Opinion
17-4487
06-02-2023
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DONOVAN LETRELL HALL, Defendant-Appellant.
Jaclyn L. Tarlton, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. David A. Bragdon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Louis C. Allen, Acting Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED
Argued: May 4, 2023
On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States. (S.Ct. No. 17-9221)
ARGUED:
Jaclyn L. Tarlton, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
David A. Bragdon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Louis C. Allen, Acting Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, KING, Circuit Judge, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM
Donovan Letrell Hall pleaded guilty in February 2017, in the Eastern District of North Carolina, to a single count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) (the "felon-in-possession offense"). In July 2017, Hall was sentenced to 110 months in prison for that offense. On February 28, 2018, we affirmed Hall's conviction and sentence. See United States v. Hall, 725 Fed.Appx. 210 (4th Cir. 2018). In June 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari with respect to our decision, vacated the judgment of affirmance, and remanded to us for further consideration of this appeal in light of the Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019). See Hall v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2771 (2019).
Upon review of the record on appeal, the various appellate submissions of the parties, and the oral argument of counsel, we are satisfied that Hall is not entitled to relief under the Rehaif precedent. See 139 S.Ct. at 2197 (recognizing that the prosecution must prove a mens rea element that the defendant knew he was a prohibited person when he possessed a firearm). At bottom, Hall - with two previous North Carolina felony convictions for which he served more than a year in custody - fails to demonstrate that there is a "reasonable probability" he would not have pleaded guilty to the felon-inpossession offense had "the [district court] . . . correctly advised him of the mens rea element" thereof. See Greer v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 2090, 2097 (2021). Accordingly, we are satisfied to again affirm Hall's 2017 conviction on the felon-in-possession offense.
Our disposition of the Rehaif issue notwithstanding, we are also convinced that Hall is now entitled to sentencing relief, pursuant to our Court's recent decisions in United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020) (recognizing that all discretionary conditions of supervised release must be orally pronounced at sentencing), and United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2021) (emphasizing that proper remedy for Rogers error is plenary resentencing). As the government acknowledged during the oral argument in Richmond, a Rogers error is readily apparent on this record, in that the district court failed to orally pronounce 16 discretionary conditions of supervised release in Hall's sentencing proceedings. And our Singletary precedent provides - as the government also recognizes - that the remedy for such a sentencing error is a plenary resentencing.
Although Rogers and Singletary had not been decided when Hall's sentence on the felon-in-possession offense was imposed by the district court in July 2017 - nor when we initially resolved this appeal in February 2018 - those decisions are now the applicable law of this circuit. And "on direct appeal 'a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision." See Lytle v. Comm'rs of Election of Union Cnty., 541 F.2d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 1976) (quoting Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)).
We appreciate and commend the government's acknowledgment of the Rogers error that we recognize in this appeal. That position is consistent with the principle that the prosecution's "interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
Despite acknowledging the Rogers error, the government nevertheless insists that sentencing relief for Hall on the Rogers error is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's Rehaif-related remand order. More specifically, the government interposes the "mandate rule" and maintains that we are not entitled to consider or recognize the Rogers error in these appeal proceedings. Put simply, and as explained below, we readily disagree.
As our Court has heretofore recognized, the mandate rule generally "forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court." See United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993). Notably, however, the mandate rule does not apply in court of appeals proceedings when "extraordinary circumstances" are present. Id. at 67. Such circumstances include those presented when "a blatant error in the prior decision will, if uncorrected, result in a serious injustice." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). That exception is satisfied here. Pursuant thereto, we are authorized to consider - and correct - the blatant Rogers error arising from the multiple unannounced discretionary conditions of supervised release that were erroneously included in Hall's 2017 criminal judgment. As one of our sister courts of appeals recently emphasized, a failure to announce such discretionary conditions at sentencing "is tantamount to sentencing the defendant in absentia," which is plainly impermissible. See United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Pursuant to the foregoing, we reinstate our February 28, 2018 decision with respect to Hall's conviction on the felon-in-possession offense, in that we are satisfied to reject his assertion of a Rehaif error. On the other hand, we vacate Hall's July 2017 sentence and remand to the district court for such other and further sentencing proceedings as may be appropriate.
To complete the record, we grant Hall's unopposed motion to file a supplemental joint appendix. And we deny as moot Hall's motion for summary disposition.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED