U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. "Application note 4 to § 3C1.1 is a non-exhaustive list of examples of the types of conduct to which the enhancement applies." United States v. Edwards , 820 F.3d 362, 365 (8th Cir. 2016). "[C]ommitting, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury" constitute types of conduct to which the enhancement applies.
It does not matter that the government ultimately accessed the application, as Roads argues, because the enhancement for destroying evidence applies equally to an attempt to destroy evidence. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1; see United Statesv. Edwards, 820 F.3d 362, 365-66 (8th Cir. 2016). III. CONCLUSION
This court reviews for abuse of discretion. United States v. Edwards, 820 F.3d 362, 366 (8th Cir. 2016). The district court considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and explained its reasoning.
Having reviewed the district court's factual findings supporting the obstruction of justice enhancement, we find no clear error. See United States v. Edwards, 820 F.3d 362, 365 (8th Cir. 2016) (standard of review). The record demonstrates that Snead, while detained, provided the names of three of the government's anticipated witnesses to his cousins, he informed his cousins of their anticipated testimony, and Snead received regular updates from his cousins regarding the status of their testimony.
This court reviews for abuse of discretion. United States v. Edwards, 820 F.3d 362, 366 (8th Cir. 2016). "The sentencing court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing them."
"We review the substantive unreasonableness of sentences under ... an abuse-of-discretion standard." United States v. Edwards , 820 F.3d 362, 366 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). "The sentencing court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing them."
The district court abuses its discretion if it "fails to consider a relevant factor which should have received significant weight; gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or considers the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment." Id. (quoting United States v. Edwards , 820 F.3d 362, 366 (8th Cir. 2016) ). "A within-Guidelines sentence," like Frencher's 110 months’ imprisonment, "is presumed reasonable." United States v. Williams , 913 F.3d 1115, 1116 (8th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
"When reviewing the district court's calculation of the sentencing guidelines advisory sentencing range, [w]e review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its construction and application of the Guidelines de novo." United States v. Edwards, 820 F.3d 362, 365 (8th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Assuming without deciding that the district court erred in calculating Peterson's Sentencing Guidelines range, we hold that the error was harmless.
"We review the substantive unreasonableness of sentences under a standard akin to an abuse-of-discretion standard, cognizant that it will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable." United States v. Edwards , 820 F.3d 362, 366 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Sayles , 754 F.3d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 2014) ). "A sentence may be unreasonable if the district court fails to consider a relevant factor which should have received significant weight; gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or considers the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment." Id .
The record, though, contains no evidence that the sentencing court relied on its "rush" remark to arrive at Boykin's sentence, but rather shows that the court relied on the specific facts of the crime committed and Boykin's criminal history. See United States v. Edwards , 820 F.3d 362, 366 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding substantial discussion of the § 3553(a) factors sufficient to ensure that the district court did not give improper weight to irrelevant factors). The drug-selling statement occurred at the very end of the sentencing hearing. The court made a passing remark addressing the lifestyle of drug dealers generally, not Boykin specifically. The court considered it "preaching" because it was an admonition against future behavior, not punishment for past conduct.