Opinion
Case No. 07-cr-239 (JNE/FLN)(1)
07-22-2016
United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Dejuan Haywood Haggins, Defendant.
ORDER
On May 27, 2008, Defendant Dejuan Haywood Haggins was sentenced to 188 months' imprisonment as a career offender under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Haggins now moves to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). In Johnson, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the "residual clause" of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 135 S. Ct. at 2563. Though Haggins was not sentenced under the ACCA, the guidelines' career-offender enhancement, under which he was sentenced, includes an identical residual clause. Haggins asks this Court to apply Johnson retroactively to his guidelines sentence.
The Supreme Court has not made Johnson retroactive to guidelines claims. Even if this Court were nevertheless to apply Johnson to Haggins's guidelines sentence, Haggins would remain a career offender. To qualify as a career offender, a defendant must have "at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A "crime of violence" is a federal or state offense punishable by more than one year that: "(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or," to quote the residual clause, "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Id. § 4B1.2(a)(1)-(2). Haggins has a 2000 conviction for third degree burglary, a 2007 conviction for aggravated first degree robbery, and a 2004 conviction for fourth degree assault. These prior convictions qualify as crimes of violence without resort to the residual clause. See U.S. v. Sonczalla, 561 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that a third degree burglary conviction qualified as a violent felony); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, cmt. n. 1 (defining "crime of violence" to include robbery); U.S. v. Schaffer, 818 F.3d 796, 799 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that an assault conviction qualified as a violent felony); U.S. v. Harvey, -- F. App'x --, 2016 WL 1696816, at *1 (8th Cir. Apr. 28, 2016) (per curiam) (holding that a second degree assault conviction qualified as a violent felony). Accordingly, even if Johnson applied to Haggins's guidelines claims, Haggins has more than enough prior felony convictions to qualify as a career offender. Thus, his motion fails.
In addition, a defendant's instant felony offense must be a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Haggins pled guilty to armed bank robbery, which is a crime of violence. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, cmt. n. 1 (defining "crime of violence" to include robbery). --------
An appeal cannot be taken from a final order denying a motion under § 2255 without a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B); Fed. R.App. P. 22(b)(1). A court cannot issue a certificate of appealability unless the applicant has made a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). "Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here, Haggins has not demonstrated that reasonable jurists would find the rejection of his claim debatable or wrong. Thus, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
Based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons stated above, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant's § 2255 motion [Docket No. 62] is DENIED.
2. Defendant's motion to appoint counsel [Docket No. 64] is DENIED AS MOOT.
3. A certificate of appealability is DENIED. Dated: July 22, 2016
s/Joan N. Ericksen
JOAN N. ERICKSEN
United States District Judge