Opinion
ACTION NO. 4:92-CR-177-Y
2021-02-24
UNITED STATES of America v. Ronnie Lynn FOWLER (1)
Nancy E. Larson, Alex C. Lewis, US Attorney's Office, Fort Worth, TX, for United States of America. John Gleeson, Pro Hac Vice, Sandy Tomasik, Pro Hac Vice, DeBevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, NY, for Ronnie Lynn Fowler.
Nancy E. Larson, Alex C. Lewis, US Attorney's Office, Fort Worth, TX, for United States of America.
John Gleeson, Pro Hac Vice, Sandy Tomasik, Pro Hac Vice, DeBevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, NY, for Ronnie Lynn Fowler.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE TO TIME SERVED
TERRY R. MEANS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Pending before the Court is the Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3852(c)(1)(A)(i) (doc. 19) filed by defendant Ronnie Lynn Fowler. In the motion, Fowler requests that his sentence be reduced to time served under the authority of the compassionate-release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and based upon the existence of "extraordinary and compelling circumstances." After review of the motion, related briefs, the numerous notices of supplemental authority submitted by Fowler, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the motion should be granted.
Fowler was originally sentenced in 1993 after having been found guilty by a jury on five counts of robbery, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and three counts of using and carrying a weapon during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He was initially sentenced to serve 627 months in prison; only 87 months were for the actual robberies, while the remaining 540 months resulted from mandatory minimums due to the three "stacked" 924(c) offenses. In 2011, Fowler's sentence was reduced by way of an amended judgment to one day's imprisonment, total, on the five robbery counts and 540 months, total, on the three § 924(c) counts.
Fowler now seeks an additional sentence reduction in light of the First Step Act, which was enacted on December 21, 2018. Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). That act ended the practice of "stacking" § 924(c) offenses within the same case "by clarifying that the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence applies only when a prior § 924(c) conviction arises from a separate case [that] already ‘has become final.’ " United States v. McCoy , 981 F.3d 271, 275 (4th Cir. 2020). Fowler's three § 924(c) counts were stacked within the same case. But the First Step Act did not apply this change retroactively to sentences imposed prior to its enactment. See § 403(b), 132 Stat. at 5222; McCoy , 981 F.3d at 271.
The Act did, however, change the language of the compassionate-release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), to remove the prior requirement that a compassionate-release motion be filed on a defendant's behalf solely by the Bureau of Prisons. See § 603(b), 132 Stat. at 5239. "The BOP used that power so ‘sparingly’ that the Department of Justice's Inspector General found in a 2013 report that an average of only 24 imprisoned persons were released each year by BOP motion." McCoy , 981 F.3d at 276. Consequently, "[s]ection 603(b) of the First Step Act announces its purpose in its title--’Increasing the Use and Transparency of Compassionate Release.’ " McCoy , 981 F.3d at 276. After the First Step Act, compassionate-release motions may be filed by the defendant directly, if he "has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility." Fowler's motion indicates that he requested that his warden file a motion on his behalf on September 9, 2019, but that no such motion was filed.
In his motion, Fowler contends that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction of his sentence to time served. Under the compassionate-release statute, "a court may reduce a defendant's sentence if the ‘court ... finds that ... extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction’ and that the reduction is ‘consistent with applicable policy statements issue by the Sentencing Commission,’ and if the § 3553(a) sentencing factors merit a reduction." Id. at 275-76 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) ).
Fowler makes a compelling argument in support of his motion for compassionate release. His convictions were for five "night-deposit" robberies, where he accosted persons making deposits with either a knife or a gun. Although certainly traumatic for his victims, none were physically injured during these robberies. Fowler's criminal history score of 3 at the time he was sentenced was based on relatively minor convictions. He was charged in 1987 with theft in the amount of $20-200, for which his deferred adjudication was ultimately revoked and he served one day in jail and paid a $125 fine. He also pled guilty to a charge in 1989 of possession of cocaine under 28 grams and again in 1990 for delivery of cocaine under 28 grams, as to both of which he pled guilty and was sentenced to ten years’ probation. See id. at 277-78 (affirming district courts’ grant of compassionate releases where convictions were based on stacked § 924(c) offenses and defendants had only minor prior convictions that had resulted in only fines or probation). And the Court is mindful of the fact that at the time Fowler's offenses herein were committed, he was only twenty-five years old. See id. (noting that the defendants for whom compassionate release was granted were nineteen, twenty-two, and twenty-five years of age at the time of their § 924(c) offenses).
Were Fowler sentenced today, he would receive a much lighter sentence. The government admits that if prosecuted for the same offenses under current law, Fowler "likely would have been released from prison by now." (Govt.’s Resp. (doc. 26) 3.) Indeed, Fowler notes in his reply brief that the average sentence over the last ten years in the four Texas districts for murder was 254 months, less than half of his amended sentence. Fowler has now served over twenty-eight years of his sentence and is currently due for release, according to the Bureau of Prisons's website, on October 11, 2031.
While in prison, Fowler has been largely a model prisoner, with only a few minor disciplinary infractions on his record. Additionally, he has taken numerous courses while imprisoned to enhance his education and life skills. These include classes geared toward helping him obtain his commercial truck driver's license, which is how he intends to earn a living upon release. His motion also indicates that while incarcerated he completed "the Challenge Program, a 500-hour minimum cognitive behavioral program focused on addressing substance use, criminal thought and behavioral patterns. After successfully completing the program, Fowler remained a resident of the treatment unit, acting as a mentor to those in the program." (Fowler's Mot. (doc. 19) at 12-13). He currently works in the prison library.
The government objects to Fowler's release, contending both that the First Step Act did not make retroactive its changes to § 924(c) and that the Court is constrained by applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, specifically U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, from granting the requested reduction. For the reasons articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. McCoy , 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020), however, the Court finds these arguments unavailing. The fact that the First Step Act did not make its changes to § 924(c) retroactive reflects Congress's conclusion " ‘that not all defendants should receive new sentences, even while expanding the power of the courts to relieve some defendants of those sentences on a case-by-case basis.’ " Id. at 279 (quoting United States v. Bryant , Crim. No. 95-202-CCB-3, 2020 WL 2085471 (D. Maryland, April 30, 2020) ). And the sentencing guideline to which the government points "was adopted before the First Step Act, and the Sentencing Commission has not updated it to account for the fact that the Act now allows defendants to file their own motions for compassionate release." Id. at 282. Thus, "[b]y its plain terms, in short, § 1B1.13 does not apply to defendant-filed motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A)." Id. (citing United States v. Gunn , 980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 2020) ); accord United States v. Jones , 980 F.3d 1098, 1101 (6th Cir. 2020) ; United States v. Zullo , 976 F.3d. 228, 230 (2d Cir. 2020).
Consequently, after review of Fowler's motion and all related briefs, and for the reasons stated herein and those articulated by the Fourth Circuit in McCoy , the Court concludes that Fowler's motion should be and it is hereby GRANTED. Fowler's sentence is hereby REDUCED to TIME SERVED. The Court wishes Fowler good luck in his future endeavors.