Opinion
20-10399
09-22-2021
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANKIE THOMAS GOULDING, Defendant-Appellant.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court No. 1:18-cr-00240-LJO-SKO-1 for the Eastern District of California Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
Before: PAEZ, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Frankie Thomas Goulding appeals pro se from the district court's orders denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and subsequent motion for reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Initially, the government is correct that Goulding's appeal from the order denying his motion for compassionate release is untimely. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1). Goulding's motion for reconsideration did not toll the deadline to file a notice of appeal because it was not filed within the requisite 14-day period. See United States v. Lefler, 880 F.2d 233, 235 (9th Cir. 1989).
We review the district court's order denying reconsideration for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Tapia-Marquez, 361 F.3d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 2004). Goulding contends that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by treating U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as the applicable policy statement. While the district court appears to have treated § 1B1.13 as binding in violation of United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2021), the error does not warrant remand because the district court also denied reconsideration after weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 2021) (district court can deny compassionate release on the basis of the § 3553(a) factors alone). Contrary to Goulding's argument, the court did not rely on any clearly erroneous findings related to the length or consecutive nature of his sentence, see United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010), and it did not abuse its discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, see Keller, 2 F.4th at 1284. We do not reach Goulding's remaining arguments related to the reconsideration order because they do not raise any error in the court's § 3553(a) analysis.
We deny Goulding's renewed request for a limited remand and deny as unnecessary his requests for judicial notice.
AFFIRMED.