defense. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635-36. The Supreme Court adopted a framework based on “both text and history” for analyzing Second Amendment challenges to firearm restrictions. Id. at 595. Relevant here, however, the Supreme Court observed “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill[,]” calling such restrictions “presumptively lawful.” Id. at 627 & n.26.
The Eleventh Circuit subsequently relied on Heller to reject a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) in Rozier. The defendant in Rozier challenged his conviction under § 922(g)(1) for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, on the ground that his conviction was inconsistent with Heller. The Eleventh Circuit held that “statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.” 598 F.3d at 771. The court explained Heller S “first question ... is whether one is qualified to possess a firearm.” Id. (emphasis in original). The court found felons are unqualified to possess firearms as a class because they are not “law-abiding citizen[s].” Id. The Eleventh Circuit observed that this conclusion was consistent with Heller as well as the Supreme Court's opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742 (2010). Id. (citations omitted).
In Bruen, the Supreme Court revisited the analytical framework set forth in Heller. The court struck down a New York law prohibiting citizens from obtaining a license to carry firearms outside the home without first obtaining a special permit. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 10-11. The court held this restriction was unconstitutional because “the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual's right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home.” Id. at 10. As the Eleventh Circuit recently explained in United States v. Dubois, No. 22-10829, 2024 WL 927030 (11th Cir. Mar. 5, 2024), the Supreme Court rejected a two-step test employed by most federal circuits in the process:
Bruen began its analysis by rejecting, as inconsistent with Heller, the second part of a two-step test that then prevailed in most circuits. See id. at 2125-30. Under that test, a court would first ask whether the challenged law burdened conduct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment, “as historically understood.” See, e.g., United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012). If it did, the court would review the regulation under either intermediate or strict scrutiny. See Id. We embraced this two-part framework in dicta beginning in 2012, see Georgia Carry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012), but we have never actually applied the second, means-end-scrutiny step, see United States v. Jimenez-Shilon, 34 F.4th 1042, 1052-53 (11th Cir. 2022) (Newsom, J., concurring).Id., at *4.
Bruen affirmed “[s]tep one of the predominant framework” as “broadly consistent with Heller, which demands a test rooted in the Second Amendment's text, as informed by history.” 597 U.S. at 19. But it rejected step two, finding “means-end scrutiny” inconsistent with Heller's rejection of a “judge-empowering interest-balancing inquiry[.]” Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 634). The Supreme Court concluded by confirming “‘Heller's text-and-history standard' is the correct test for determining the constitutionality of gun restrictions.” DuBois, 2024 WL 927030, at *5 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 39).
DuBois explicitly rejects the argument that Bruen overruled the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Rozier.The defendant in DuBois argued § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment by categorically prohibiting convicted felons from possessing firearms. Id., at *3. The defendant conceded this argument was foreclosed by Rozier but argued that Rozier was abrogated by Bruen. Id. The Eleventh Circuit explained that Bruen did not abrogate Rozier, and Rozier's holding that § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on felons possessing firearms does not violate the Second Amendment continues to be binding precedent:
The Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in DuBois after the parties fully briefed Defendant's Motion.
Bruen did not abrogate Rozier. Because the Supreme Court “made it clear in Heller that [its] holding did not cast doubt” on felon-in-possession prohibitions, McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 (plurality opinion), and because the Court made it clear in Bruen that its holding was “[i]n keeping with Heller,” 142 S.Ct. at 2126, Bruen could not have clearly abrogated our precedent upholding section 922(g)(1). See Del Castillo, 26 F.4th at 1223-25. Indeed, the Bruen majority did not mention felons or section 922(g)(1). See Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d at 1238-39.
Dubois argues that we may depart from Rozier because Bruen abrogated “[a]ll prior precedent relying on the two-step analysis.” But Rozier upheld section 922(g)(1) on the threshold ground that felons are categorically “disqualified” from exercising their Second Amendment right under Heller. Rozier, 598 F.3d at 77071 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635). We interpreted Heller as limiting the right to “law-abiding and qualified individuals” and as clearly excluding felons from those categories by referring to felon-in-possession bans as presumptively lawful. Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771 & n.6. And far from “demolish[ing]” or “eviscerat[ing]” Rozier's reliance on Heller, see Del Castillo, 26 F.4th at 1224, Bruen repeatedly stated that its decision was faithful to Heller. We require clearer instruction from the Supreme Court before we may reconsider the constitutionality of section 922(g)(1). Because Rozier binds us, Dubois's challenge based on the Second Amendment necessarily fails.Id., at *5-6.
Defendant's argument fails for the same reasons. DuBois forecloses Defendant's argument that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment under the two-step test articulated in Bruen. The Eleventh Circuit has determined Bruen does not abrogate Rozier's holding and, as such, Rozier's holding that § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on felon firearm possession does not violate the Second Amendment remains binding precedent. Accordingly, Defendant's “challenge based on the Second Amendment necessarily fails.” Id., at *6.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment, ECF No. [17], is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED