Opinion
4:10-cv-00503
2021-02-01
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. DICO, INC. and Titan Tire Corporation, Defendants.
Sergio Enrique Acosta, Joel David Bertocchi, Thomas D. Lupo, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Chicago, IL, Michael F. Iasparro, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Rockford, IL, Stephen H. Locher, Mark McCormick, Belin McCormick, P.C., Des Moines, IA, for Defendant. Eric D. Albert, Sara C. Colangelo, Elizabeth L. Loeb, Zachary Nathaniel Moor, Steven D. Shermer, Sarah D. Himmelhoch, U.S. Department of Justice-Environment & Natural Resources, Washington, DC, Robyn E. Hanson, United States Department of Justice, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.
Sergio Enrique Acosta, Joel David Bertocchi, Thomas D. Lupo, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Chicago, IL, Michael F. Iasparro, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Rockford, IL, Stephen H. Locher, Mark McCormick, Belin McCormick, P.C., Des Moines, IA, for Defendant.
Eric D. Albert, Sara C. Colangelo, Elizabeth L. Loeb, Zachary Nathaniel Moor, Steven D. Shermer, Sarah D. Himmelhoch, U.S. Department of Justice-Environment & Natural Resources, Washington, DC, Robyn E. Hanson, United States Department of Justice, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.
ORDER
ROBERT W. PRATT, Judge
Before the Court is the United States Government's Unopposed Motion to Enter Consent Decree. ECF No. 368. On November 2, 2020, the Court entered an Order directing the parties to file a joint submission providing the Court with further information regarding the parties' negotiation process, the anticipated litigation risks if the settlement had not been reached or was not approved, the remaining cleanup to be performed, and any lingering environmental concerns. ECF No. 369. The Court further asked the parties to brief whether the Court could approve the settlement without first vacating the judgments previously entered. Id. On December 1, 2020, the parties filed a joint supplemental brief addressing the Court's concerns. ECF No. 370. The matter is fully submitted.
The extensive factual background of this case has been well-recorded in numerous prior decisions and will not be exhaustively repeated here.
In 1974, trichloroethylene (TCE) was found in the Des Moines public drinking water supply. United States v. BP Amoco Oil , No. 3:99-cv-10671, 2000 WL 35503251, at *1 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 29, 2000). The hazardous chemical was traced back to property owned by Defendant Dico, Inc. Id. Following enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 – 9628, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) designated Dico's property in Des Moines, Iowa a Superfund Site (Des Moines TCE Site) in 1983 and placed it on a national priority list. Id. ; E2 Inc., Planning for the Future: A Reuse Planning Report for the Des Moines TCE Superfund Site Dico Property 2 (2007), https://semspub.epa.gov/work/07/30047239.pdf. In 1986, the EPA initiated response activities to mitigate the release of hazardous substances into the local water supply, including the installation of a groundwater treatment system that requires monitoring to this day. BP Amoco Oil , 2000 WL 35503251, at *1 ; Superfund Site: Des Moines TCE Des Moines, IA Cleanup Activities , U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (last visited Jan. 26, 2021), https://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/SiteProfiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=second.Cleanup & id=0700316#bkground.
On April 21, 1995, the Government filed a complaint against Dico, Inc. in United States v. Dico, Inc. , No. 4-95-cv-10289 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 21, 1995), under CERCLA seeking reimbursement of the response costs incurred in the cleanup of hazardous substances at the Des Moines TCE Site. See generally No. 4-95-cv-10289, ECF No. 1. Following a bench trial, the Court found Dico liable for response costs. No. 4-95-cv-10289, ECF No. 247. On March 29, 2000, the Court entered judgment against Dico for $4,129,426.67 in past response costs and for future response costs with respect to the Des Moines TCE Site, which the Eighth Circuit affirmed. No. 4-95-cv-10289, ECF Nos. 252, 256. Dico has not paid this judgment.
In 1994, hazardous polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) were discovered in several buildings on Dico's property. ECF No. 350 at 2. The EPA initiated a removal action and issued a unilateral administrative order (UAO) requiring Dico to address the contamination by repairing and encapsulating its buildings to prevent the further release of PCBs into the environment and to implement an ongoing operation and maintenance plan. Id. In 2007, Defendant Titan Tire Corporation, on behalf of Dico, its corporate affiliate, sold several buildings that were the subject of the UAO to Southern Iowa Mechanical, L.L.C. (SIM) without disclosing the presence of the PCBs to SIM or notifying the EPA of the sale. Id. at 1–2. SIM dismantled the buildings, relocated the steel beams used to construct them to its property in Ottumwa, Iowa, and destroyed the rest of the building materials. Id. at 2. Later that year, the EPA learned of the sale of the buildings and their dismantling. Id. The EPA traced the buildings to SIM's property and found PCBs still attached to the steel beams and in the surrounding soil. Id. The EPA initiated another removal action at the SIM site to dispose of the hazardous substance. Id.
On October 26, 2010, the Government filed this action against Dico and Titan Tire under CERCLA seeking reimbursement of the response costs incurred in connection with the SIM Site and civil penalties and punitive damages for violations of the UAO issued with respect to the Des Moines TCE Site. Id. On summary judgment, the Court concluded that Defendants were liable for intentionally arranging for the disposal of a hazardous substance by selling the buildings to SIM; that Dico had violated the UAO by arranging for demolition of the buildings and failing to notify the EPA and could thus be subject to punitive damages; and that Defendants were liable for all response costs incurred as a result of the SIM site removal action. ECF Nos. 119, 128. On February 25, 2014, following a bench trial, the Court entered judgment in this case against Dico for $1,620,000 in civil penalties related to its violation of the UAO. ECF Nos. 198, 199. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the civil penalties award but vacated the Court's Order with respect to its conclusions on arranger liability, associated response costs, and punitive damages. United States v. Dico, Inc. , 808 F.3d 342, 351, 352 (8th Cir. 2015). On September 7, 2017, following a second bench trial, the Court entered judgment against both Defendants jointly and severally for past response costs amounting to $5,454,370 at the time of trial as well as future response costs at the SIM Site, and against Dico for $5,454,370 in punitive damages related to its violation of the UAO after concluding Defendants were liable as arrangers under CERCLA. ECF Nos. 350, 351. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Dico, Inc. , 920 F.3d 1174, 1181 (8th Cir. 2019). Defendants have not paid either of these judgments.
In their Supplemental Brief, the parties acknowledge the total amount owed on the judgments is approximately $20.2 million after accounting for approximately $9 million in post-judgment interest. ECF No. 370. Most of the interest owed, however, is due on the judgment entered in March 2000 against Dico, which the Government admits it arguably faces the greatest litigation risk in enforcing against Titan International. Id.
On September 15, 2020, the Government lodged a proposed Consent Decree with the Court. ECF Nos. 367, 367-1. The Consent Decree, if entered by the Court, would satisfy (1) the judgment rendered against Dico on March 29, 2000, in the amount of $4,129,426.67; (2) the judgments rendered against both Defendants on February 25, 2014, for civil penalties in the amount of $1,620,000, and on September 7, 2017, for response costs and punitive damages each in the amount of $5,454,370; and (3) any potential claims related to the Des Moines TCE and SIM Sites against Defendants' mutual parent corporation Titan International, Inc. ECF No. 367-1 ¶¶ 35, 36. In exchange for satisfaction of the judgments, Defendants and Titan International would be required, jointly and severally, to pay a total of $11,500,000, plus interest, to the United States and to donate the Dico property to the City of Des Moines free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. Id. ¶¶ 4, 9. The City would then be responsible for the remaining response actions required to return the property to productive use, under the EPA's oversight. Id. ¶ 14; ECF No. 367-2 at 19–28. The Consent Decree further provides a covenant not to sue or take administrative action under CERCLA relating to either site. ECF No. 367-1 ¶¶ 35, 37. Once entered, the Government would file notices that all three judgments entered by the Court have been satisfied, id. ¶ 36, and Defendants would also be required to dismiss their still-pending petition to the EPA's Environmental Appeals Board, id. ¶ 45.
The City of Des Moines is a non-party to this action but is a party to the Consent Decree and is thus bound by its terms. ECF No. 367-1 ¶ 2.
On May 24, 2010, Dico and Titan Tire submitted a petition for the reimbursement of response costs they incurred in performing the SIM Site Removal Action to the EPA's Environmental Appeals Board, as permitted under § 106(b)(2) of CERCLA. Email from Eric Albert, Counsel for the United States, to the Court & Stephen Locher, Counsel for Defendants (Dec. 18, 2020, 9:14 AM) (on file with the Court).
On September 22, 2020, the Government published notice of the proposed Consent Decree in the Federal Register. See 85 Fed Reg. 184 at 59552 (Sept. 22, 2020) (setting comment period expiring thirty days after publication). The Government did not receive any comments. ECF No. 368. The Des Moines City Council also placed the approval of the proposed Consent Decree on the public agenda for their meeting held on September 14, 2020; no comments were voiced against the proposed Consent Decree. ECF No. 370 at 7.
On October 23, 2020, the Government filed its unresisted motion for entry of the proposed Consent Decree. Id. The Court concludes an evidentiary hearing is not necessary in this matter. See United States v. BP Amoco Oil PLC , 277 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding, in a CERCLA action, that the decision to hold an evidentiary hearing rests within the sound discretion of the district court); see also United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp. , 899 F.2d 79, 94 (1st Cir. 1990) ("In general, ... evidentiary hearings are not required under CERCLA when a court is merely deciding whether monetary settlements [are] fair and reasonable ...."). Nor does the Court believe that an independent expert will substantially aid it in its review. See Grove v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 200 F.R.D. 434, 443–44 (S.D. Iowa 2001) (concluding the hiring of outside experts pursuant to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to advise and educate the Court regarding various complex issues presented by the case was necessary to fulfill the Court's oversight role in reviewing a proposed class-action settlement).
II. ANALYSIS
"CERCLA is a comprehensive statute that grants the President broad power to command government agencies and private parties to clean up hazardous waste sites." Dico, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co. , 340 F.3d 525, 529 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Key Tronic Corp. v. United States , 511 U.S. 809, 814, 114 S.Ct. 1960, 128 L.Ed.2d 797 (1994) ). "Congress enacted CERCLA to facilitate the cleanup of hazardous waste sites, and to shift the costs of environmental response from taxpayers to the parties who benefitted from the use or disposal of the hazardous substances." Id. (quoting Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc. , 263 F.3d 134, 136–37 (5th Cir. 2001) ). In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA to "expedite effective remedial actions and minimize litigation." United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc. , 949 F.2d 1409, 1426 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) ). Thus, "CERCLA provides the EPA with ‘a variety of tools for achieving the efficient and cost-effective cleanup of the nation's hazardous waste sites.’ " In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA Litig. , 326 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). One such tool is the authority to enter into settlement agreements with "potentially responsible parties" (PRPs). 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a). Such agreements shall be facilitated "[w]henever practicable and in the public interest," id. , and once reached, "shall be entered in the appropriate United States district court as a consent decree." Id. § 9622(d)(1)(A).
This Court must review the proposed Consent Decree here for "procedural and substantive fairness, reasonableness, and consistency with the meaning and purpose of CERCLA." BP Amoco Oil, PLC , 277 F.3d at 1018 (citing Cannons Eng'g Corp. , 899 F.2d at 85 ). In doing so, the Court owes deference to "the EPA's expertise." United States v. Union Elec. Co. , 132 F.3d 422, 430 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Cannons Eng'g Corp. , 899 F.2d at 84 ). CERCLA itself encourages the settlement of claims with the EPA. Id. ; Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc. , 949 F.2d at 1426 (noting the presumption in favor of a voluntary settlement "is particularly strong where a consent decree has been negotiated by the Department of Justice on behalf of a federal administrative agency like EPA which enjoys substantial expertise in the environment field"). Indeed, "[t]he relevant standard ... is not whether the settlement is one which the court itself might have fashioned, or considers as ideal, but whether the proposed decree is fair, reasonable, and faithful to the objectives of the governing statute." Cannons Eng'g Corp. , 899 F.2d at 84.
Still, the Court "should not mechanistically rubberstamp the agency's suggestions." Cannons Eng'g Corp. , 899 F.2d at 84 ; see also Arizona v. City of Tucson , 761 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) "[T]he district court has an ‘obligation to independently scrutinize the terms of [the agreement].’ " (second alteration in original). Rather, the Court's "review must be thorough and penetrating," Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc. , 949 F.2d at 1426 ;; see also Angela R. ex rel. Hesselbein v. Clinton , 999 F.2d 320, 324 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Although the law favors settlements, federal courts in adopting consent decrees are not mere " ‘recorders of contracts" from whom parties can purchase injunctions.’ " (quoting Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland , 478 U.S. 501, 525, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405, (1986) )). "In sum, in evaluating the efforts of an agency charged with making technical judgments and weighing complex data," the Court "must give a proper degree of deference to the agency's expertise, yet also ensure that the agency has considered all of the relevant evidence in the record and has acted in the public interest." Id. (citing Lile v. Univ. of Iowa Hosps. & Clinics , 886 F.2d 157 (8th Cir. 1989) ). As discussed below, the Court has considered each of the four elements for approval of a consent decree under CERCLA and will grant the Government's Motion to Enter Consent Decree. See City of Tucson , 761 F.3d at 1012 (requiring district courts to "actually engage with [the information provided by the parties in support of the consent decree] and explain in a reasoned disposition why the evidence indicates that the consent decrees are procedurally and substantively ‘fair, reasonable, and consistent with CERCLA's objectives.’ " (quoting United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. , 50 F.3d 741, 748 (9th Cir. 1995) ).
A. Procedural Fairness
"To measure procedural fairness, a court should ordinarily look to the negotiation process and attempt to gauge its candor, openness and bargaining balance." Cannons Eng'g Corp. , 899 F.2d at 86. Here, the parties' discussion of the negotiation process in their supplemental brief persuades the Court that the parties to the Consent Decree have negotiated with one another at arm's length and in good faith. See BP Amoco Oil, PLC , 277 F.3d at 1019–20 (affirming district court's finding that consent decree was procedurally fair because there was no evidence that the negotiations were not in good faith or at arms-length). The parties spent a considerable amount of time, effort, and expense negotiating a settlement. The process appears to have been full of "adversarial vigor," see Cannons Eng'g Corp. , 899 F.2d at 87 n.4, and there is no hint of collusion between the negotiators. The Court believes the dedicated work of the career lawyers of the Justice Department in crafting this settlement is highly credible.
Ultimately, the Court finds that the settlement process involving the Consent Decree was procedurally fair.
B. Substantive Fairness
"Substantive fairness introduces into the equation concepts of corrective justice and accountability: a party should bear the cost of the harm for which is it legally responsible." BP Amoco Oil PLC , 277 F.3d at 1020 (citing Cannons Eng'g Corp. , 899 F.2d at 87 ). Generally, this inquiry concerns whether the settlement terms rationally apportion liability and calculate the damages owed by a particular defendant based on its responsibility for the harm caused. See Cannons Eng'g Corp. , 899 F.2d at 87. Again, the Court must "give the EPA's expertise the benefit of the doubt when weighing substantive fairness." Cannons Eng'g Corp. , 899 F.2d at 88.
This case is unique in that the Court has determined already Defendants' liability, the amount owed for past response costs, and the percentage of Defendants' responsibility for future response costs at the Des Moines TCE Site compared to other PRPs. See ECF Nos. 350, 351; BP Amoco Oil PLC , 277 F.3d at 1015. Thus, the Court need not conduct a comparative analysis to determine whether Defendants are paying "a reasonable allocation of legal responsibility," because that has already been determined. BP Amoco Oil PLC , 277 F.3d at 1020 (affirming the district court's approval of the EPA's 1996 Non-Binding Preliminary Allocation of Responsibility assigning Dico sixty-one percent responsibility for the response costs for two sections of the Des Moines TCE Site). Instead, the Court's task in this case is to "factor into the equation any reasonable discount for litigation risks, time savings, and the like." City of Tucson , 761 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. , 50 F.3d at 747 ). The Court proceeds with this analysis in the reasonableness section below.
Further, the Court acknowledges there are some response actions remaining at the Des Moines TCE Site as well as ongoing operations and maintenance work that must be performed to safely contain the contamination in the soil and treat the groundwater. After reviewing the Statement of Work attached to the proposed Consent Decree, ECF No. 367-2 at 19–28, the Court has no doubt the remaining cleanup actions to be performed are appropriate and will successfully address environmental concerns.
Thus, the Court is satisfied that the settlement fashioned in this case is substantively fair and holds Defendants accountable for the harms they caused.
C. Reasonableness
In determining whether a consent decree is reasonable, the first consideration is "the decree's likely efficaciousness as a vehicle for cleansing the environment." Cannons Eng'g Corp. , 899 F.2d at 89. In general, the reasonableness inquiry is "primarily concerned with the probable effectiveness of proposed remedial responses." Id. at 89–90. However, in a case like this in which the issue is largely that of the recoupment of cleanup costs already spent, the Court need not consider the "technical adequacy" of the response actions. Id. Instead, the Court focuses its inquiry on "whether the settlement satisfactorily compensates the public for the actual (and anticipated) costs of remedial and response measures" and "the relative strength of the parties' litigating positions." Id. at 90.
The Court previously expressed concern over the substantial discount it believed Defendants would receive as a result of this settlement. ECF No. 369. In addressing the Court's concerns, the parties assert Titan Tire will receive no discount on the judgment against it, considering that $7 million of the settlement funds will be used to reimburse the Government for response costs incurred in relation to the SIM Site. ECF No. 367-1 ¶ 4. The parties further assert that Dico—which essentially has no income and no assets other than the property to be donated to the City and thus would be unable to satisfy either of the judgments against it—expects to receive a discount of $1.7 million from the $11.2 million in judgments against it after taking into account the value of the property to be donated. The EPA expects to incur another $2.15 million in response costs that Dico would be liable for, and the City will be required to conduct ongoing operations and maintenance work amounting to approximately $2 million, for an additional amount of $4.1 million for which Dico will not be forced to account. ECF No. 370 at 2–3. The Government recognizes that, although it appears Dico is receiving a substantial discount, Dico is in effect paying all it can in light of its current financial status, and there is no certainty the Government would ever recover more from Titan International even after a prolonged and costly legal battle. Id. at 4–5.
The Consent Decree provides that the Government has incurred $6,994,240 in past response costs at the SIM Site. ECF No. 367-1 ¶ J.
The parties value the property at $5 million based upon an independent appraisal requested by the EPA. ECF No. 370 at 3–4; ECF No. 370-2 ¶ 37.
This value assumes five years of operation and maintenance work to be performed by the City, including $790,000 the first year and $300,000 each year thereafter. ECF No. 370 at 3.
The parties also acknowledge that cleanup efforts at the Des Moines TCE Site "are complicated, and perhaps impossible, while the property remains in Dico's hands and subject to [Titan International's] lien [on the property]." ECF No. 370 at 4. A settlement, they contend, benefits the public by placing the property in the City's hands so that it may be rapidly redeveloped. Id. at 6. The Government and the City publicized the proposed Consent Decree and provided the public with an opportunity to comment and raise any concerns. The Court finds that the lack of any comments or concerns raised by the public lends credence to the Consent Decree's reasonableness.
Finally, the parties assure the Court that the litigation risk of enforcing the judgments against Titan International on a corporate veil-piercing or alter-ego theory is high. ECF No. 370 at 7–8. "The trial court in approving a settlement need not ... reach and resolve the merits of the claims or controversy." Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch , 718 F.2d 1117, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights , 616 F.2d 1006, 1014 (7th Cir. 1980) ). Indeed, "it is precisely the desire to avoid a protracted examination of the parties' legal rights which underlies consent decrees." Id. "Not only the parties, but the general public as well, benefit from the saving of time and money that results from the voluntary settlement of litigation." Id. The Court agrees that further prolonged litigation focusing on discovery and events from over twenty-five years ago is not in the public's best interest.
The Court recognizes that an agreement naturally "embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with litigation." Citizens for a Better Env't , 718 F.2d at 1124. The Court, while skeptical at first, is satisfied the public will be adequately compensated for the response costs incurred. Under the Consent Decree, Defendants and Titan International are required to pay the full amount of response costs incurred in relation to the SIM Site. ECF No. 367-1 ¶ 4. A portion of the remaining settlement funds represents the civil penalties and punitive damages awarded to the Government in this case for Defendants' actions in violating the UAO and disposing of the hazardous material without notifying the EPA. Id. And an additional $2.9 million will be put toward the remaining response costs at the Des Moines TCE Site. Id. On top of these monetary payments, the public benefits from the donation of the property to the City of Des Moines, which ensures that the property is cleaned up, properly maintained, and restored to productive use. The Court acknowledges the compromise made in this case and concludes it is reasonable. See Cannons Eng'g Corp. , 899 F.2d at 90 ("[I]t may take time and money to collect damages or to implement private remedial measures through litigatory success. To the extent that time is of essence or that transaction costs loom large, a settlement which nets less than full recovery of cleanup costs is nonetheless reasonable."); United States v. McGraw-Edison Co. , 718 F. Supp. 154, 159 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (settlement reasonable in light of prospect of protracted litigation as contrasted to expeditious reimbursement and remedy).
D. Consistency with CERCLA
Finally, the settlement must be consistent with the primary purposes of CERCLA, which are "accountability, the desirability of an unsullied environment, and promptness of response activities." United States v. Union Elec. Co. , 934 F. Supp. 324, 331 (E.D.Mo. 1996 ) (quoting Cannons Eng'g Corp. , 899 F.2d at 90 ); see also In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA Litig. , 326 F.3d at 206 ("CERCLA's ‘essential purpose [is] making those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created.’ " (citation omitted)).
Under the terms of the proposed Consent Decree, Defendants and Titan International will be required to pay for the full amount of responses costs at the SIM Site and a substantial portion of the response costs at the Des Moines TCE Site, as well as donate the forty-acre property to the City of Des Moines for redevelopment. ECF No. 367-1 ¶¶ 3, 4, 9. Thus, the Court finds those largely responsible for the contamination will be held accountable for the harm they caused to the environment. The Consent Decree further allows the EPA to finally conclude response actions at the sites after several decades of litigation and will prevent further delay. For these reasons, the Court concludes entry of the Consent Decree is faithful to the objectives and design of CERCLA.
The Court notes Dico conducted costly removal actions of the Des Moines TCE Site prior to the Court's judgment in 2000. See BP Amoco Oil PLC , 277 F.3d at 1014–15 ; see also Dico, Inc. , 340 F.3d at 527 (noting Dico had "incur[ed] approximately $5.7 million in cleanup costs").
III. CONCLUSION
"In evaluating the decree, it is not [the Court's] function to determine whether this is the best possible settlement that could have been obtained, but only whether it is fair, adequate and reasonable." Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc. , 949 F.2d at 1436. The "underlying purpose of the court in making these inquiries is to determine whether the decree adequately protects the public interest." United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp. , 554 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (S.D. Ind. 1982). It is time to finally put this case to bed and force Defendants to pay for the damage caused to the environment. Given Dico's status as judgment proof, Titan Tire's full payment of the response costs incurred at the SIM Site, and the legal challenges to be faced in trying to pierce the corporate veil and hold Titan International liable for these judgments—not to mention the additional time and expense of litigating such a case—as well as the need to expedite the remaining response actions at the Des Moines TCE Site and restore the property to productive use, the Court is satisfied the settlement if fair, reasonable, and consistent with CERCLA.
The Court previously asked the parties to brief the issue of whether vacatur of the judgments would be necessary in this case before entering the Consent Decree. ECF No. 369. The Court concludes vacatur is not required to approve the Consent Decree in this case. See, e.g., Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige , 211 F.3d 112, 117 (4th Cir. 2000) ; Amoco Oil v. United States , 231 F.3d 694, 697–98 (10th Cir. 2000). Nor is it appropriate here as vacatur would not serve the public interest. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship , 513 U.S. 18, 26, 115 S.Ct. 386, 130 L.Ed.2d 233 ("Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public interest would be served by a vacatur." (citation omitted)). The precedential effect of the prior decisions in this case by this Court as well as the appellate court involving arranger liability is great and leaving these judgments intact best serves the public interest.
Accordingly, the United States' Unopposed Motion to Enter Consent Decree (ECF No. 368) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter the Consent Decree.
IT IS SO ORDERED.