United States v. Gleason

33 Citing cases

  1. Byrd v. Wainwright

    428 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1970)   Cited 140 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the court is not required to sever if the testimony is of negligible weight or probative value

    It is clear that the court treated as trustworthy the statements of the numerous counsel, as officers of the court. United States v. Gleason, 259 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) is an example of handling the motion, and the showings of underlying factors, by affidavits from both sides. We turn to the second area of inquiry, the exculpatory nature, and the significance, of the codefendant's testimony and the showing of those factors.

  2. United States v. Shuford

    454 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971)   Cited 86 times
    Finding that the defendant should not be precluded from offering a co-defendant's testimony "simply because that probability was not an absolute certainty"

    The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding on these facts that denial of the severance so prejudiced Echeles' defense that a new trial was required. Other courts likewise have recognized that a severance is due where the moving defendant needs the evidence of a co-defendant; this need is unlikely to be met in a joint trial; and "there is a substantially greater likelihood" that the evidence would be forthcoming if severance were granted. United States v. Gleason. 259 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also United States v. Addonizio, 313 F. Supp. 486 (D.C.N.J. 1970).

  3. United States v. Gilbert

    504 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)   Cited 13 times
    Finding a risk of prejudice because a defendant-described as an "innocent dupe"-had a disproportionate involvement with the overall scheme and was otherwise unfamiliar with the principal defendant's machinations

    Implicit in this discussion is a recognition that the resolution of the co-defendant's severed trial might eliminate the basis for any subsequent assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. That consideration occurred to Judge Frankel when he directed severance in United States v. Gleason, 259 F. Supp. 282, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1966): "If Pitkin is tried separately and first, he may plead, or be found, guilty.

  4. United States v. DePalma

    466 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that movant may make offer of codefendant's testimony conditional upon codefendant's being tried first

    A reasonable probability appearing that the proffered testimony would, in fact, materialize, Shuford should not have been foreclosed from the benefits of Jordan's pivotal testimony simply because that probability was not an absolute certainty. United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Gleason, 259 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). (Footnotes omitted.)

  5. United States v. Rosa

    560 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1977)   Cited 41 times
    In United States v. Rosa, 560 F.2d 149, 153 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862, 98 S.Ct. 191, 54 L.Ed.2d 135 (1977), a case in which there was no effect on commerce because the "victim" refused to pay the extortion demand, we stated that a defendant may be convicted under the Hobbs Act for an "attempted extortion which would, if the act were completed, have the effect of obstructing commerce."

    The attitude toward the motions for severance I think should have been treated with greater deference as was done in Byrd. In United States v. Gleason, 259 F. Supp. 282, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the court stated: "It is enough to say that Karp [the movant] has shown persuasive ground for the claim that she needs Pitkin's [the co-defendant's] evidence; that the need must almost certainly go unsatisfied in a joint trial; and that there is substantially greater likelihood of her using him if they are tried separately." What has been stated in Gleason, I deem to be truly applicable here.

  6. Smith v. United States

    385 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1967)   Cited 82 times
    In Smith v. United States, 385 F.2d 34 (5 Cir. 1967), the court assumed that any prejudice in that particular case had been remedied by such an instruction.

    See United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1965). See Kolod v. United States, 371 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Sanders, 266 F. Supp. 615 (W.D.La. 1967); United States v. Gleason, 259 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 1 A.L.R.3d 969 (5th Cir. 1962), is no obstacle.

  7. U.S. v. Pirro

    76 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)   Cited 23 times
    Requiring the Government to provide information as required by Rule 16(E) no less than fifteen days prior to trial

    See United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1362 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance, in part because the defendant had failed to establish, as Finkelstein require[d], that the codefendant would waive his Fifth Amendment privilege given the codefendant's repeated assertions that he would not answer any questions until instructed by the court that he had no Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer). Albert Pirro's reliance on United States v. Gleason, 259 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), is misplaced. In Gleason, decided long before Finkelstein and Zafiro, the district court granted a defendant's motion for severance in a tax fraud case from her co-defendant tax preparer because she wished to call the preparer as a witness expecting exculpatory testimony.

  8. United States v. Kozell

    468 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Pa. 1979)   Cited 5 times
    In Kozell, supra, defendant Kozell similarly attempted to demonstrate that his co-defendant's (Keller) testimony would be exculpatory.

    The only information provided to the Court is based upon the unsworn representations of counsel for both Kozell and Keller to the effect that Keller would, in essence, admit his own role in the delivery but would state that Kozell was not a participant in the conspiracy, that he had no knowledge of it and that he did not receive any part of the proceeds of the sale. While it is not necessary that Kozell demonstrate the nature of Keller's testimony through sworn testimony, Byrd v. Wainwright, supra, 428 F.2d at 1020; United States v. Gleason, 259 F. Supp. 282, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), and while the Court has no reason to doubt the integrity and professionalism of respective counsel, we are not convinced that Keller's testimony would go far to exculpate Kozell. This case is unlike others in which the codefendant whose testimony is sought has already made exculpatory statements which can give the Court some notion of what he will testify to at a later trial.

  9. United States v. Sherman

    426 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)   Cited 7 times

    The statement of the co-defendant had been made several times in the context of an earlier trial of that co-defendant on a different offense, and thus the exact nature and significance of that testimony was known. Also in United States v. Gleason, 259 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), Judge Frankel severed the trial of two co-defendants where oral and written statements had been made by one co-defendant specifically supporting the main defendant's defense of lack of criminal intent in an income tax evasion case. By way of contrast, in United States v. Crisona, 271 F. Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where the significance and content of the alleged exculpatory testimony of a co-defendant could not be determined in advance of the trial, the court denied the motion for separate trials.

  10. United States v. Rosa

    404 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Pa. 1975)   Cited 6 times

    Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 80 S.Ct. 945, 4 L.Ed.2d 921 (1960). In support of his argument, defendant cites United States v. Gleason, 259 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971) and United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1965). In Gleason, after a pretrial hearing the court granted severance in an income tax evasion case when the moving defendant made a showing that he needed the evidence of a co-defendant to establish his defense of lack of guilty knowledge.