United States v. Gebhard

7 Citing cases

  1. In re Baldinger

    356 F. Supp. 153 (C.D. Cal. 1973)   Cited 12 times
    In Baldinger, a grand jury witness opposed immunity on the ground that § 6002 did not preclude the use of her compelled testimony in a possible prosecution for prior false statements to FBI agents.

    The exception from immunity for perjury and false statements in § 6002 is not so restricted. The failure of the use immunity statute to provide for immunity for past acts of perjury and false statement constitutes a defect that is laden with constitutional significance. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Kronick in United States v. Gebhard, 426 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1970). The witness had been granted immunity under a broad transactional immunity statute which provided that:

  2. State v. Kenny

    68 N.J. 17 (N.J. 1975)   Cited 15 times

    The Marcus language, although dictum, clearly and unequivocally states that once immunity has been granted, the witness is entitled to protection with respect to any facet of his compelled testimony. In United States v. Gebhard, 426 F.2d 965 (9 Cir. 1970), the defendant, after having been granted immunity under 47 U.S.C. § 409 (l), had refused to testify as a witness at a perjury trial. He was held in contempt.

  3. United States v. Coachman

    752 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1985)   Cited 11 times
    Allowing two criminal contempts where appellants refused to testify before the grand jury and later during the trial because the appellants impeded two distinct government functions—investigation by the grand jury and the court in trying the crime—“witness contemptuous conduct in both operations defies governmental authority in each of those separate manifestations, and is guilty of separate contempts”

    See text supra at note 8.Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683, 695 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 909, 79 S.Ct. 1294, 3 L.Ed.2d 1260 (1959); United States v. Hawkins, 501 F.2d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079, 95 S.Ct. 668, 42 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974); United States v. Gebhard, 426 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1970). See also cases cited supra note 36.

  4. United States v. Smith

    532 F.2d 158 (10th Cir. 1976)   Cited 18 times
    Allowing two criminal contempts for the defendant's refusal to testify in two successive trials because “the government had reason to expect that the defendant would testify” at the second trial

    The cases hold that successive contempts are punishable as separate offenses. United States v. Gebhard, 426 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Hawkins, 501 F.2d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir. 1974); Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 909, 79 S.Ct. 1294, 3 L.Ed.2d 1260 (1950); Tobin v. Pielet, 186 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1951). A further reason should be mentioned. Appellant received identical sentences to be served concurrently and thus he is not prejudiced. United States v. Wertis, 505 F.2d 683, 685 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.Hale, 468 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1972); see, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 105, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 1387-1388, 87 L.Ed. 1774, 1778 (1943); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969); United States v. Tager, 479 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162, 94 S.Ct. 924, 39 L.Ed.2d 115 (1974).

  5. United States v. Hawkins

    501 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1974)   Cited 24 times

    "It is well established that separate successive contempts are punishable as separate offenses." United States v. Gebhard, 426 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1970), and cases cited therein. Thus, the criminal contempt citation for Hawkins' first refusal to provide exemplars was wholly separable from the civil contempt citation for his second refusal.

  6. In re Sp. Sep., 1972 Gr. Jury

    500 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1974)   Cited 1 times

    Our court took notice of both United Mine Workers and Gompers in Tobin v. Pielet, 7 Cir., 186 F.2d 886, 888-890 (1951), written by the late Chief Judge Major. Pielet was cited in Bullock v. United States, 6 Cir., 265 F.2d 683, 695, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 909, 79 S.Ct. 1294, 3 L.Ed.2d 1260 (1959), where Chief Judge Allen stated: "Successive and separate contempts are punishable as separate offenses," citing Jennings v. United States, 8 Cir., 264 F. 399, 406 (1920). Further, in United States v. Gebhard, 9 Cir., 426 F.2d 965, 968 (1970), the court held a plea of double jeopardy to be groundless since "[i]t is well established that separate successive contempts are punishable as separate offenses," citing Bullock and Pielet, supra. Finally, in Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 74-75, 78 S.Ct. 128, 133, 2 L.Ed. 2d 95 (1957), Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the majority, wrote:

  7. State v. Driscoll

    89 N.M. 541 (N.M. 1976)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that further contempt proceedings after a lawyer was summarily jailed for contempt in open court would constitute double jeopardy

    Separate, successive contempts are punishable as separate offenses. United States v. Gebhard, 426 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1970); Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683, 695 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 909, 79 S.Ct. 1294, 3 L.Ed.2d 1260 (1959); Donovan v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.2d 848, 250 P.2d 246 (1952); Blodgett v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. 1, 290 P. 293 (1930); Application of Stafford, 160 Cal.App.2d 110, 324 P.2d 967, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 913, 79 S.Ct. 242, 3 L.Ed.2d 233 (1958); 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 100 (1963). The final question to be decided is whether the conviction of Driscoll by Judge Traub can properly be permitted to stand, since the judgment of conviction does not expressly negative the possibility that the conviction was based, in whole or in part, upon the same misconduct for which Driscoll was summarily convicted of contempt and sentenced to jail by Judge Ryan, as above discussed.