United States v. Frascone

17 Citing cases

  1. State v. Dull

    120 Wn. App. 1051 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)

    While these statements are improper, Dull has not shown that they were so flagrant and ill-intentioned that no curative instruction could have neutralized their effect. United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957-58 (5th Cir. 1984). In Frascone, the prosecutor in closing argument stated: "I take an oath to see that justice is done. [The defense attorneys] take an oath to represent their client zealously."

  2. State v. Gonzales

    111 Wn. App. 276 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 77 times
    In State v. Gonzales, 111 Wash.App. 276, 283, 45 P.3d 205 (2002), the prosecutor directly contrasted the roles of prosecutor and defense counsel.

    Because of the trial court's immediate corrective instruction, however, the court concluded the remark did not require reversal. 747 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1984).Frascone, 747 F.2d at 957.

  3. U.S. v. Vaccaro

    115 F.3d 1211 (5th Cir. 1997)   Cited 37 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding no plain error in the prosecutor's reference to the defendants as “criminals”

    The prosecutor was seeking to "draw the cloak of righteousness around the prosecutor in his personal status as government attorney and impugn the integrity of defense counsel." United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957-58 (5th Cir. 1984). This court has been clear that "[n]o prosecutor . . . may impugn the integrity of a particular lawyer or that of lawyers in general, without basis in fact, as a means of imputing guilt to a defendant."

  4. Moffett v. State

    156 So. 3d 835 (Miss. 2014)

    The prosecutor was seeking to “draw the cloak of righteousness around the prosecutor in his personal status as government attorney and impugn[ ] the integrity of defense counsel.” United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957–58 (5th Cir.1984). This court has been clear that “[n]o prosecutor ... may impugn the integrity of a particular lawyer or that of lawyers in general, without basis in fact, as a means of imputing guilt to a defendant.”

  5. Moffett v. State

    156 So. 3d 835 (Miss. 2014)

    The prosecutor was seeking to “draw the cloak of righteousness around the prosecutor in his personal status as government attorney and impugn[ ] the integrity of defense counsel.” United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957–58 (5th Cir.1984). This court has been clear that “[n]o prosecutor ... may impugn the integrity of a particular lawyer or that of lawyers in general, without basis in fact, as a means of imputing guilt to a defendant.”

  6. United States v. Valas

    822 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2016)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that prosecutor's comment shifting the burden did not constitute reversible error because court gave curative jury instruction

    In that case, the prosecutor was clearly talking about the defense attorney “muddling the issues,” and the court found it was improper because the prosecutor “was seeking to ‘draw the cloak of righteousness around the prosecutor in his personal status as government attorney and impugn[ ] the integrity of defense counsel.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957–58 (5th Cir.1984) ). Here, the prosecutors focused on Valas himself “muddying the waters,” and Valas testified at trial.

  7. U.S. v. Palmer

    37 F.3d 1080 (5th Cir. 1994)   Cited 52 times
    Upholding admission of parole supervisor's testimony that she had advised defendant that commission of a crime would operate to revoke his parole as evidence of motive, even though defendant had already stipulated to the fact that he was on parole for a prior conviction

    There, the prosecutor's comments about defense counsel's presence during a search were improper because they likely gave rise, in the average juror's mind, to inferences which included (1) the attorney aided in or tolerated destruction of evidence, and (2) the defendant would not have gotten a lawyer unless he was guilty. By contrast, the context of the instant statements reveals that the prosecutor merely outlined his view of the defense strategy. See and compare, United States v. Wisenbaker, 14 F.3d 1022, 1028 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957-958 (5th Cir. 1984). Moreover, the testimony of the officers was such that the prosecutor's comment did not amount to a mischaracterization.

  8. United States v. Nations

    764 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1985)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that undercover agent's exploitation of cancer to persuade defendant to assist in the sale of stolen vehicles was not even "improper," let alone "the 'rarest and most outrageous circumstances' necessary to require dismissal of an indictment"

    Thus, to declare entrapment as a matter of law requires the conclusion that a reasonable jury could not find that the government discharged its burden of proof. See United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 956-57 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Garrett, 716 F.2d 257, 274 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Cochran, 697 F.2d 600, 608 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1983). A reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Nations was predisposed to serve as a go-between in the sale of stolen automobiles.

  9. Guy v. State

    108 Nev. 770 (Nev. 1992)   Cited 70 times
    Holding that the following jury instruction was valid: "The condition of the mind described as malice aforethought may arise, not alone from anger, hatred, revenge or from particular ill will, spite or grudge toward the person killed, but may result from any unjustifiable or unlawful motive or purpose to injure another, which proceeds from a heart fatally bent on mischief or with reckless disregard of consequences and social duty"

    In both cases, the prosecutor, by invoking the authority of his supposedly greater experience and knowledge, invites undue jury reliance upon the conclusions he personally endorses. Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1480, 1484-1485 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957 (5th Cir. 1984). Thus, we conclude that the prosecutor's remark was egregiously improper.

  10. Collier v. State

    101 Nev. 473 (Nev. 1985)   Cited 74 times
    Holding that it was inappropriate for a prosecutor to reference facts of another case to promote conclusions about the defendant

    By stepping out of the prosecutor's role, which is to seek justice, id. at 347, 102 P. 863, and by invoking the authority of his or her own supposedly greater experience and knowledge, a prosecutor invites undue jury reliance on the conclusions personally endorsed by the prosecuting attorney. United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957 (5th Cir. 1984); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1480, 1484-85 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc); see State v. Gunderson, 144 N.W. 659, 660 (N.D. 1913). Prosecutors therefore must not express their personal beliefs, as was done here. Emerson v. State, 98 Nev. 158, 163-64, 643 P.2d 1212 (1982); Owens v. State, 96 Nev. 880, 885, 620 P.2d 1236 (1980).