On the other hand, if the search is held to have been a "state" undertaking with minimal federal involvement, the warrant, assuming proper issuance under state law, need only conform to federal constitutional requirements. See, e. g., United States v. Johnson, 451 F.2d 1321, 1322 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1018, 92 S.Ct. 1298, 31 L.Ed.2d 480 (1972); United States v. Coronna, 420 F.2d 1091, 1092 n.2 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Cotham, 363 F. Supp. 851, 855 (W.D.Tex. 1973) United States v. Grosso, 225 F. Supp. 161 (W.D.Pa. 1964). An argument can be made that the search was "federal" in character, but we are more inclined to view the search as a "state" undertaking in which federal agents participated solely to supply additional manpower for the execution of the warrant.

Consequently, federal customs officers may now make warrantless arrests for narcotics misdemeanors on probable cause. See also United States v. Grosso, 225 F. Supp. 161, 168-170 (W.D.Pa. 1964) (Pennsylvania statute authorizing warrantless arrests for misdemeanor offenses involving "gaming devices" is constitutional). This conclusion is not undermined by occasional references to state law in cases challenging the validity of state arrests.

We do not reach the point urged by the appellant that unrecorded oral statements to the magistrate may not be the basis for a finding of probable cause to issue a warrant. United States v. Sterling, 3d Cir. 1966, 369 F.2d 799, 802 n. 2; Miller v. Sigler, 8th Cir. 1965, 353 F.2d 424; United States v. Grosso, W.D.Pa. 1964, 225 F. Supp. 161; Commonwealth v. Crawley, 1966, 209 Pa. Super. 70, 223 A.2d 885. The time of a police search of an occupied family home may be a significant factor in determining whether, in a Fourth Amendment sense, the search is "unreasonable."

"We do not believe, however, that dismissal of the indictments would be an appropriate sanction * *. The law calls only for exclusion, and we do not0 think that the public interest would be served by requiring more than this in the exercise of our supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice." See also United States v. Grosso, 225 F. Supp. 161, 175 (W.D.Pa. 1964) ("the use of such illegally obtained evidence is irrelevant where the issue facing the Court is whether * * * an indictment should be dismissed."); United States v. Block, 202 F. Supp. 705, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ("The motion to suppress the evidence is granted. The motion to dismiss the indictment is denied, because the court cannot speculate upon the nature and quality of the evidence presented to the grand jury.").

Indeed, our research has disclosed no case in which an "in the presence of" requirement has been held constitutionally indispensible to a valid arrest. See Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1974); Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975); United States v. Grosso, 225 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Pa. 1964); Lurie v. District Attorney of Kings County, 56 Misc.2d 68, 288 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1968). We have said in State v. Davis, 105 R.I. 247, 251 A.2d 394 (1969), that article 1, § 6 of our state constitution has the same effect as the fourth amendment of the Federal Constitution.