United States v. Tou Chi Fang

9 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Kinney

    No. 23-3418 (8th Cir. Oct. 30, 2024)

    "We evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, reversing only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Fang, 844 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Importantly, "we do not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses"-that is for the jury.

  2. United States v. Nosley

    62 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2023)   Cited 8 times
    Affirming sentence of 1,680 months in which district court properly considered defendant's background, offense conduct, mitigating factors, and also that defendant exhibited no remorse or repentance

    "We evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, reversing only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Fang, 844 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Importantly, "we do not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses"—that is for the jury.

  3. United States v. Kelley

    861 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2017)   Cited 44 times
    Holding that a jury could infer that a child-pornography defendant who used Ares had knowledge of illegal files when he was the primary user of a device when child pornography files were downloaded to the device

    " Id . (quoting United States v. Surratt , 172 F.3d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1999) ). "If the evidence rationally supports two conflicting hypotheses, the reviewing court will not disturb the conviction." United States v. Fang , 844 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Serrano–Lopez , 366 F.3d 628, 634 (8th Cir. 2004) ). "This is a very strict standard of review." Id. (quoting United States v. Thunder , 745 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir. 2014) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

  4. United States v. Carnes

    22 F.4th 743 (8th Cir. 2022)   Cited 26 times
    Approving the following jury instruction: “The defendant must have been actively engaged in use of a controlled substance during the time he possessed the firearm, but the law does not require that he use the controlled substance at the precise time he possessed the firearm. Such use is not limited to the use of drugs on a particular day or within a matter of days or weeks before but, rather, that the unlawful use has occurred recently enough to indicate that the individual is actively engaged in such conduct”

    Carnes first argues that the government failed to present sufficient evidence that he was an "unlawful user of a controlled substance," as required for Counts 2 and 3. "We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence." United States v. Fang, 844 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). "We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict."

  5. United States v. Gensley

    No. 20-2487 (8th Cir. Jun. 25, 2021)   Cited 3 times

    But whatever the amount itself may have lacked in probative value was more than adequately supplied by the government's circumstantial evidence that the cash was proceeds of a drug crime and therefore subject to forfeiture. Cf. United States v. Fang, 844 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2016) (a reasonable jury could infer intent to distribute from $3,900 in small bills and other circumstantial evidence). Gensley next argues that the district court erred in determining his base offense level under the Guidelines.

  6. United States v. Shelledy

    961 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2020)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that claims not meaningfully argued in the opening brief are not generally considered

    Rather, a reasonable jury could infer that Shelledy was distributing and possessing with the intent to distribute from this evidence. See United States v. Schubel, 912 F.2d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Intent to distribute may be inferred solely from the possession of large quantities of narcotics."); cf. United States v. Fang, 844 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that 25 grams of methamphetamine, with $3,900 in cash and small plastic bags, supports an inference of intent to distribute). Additionally, the jury heard testimony that Shelledy once "fronted" methamphetamine to Smith. Similarly, the testimony from Holmes showed that Holmes helped Shelledy purchase one kilogram of methamphetamine from Holmes's supplier.

  7. United States v. Shavers

    955 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2020)   Cited 16 times
    Noting that a constructive amendment "often occurs 'through the evidence presented at trial or the jury instructions.' " (quoting Whirlwind Soldier, 499 F.3d at 870)

    Medellin also brought 55.3683 grams—just under two ounces—of 80 percent pure methamphetamine to the scene of the failed deal. See United States v. Schubel, 912 F.2d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Intent to distribute may be inferred solely from the possession of large quantities of narcotics."); cf. United States v. Fang, 844 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that 25 grams of methamphetamine, with $3,900 in cash and small plastic bags, supports an inference of intent to distribute). Moreover, evidence was presented at trial that Roberts did not smoke methamphetamine, which further supported the conclusion that he was attempting to purchase the drug for resale.

  8. United States v. Brown

    No. 16-4136 (8th Cir. Apr. 4, 2018)

    "At the outset, we note that all prior criminal convictions tend to be prejudicial to a defendant, but 'the question is whether the evidence is unfairly prejudicial.'" United States v. Fang, 844 F.3d 775, 780 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Tyerman, 701 F.3d 552, 563 (8th Cir. 2012)). "To establish unfair prejudice, we look for evidence that causes a verdict to be based on an improper basis, an inquiry into the interplay between the Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403."

  9. United States v. Lopez

    880 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2018)   Cited 11 times
    Affirming judicial notice of "a legislative fact—that Sioux City lies within the geographic bounds of the Northern District of Iowa."

    "We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence." United States v. Fang , 844 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Griffith , 786 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2015) ). Evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we will reverse "only if ‘no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " Id. (quoting United States v. Serrano–Lopez , 366 F.3d 628, 634 (8th Cir. 2004) ).