"We evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, reversing only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Fang, 844 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Importantly, "we do not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses"-that is for the jury.
"We evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, reversing only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Fang, 844 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Importantly, "we do not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses"—that is for the jury.
" Id . (quoting United States v. Surratt , 172 F.3d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1999) ). "If the evidence rationally supports two conflicting hypotheses, the reviewing court will not disturb the conviction." United States v. Fang , 844 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Serrano–Lopez , 366 F.3d 628, 634 (8th Cir. 2004) ). "This is a very strict standard of review." Id. (quoting United States v. Thunder , 745 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir. 2014) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Carnes first argues that the government failed to present sufficient evidence that he was an "unlawful user of a controlled substance," as required for Counts 2 and 3. "We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence." United States v. Fang, 844 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). "We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict."
But whatever the amount itself may have lacked in probative value was more than adequately supplied by the government's circumstantial evidence that the cash was proceeds of a drug crime and therefore subject to forfeiture. Cf. United States v. Fang, 844 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2016) (a reasonable jury could infer intent to distribute from $3,900 in small bills and other circumstantial evidence). Gensley next argues that the district court erred in determining his base offense level under the Guidelines.
Rather, a reasonable jury could infer that Shelledy was distributing and possessing with the intent to distribute from this evidence. See United States v. Schubel, 912 F.2d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Intent to distribute may be inferred solely from the possession of large quantities of narcotics."); cf. United States v. Fang, 844 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that 25 grams of methamphetamine, with $3,900 in cash and small plastic bags, supports an inference of intent to distribute). Additionally, the jury heard testimony that Shelledy once "fronted" methamphetamine to Smith. Similarly, the testimony from Holmes showed that Holmes helped Shelledy purchase one kilogram of methamphetamine from Holmes's supplier.
Medellin also brought 55.3683 grams—just under two ounces—of 80 percent pure methamphetamine to the scene of the failed deal. See United States v. Schubel, 912 F.2d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Intent to distribute may be inferred solely from the possession of large quantities of narcotics."); cf. United States v. Fang, 844 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that 25 grams of methamphetamine, with $3,900 in cash and small plastic bags, supports an inference of intent to distribute). Moreover, evidence was presented at trial that Roberts did not smoke methamphetamine, which further supported the conclusion that he was attempting to purchase the drug for resale.
"At the outset, we note that all prior criminal convictions tend to be prejudicial to a defendant, but 'the question is whether the evidence is unfairly prejudicial.'" United States v. Fang, 844 F.3d 775, 780 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Tyerman, 701 F.3d 552, 563 (8th Cir. 2012)). "To establish unfair prejudice, we look for evidence that causes a verdict to be based on an improper basis, an inquiry into the interplay between the Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403."
"We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence." United States v. Fang , 844 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Griffith , 786 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2015) ). Evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we will reverse "only if ‘no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " Id. (quoting United States v. Serrano–Lopez , 366 F.3d 628, 634 (8th Cir. 2004) ).