Inasmuch as the federal courts are not appendages of the state courts, a federal court cannot enforce a state-court judgment without first independently establishing its own jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties. See United States v. Potter, 19 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. Fairbank Realty Corp., 50 F. Supp. 373 (E.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd on other grounds, 142 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1944). Here diversity jurisdiction provides the basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, while the Tucker-initiated state lawsuit (resulting in the judgment sued upon in this action), viewed in the context of the other California contacts discussed throughout this opinion, provides the basis for personal jurisdiction.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part, and cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with opinion. See also, D.C., 50 F. Supp. 373. Charles H. Ellner, of Jamaica, N.Y., for plaintiff-appellant.
, report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 12804017 (Aug. 22, 2014); Bronkovic v. Sandholm, No. CV 95 3134 (RJD), 1996 WL 743346, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1996) (“Before enforcing a state court judgment, a federal court must establish an independent basis for its own subjectmatter jurisdiction.”); United States v. Fairbank Realty Corp., 50 F.Supp. 373, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 1943) (“It is academic that it would be impossible for the holder of a judgment recovered in a state court to issue execution on that judgment in this [federal] Court . . . until he first sued on that judgment and recovered one in this Court.”), aff'd sub nom. Rottenberg v. United States, 142 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1944); Threlkeld v. Tucker, 496 F.2d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 1974) (“Inasmuch as the federal courts are not appendages of the state courts
See Gagan v. Monroe, 269 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir.2001) (“[Rule 69] allows a judgment creditor ... to return to the district court where the judgment was entered and seek the district court's assistance in enforcing the judgment.”); Threlkeld v. Tucker, 496 F.2d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir.1974) (“Inasmuch as the federal courts are not appendages of the state courts, a federal court cannot enforce a state-court judgment without first independently establishing its own jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.”); United States v. Potter, 19 F.R.D. 89, 89–90 (S.D.N.Y.1956) (“Rule 69(a) ... provides for conformity of procedure in enforcing judgments of the Federal Court to state practice but does not constitute the Federal Court an arm of the State Court with respect to collection of its judgments.”); United States v. Fairbank Realty Corp., 50 F.Supp. 373, 375 (E.D.N.Y.1943), aff'd sub nom. Rottenberg v. United States, 142 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.1944) (“Rule 69(a) ... in no way gives [the federal court] jurisdiction in supplementary proceedings over state court judgments until they have been reduced to judgment in [the federal court].”); see also 12 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3011 (2d ed. 2015) (“Rule 69 applies only to money judgments of the federal court ... [and] has no application to state-court judgments.”).
After successfully suing on the state court judgment and securing a federal court judgment, a state court judgment creditor may pursue a Rule 69(a) supplemental proceeding to enforce the new federal court judgment. United States v. Fairbank Realty Corp., 50 F.Supp. 373, 375 (E.D.N.Y.1943) (“It is academic that it would be impossible for the holder of a judgment recovered in a state court to issue execution on that judgment in this [federal] Court ... until he first sued on that judgment and recovered one in this Court”). In this case, only the Jackson estate can accomplish in federal court a supplemental proceeding to recover from an impleaded party the assets of the judgment debtor against whom the Jackson estate prevailed in Polk County circuit court. Of course, the Jackson estate surely lacks the inclination to do so, and the parties impleaded in Polk County circuit court lack complete diversity.
Rule 69(a) merely directs this Court to follow the state court practice in supplementary proceedings but in no way gives it jurisdiction in supplementary proceedings over state court judgments until they have been reduced to judgment in this Court.United States v. Fairbank Realty Corporation, 50 F.Supp. 373, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 1943). See Threlkeld v. Tucker, 496 F.2d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[i]nasmuch as the federal courts are not appendages of the state courts, a federal court cannot enforce a state-court judgment without first independently establishing its own jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties"); Pierre v. Board of Com'rs of Port of New Orleans, No. 92-2607, 1993 WL 54397 at *3 (E.D.La. Feb. 18, 1993) ("this court has no apparent interest in the execution of plaintiff's state court judgment . . . Rule 69 specifically refers to enforcement of federal court judgments"); Kirtz v. Wiggin, 538 F.Supp. 1218, 1221 (E.D. Mo. 1982) ("[t]his Court will not be used as a forum to execute on a state judgment").
It provides for conformity of procedure in enforcing judgments of the Federal Court to state practice but does not constitute the Federal Court an arm of the State Court with respect to collection of its judgments. See 7 Moore, Federal Practice, § 69.03(2); 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1481; United States v. Fairbank Realty Corp., D.C.E.D.N.Y.1943, 50 F.Supp. 373, affirmed on other grounds sub nom. Rottenberg v. United States, 2 Cir., 1944, 142 F.2d 151; see also former Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 727.