While these statements are improper, Dull has not shown that they were so flagrant and ill-intentioned that no curative instruction could have neutralized their effect. United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957-58 (5th Cir. 1984). In Frascone, the prosecutor in closing argument stated: "I take an oath to see that justice is done. [The defense attorneys] take an oath to represent their client zealously."
Because of the trial court's immediate corrective instruction, however, the court concluded the remark did not require reversal. 747 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1984).Frascone, 747 F.2d at 957.
The prosecutor was seeking to "draw the cloak of righteousness around the prosecutor in his personal status as government attorney and impugn the integrity of defense counsel." United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957-58 (5th Cir. 1984). This court has been clear that "[n]o prosecutor . . . may impugn the integrity of a particular lawyer or that of lawyers in general, without basis in fact, as a means of imputing guilt to a defendant."
The prosecutor was seeking to “draw the cloak of righteousness around the prosecutor in his personal status as government attorney and impugn[ ] the integrity of defense counsel.” United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957–58 (5th Cir.1984). This court has been clear that “[n]o prosecutor ... may impugn the integrity of a particular lawyer or that of lawyers in general, without basis in fact, as a means of imputing guilt to a defendant.”
The prosecutor was seeking to “draw the cloak of righteousness around the prosecutor in his personal status as government attorney and impugn[ ] the integrity of defense counsel.” United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957–58 (5th Cir.1984). This court has been clear that “[n]o prosecutor ... may impugn the integrity of a particular lawyer or that of lawyers in general, without basis in fact, as a means of imputing guilt to a defendant.”
In that case, the prosecutor was clearly talking about the defense attorney “muddling the issues,” and the court found it was improper because the prosecutor “was seeking to ‘draw the cloak of righteousness around the prosecutor in his personal status as government attorney and impugn[ ] the integrity of defense counsel.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957–58 (5th Cir.1984) ). Here, the prosecutors focused on Valas himself “muddying the waters,” and Valas testified at trial.
There, the prosecutor's comments about defense counsel's presence during a search were improper because they likely gave rise, in the average juror's mind, to inferences which included (1) the attorney aided in or tolerated destruction of evidence, and (2) the defendant would not have gotten a lawyer unless he was guilty. By contrast, the context of the instant statements reveals that the prosecutor merely outlined his view of the defense strategy. See and compare, United States v. Wisenbaker, 14 F.3d 1022, 1028 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957-958 (5th Cir. 1984). Moreover, the testimony of the officers was such that the prosecutor's comment did not amount to a mischaracterization.
Thus, to declare entrapment as a matter of law requires the conclusion that a reasonable jury could not find that the government discharged its burden of proof. See United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 956-57 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Garrett, 716 F.2d 257, 274 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Cochran, 697 F.2d 600, 608 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1983). A reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Nations was predisposed to serve as a go-between in the sale of stolen automobiles.
In both cases, the prosecutor, by invoking the authority of his supposedly greater experience and knowledge, invites undue jury reliance upon the conclusions he personally endorses. Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1480, 1484-1485 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957 (5th Cir. 1984). Thus, we conclude that the prosecutor's remark was egregiously improper.
By stepping out of the prosecutor's role, which is to seek justice, id. at 347, 102 P. 863, and by invoking the authority of his or her own supposedly greater experience and knowledge, a prosecutor invites undue jury reliance on the conclusions personally endorsed by the prosecuting attorney. United States v. Frascone, 747 F.2d 953, 957 (5th Cir. 1984); Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1480, 1484-85 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc); see State v. Gunderson, 144 N.W. 659, 660 (N.D. 1913). Prosecutors therefore must not express their personal beliefs, as was done here. Emerson v. State, 98 Nev. 158, 163-64, 643 P.2d 1212 (1982); Owens v. State, 96 Nev. 880, 885, 620 P.2d 1236 (1980).