Opinion
23-1577
01-26-2024
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
Submitted January 16, 2024[*]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 89 CR 908-12 Rebecca R. pallmeyer, Chief Judge.
BEFORE DIANE S. SYKES, CHIEF JUDGE MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, CIRCUIT JUDGE DORIS L. PRYOR, CIRCUIT JUDGE
ORDER
William Doyle, a federal prisoner serving a life sentence, appeals the judgment denying his motion for compassionate release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Because the district judge did not abuse her discretion in concluding that Doyle failed to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, we affirm.
In 1995, a jury convicted Doyle of various federal offenses related to his involvement in the El Rukn organization, a Chicago street gang. He was found guilty of committing numerous racketeering acts, including multiple murders, conspiracies to murder, attempted murders, and drug crimes. His federal sentence-which ran consecutive to a prior state sentence for murder-was for life, concurrent with two twenty-year sentences. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Doyle, 121 F.3d 1078 (7th Cir. 1997).
Doyle sought compassionate release in 2022. He argued that early release was justified because his sentence was grossly disproportionate relative to his co-defendants; his rehabilitation tilted the weight of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) against continued detention; and a combination of factors-his advancing age, unspecified health conditions, and heightened risk of COVID-19 in prison-posed extraordinary risks to his health.
The district judge denied Doyle's motion. Doyle, the judge noted, did not show that he suffered from a serious medical condition warranting release. Relatedly, Doyle-as a vaccinated prisoner-could not show that the risk of COVID-19 was an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. See United States v. Broadfield, 5 F.4th 801, 803 (7th Cir. 2021). The judge added that prisoners may not use the compassionate release statute to challenge a sentence on grounds that could be raised on direct appeal. United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v. Martin, 21 F.4th 944, 946 (7th Cir. 2021). And rehabilitation arguments alone cannot support a motion for compassionate release. See United States v. Peoples, 41 F.4th 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2022). Because Doyle had not established an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction, the judge did not reach the question whether the § 3553(a) factors supported his motion. See United States v. Newton, 37 F.4th 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 2022).
On appeal, Doyle primarily challenges the court's conclusion that he has no medical issues warranting compassionate release. He now argues for the first time that he takes pain medication, sometimes uses a wheelchair, and has severe degenerative osteoarthritis and mildly elevated prostate-specific antigen levels. He also asserts that his medical needs are not being adequately addressed in prison. Even though Doyle failed to contend, in the district court, that his medical problems justified release, the district court determined that Doyle's medical record did not support such a finding. Based on the evidence that Doyle presented in the district court, the judge acted well within her discretion in denying his motion. United States v. Howell, 958 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2020) (our review is limited to information that the district court considered at the time of her ruling).
Doyle also contends that his daughter, who recently had a hysterectomy and is undergoing cancer treatments, needs him to care for her at home. Because he raises this issue too for the first time on appeal, it is forfeited, Jackson v. Bartow, 930 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2019), and we see no circumstances under which we may overlook the forfeiture.
AFFIRMED.
[*] We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. p. 34(a)(2)(C).