In United States v. Fuentes, the circuit court concluded that officers established probable cause in conducting a consensual search that ultimately became an arrest where the defendant grew evasive and forceful as the officers identified something in his pocket. 105 F.3d 487, 48890 (9th Cir. 1997). The court found that because the defendant “emphatically”
termining that most significant factor establishing reasonable suspicion was defendant “veer[ing] to his left, rushing by a couple of people, and beginning] [to] walk[] very fast, looking out of the corner of his eye as if waiting for [investigator] to catch up with him” after defendant spotted investigator identifying himself to another passenger at airport), aff'd, 615 F.2d 1351 (2d Cir. 1979); Atchak, 2023 WL 5753618, at *2; United States v. Peralta, No. 3:08-cr-00084-RRB-DMS, 2008 WL 11396749, at *4 (D. Alaska Nov. 4, 2008) (finding one of four relevant factors establishing reasonable suspicion to be defendant's refusal to stop upon initiation of a traffic stop because such refusal “could suggest that the occupants [were] trying to hide something in the vehicle”); United States v. Smith, 633 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that defendant's sudden, unprovoked, headlong flight was suggestive of wrongdoing under the circumstances and established reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Fuentes, 105 F.3d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that reasonable suspicion existed where, among other factors, defendant looked around airport “as if he were watching for law enforcement people,” and defendant waited outside in a car with others until only 10 minutes before his flight, “thus minimizing his exposure to possible law enforcement surveillance in the airport”); United States v. Campbell, 627 F.Supp. 320, 324 (D. Alaska 1985) (determining that reasonable suspicion existed based on factors including his “scanning] the crowd [aft er arrival at the airport] in a furtive manner”). Second, Defendant's answers to Investigator Beene's questions, including her explanation that the purpose of her travel was to look for a home
Plaintiff briefly argues in his MSJ that Section 25850(b) violates the Fourth Amendment because “the mere refusal to consent to a search” cannot constitute probable cause for an arrest. (MSJ at 10) (citing United States v. Fuentes, 105 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir.1997)). The Court disagrees with Defendant that Plaintiff's misdemeanor conviction for violation of Redondo Beach Municipal Section 4–35.20(a), which prohibits carrying a weapon “across, in, or into a park,” necessarily bars Plaintiff's challenge to California Penal Code Section 25850(b).
Such a finding is further reinforced by Teal's attempts to discourage further investigation into the incident and his flight from law enforcement. See United States v. Fuentes, 105 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1997) (flight from law enforcement, combined with other evidence, may give rise to probable cause). The suggestion made to Helm that "the suspect might have braided hair" is insufficient to negate this ample showing of probable cause.
Her jury instruction relating to September 11 was overbroad, and her instruction regarding refusal to consent to search misstated the law. See United States v. Fuentes, 105 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that such refusal may be relevant in certain circumstances). The district court therefore did not err in declining to give the proposed instructions.
with other evidence g[ives] rise to probable cause." United States v. Fuentes, 105 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). Hanline drove her car less than one block, looked in the direction of a marked police car, shifted her car into reverse and drove away from the police car, causing her tires to squeal.
To conclude otherwise would be illogical because Crowell has a constitutional right to refuse consent to an unlawful search. See id.; United States v. Fuentes, 105 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1997) ("People do not have to voluntarily give up their privacy or freedom of movement, on pain of justifying forcible deprivation of those same liberties if they refuse.") The Idaho Supreme Court similarly has recognized that the legality of an arrest for obstructing an officer under the Idaho Code depends on the lawfulness of the officer's request.
SeeFlorida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ("[A]n individual may decline an officer's request [to cooperate] without fearing prosecution."). And his mere refusal to do so does not give rise to reasonable suspicion. Seeid. ("We have consistently held that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure."); United States v. Fuentes, 105 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir.1997) ("Mere refusal to consent to a stop or search does not give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause. People do not have to voluntarily give up their privacy or freedom of movement, on pain of justifying forcible deprivation of those same liberties if they refuse.").
The propriety of a Terry stop is reviewed de novo. United States v. Fuentes, 105 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir.1997). Although it is a close case, we conclude that the Anchorage Police Department ("APD") had reasonable suspicion to stop and search Donnelly.
The propriety of a Terry stop is reviewed de novo. See United States v. Fuentes, 105 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1997). Maggio contends that Officer Jones had no reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot when he approached Maggio outside of Room 320 and moved him to Room 323. Maggio argues that Jones knew that Room 320 had been cleared of people and drugs and thus that Maggio could not have committed a drug crime in Room 320.