Opinion
5:22-cr-0230 (BKS)
2023-01-20
UNITED STATES of America v. Alexander J. DEHOYOS, Defendant.
For the United States of America: Carla B. Freedman, United States Attorney, Michael F. Perry, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, 100 South Clinton Street, P.O. Box 7198, Syracuse, New York 13261. For Defendant Alexander J. Dehoyos: Lisa A. Peebles, Federal Public Defender, John J. Gilsenan, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, 4 Clinton Square, 3rd Floor, Syracuse, New York 13202.
For the United States of America: Carla B. Freedman, United States Attorney, Michael F. Perry, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, 100 South Clinton Street, P.O. Box 7198, Syracuse, New York 13261. For Defendant Alexander J. Dehoyos: Lisa A. Peebles, Federal Public Defender, John J. Gilsenan, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, 4 Clinton Square, 3rd Floor, Syracuse, New York 13202.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge:
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Alexander Dehoyos is charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l). (Dkt. No. 13.) Dehoyos moves to suppress physical evidence and statements arising from a seizure and warrantless search that occurred on June 5, 2022. (Dkt. No. 18.) The Government opposes the motion. (Dkt. No. 20.) The Court conducted an evidentiary suppression hearing on October 24, 2022. Following the hearing, Dehoyos and the Government filed supplemental briefs. (Dkt. Nos. 34, 37.) Based on the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, Dehoyos's motion to suppress is granted.
II. FACTS
The Court makes the following findings of fact based on witness testimony given and exhibits admitted at the October 24, 2022, suppression hearing, (Dkt. Nos. 29, 30), and the parties' submissions, (Dkt. Nos. 18, 19, 20, 23, 34, 37). At the hearing, the Court heard the testimony of Dehoyos, New York State Police ("NYSP") Trooper Brian Sierotnik, NYSP Investigator Carl Schneider, and New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") Parole Officer Patrick Bennett. To the extent that discrepancies in testimony arose, the Court resolves those discrepancies as set forth below.
A. Events of June 5, 2022
On June 5, 2022, NYSP Trooper Brian Sierotnik, NYSP Investigator Carl Schneider, and DOCCS Parole Officer Patrick Bennett, among others, were assigned to take part in a gun interdiction detail on the west side of Syracuse, New York, and in the Village of Solvay, New York. (Dkt. No. 20-1, ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 20-2, ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 20-3, ¶ 2; October 24, 2022, Hearing Transcript ("Tr.") at 30-31.) Schneider testified that the detail was "primarily focused to get violent criminals off the street" and was "looking not so much for simple traffic infractions, [but] looking for handguns or firearms that are illegally possessed." (Tr. at 30.) As part of such details, officers "primarily find guns through traffic stops." (Id. at 31.) Schneider explained that once officers stop a vehicle, they attempt to develop elevated levels of suspicion to ask for consent to search the vehicle, "looking for . . . guns [or] drugs." (Id. at 30-31.) Sierotnik was in charge of writing any traffic tickets arising from this assignment. (Id. at 5, 29.)
Sierotnik and Schneider initiated a stop of a vehicle for excessively tinted windows and an expired inspection at 8:44:21 p.m. (BWC #2, at 0:00:30; Dkt. No. 20-1, ¶ 3; Dkt. No. 20-2, ¶ 3.) The vehicle, a black Chrysler 300, stopped in the entryway of the parking lot of a Byrne Dairy at 1800 West Fayette Street, Syracuse, New York. (Dkt. No. 20-1, ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 20-2, ¶ 4.) Another NYSP patrol car with two officers stopped behind Sierotnik and Schneider's patrol car "to assist with scene security, traffic control, and any potential transport needed." (Dkt. No. 20-1, at 3.)
Body-worn camera footage, which was admitted into evidence at the hearing, (Dkt. No. 19), cited as "BWC #2" is body-worn camera footage from Trooper Sierotnik. Body-worn camera footage cited as "BWC #1" or "BWC #3" is body-worn camera footage from NYSP Trooper Muller, who was on the scene but did not participate in the traffic stop. Trooper Sierotnik's body-worn camera footage (BWC #2) began recording thirty seconds before he activated his patrol car's emergency lights. (Tr. at 23.)
Sierotnik exited the patrol car and began speaking with the driver of the Chrysler at 8:44:42 p.m. (BWC #2, at 0:00:51.) Schneider began talking to Defendant Alexander Dehoyos, who was sitting in the rear of the Chrysler on the passenger side, at approximately 8:45:02 p.m. (BWC #1, at 0:00:51.) At 8:45:14 p.m., Schneider said, "You don't have a seatbelt on, man . . . . You got any ID bro?" (Id. at 0:01:02-0:01:08; Dkt. No. 18-2, ¶¶ 6-7.) Dehoyos handed Schneider an identification card at 8:45:31 p.m., and Schneider asked, "Where are you from, man?" (BWC #1, at 0:01:20-0:01:36.) Dehoyos answered, "Rochester," and Schneider said, "Ah Rochester. What you guys doing out here?" (Id.) Dehoyos said something about "friends," and Schneider replied, "Hanging out for the weekend? Alright cool, cool, cool." (Id.) Schneider testified that at that point, he had probable cause to issue Dehoyos a ticket for a seatbelt violation. (Tr. at 35-36.)
Schneider left the Chrysler to return to the patrol car with Dehoyos's identification card at 8:45:48 p.m. (BWC #1, at 0:01:37.) Schneider used the patrol car's computer from approximately 8:46:16 p.m. to 8:46:40 p.m. (Id. at 0:02:05-0:02:23; BWC #2, at 0:02:44-0:02:45; BWC #3, at 0:00:02-0:00:18.)
Sierotnik, who was at the front of the Chrysler with the driver, obtained the vehicle's registration and a broken identification card from the driver at 8:45:38 p.m. and returned to the patrol car, where Schneider was already sitting, at 8:46:24 p.m. (BWC #2, at 0:01:47-0:02:33; BWC #1, at 0:02:06-0:02:20.) While in the patrol car, Schneider and Sierotnik conferred and Schneider informed Sierotnik that there was probable cause to issue Dehoyos a ticket for a seatbelt violation. (Tr. at 25-27.) But Schneider did not give Dehoyos's identification card to Sierotnik, who was in charge of writing traffic tickets. (Id. at 29, 37.) Sierotnik adjusted the patrol car's computer so that it faced him and placed his hands near the keyboard at 8:46:41 p.m. (BWC #2, at 0:02:50.)
Schneider testified that he does not believe that he told Sierotnik that there was probable cause to issue Dehoyos a ticket for a seatbelt violation, but he believes that Sierotnik "was most likely aware" of the seatbelt violation. (Tr. at 37, 51-52.) Having observed both witnesses testify, and considering all of the evidence, including the overall credibility of Sierotnik's testimony, the Court credits Sierotnik's testimony that Schneider told him in the patrol car that there was probable cause to issue Dehoyos a ticket for a seatbelt violation. (Id. at 26-27.)
At 8:46:43 p.m., Schneider picked up a phone from the door of the patrol car and called his supervisor, NYSP Senior Investigator Todd Grant, who was also on the scene. (BWC #3, at 0:00:04; Tr. at 39, 45.) At 8:46:47 p.m., Sierotnik, seeing that Schneider was still using the computer, moved it back toward Schneider, who used it while on the phone with Grant. (BWC #2, at 0:02:56; BWC #3, at 0:00:14.) After this brief computer use, Schneider informed Grant that Dehoyos was on parole. (Tr. at 33-34, 39.) Grant contacted parole officers and then informed Schneider that parole officers would be responding to the scene. (Id. at 40, 64.) Schneider was aware that parole officers were "somewhere nearby and participating in the detail." (Dkt. No. 20-2, ¶ 7; Tr. at 34.) The Court finds that Schneider ran the records check that led him to conclude Dehoyos was on parole. At some point between 8:47:02 p.m. and 8:47:07 p.m., while still on the phone with Grant, Schneider exited the patrol car. (BWC #2, at 0:03:03-0:03:11; BWC #3, at 0:00:29.) Schneider ended his phone call with Grant at 8:47:19 p.m. but did not reenter the patrol car and ultimately walked away from the patrol car at 8:47:52 p.m. (BWC #3, at 0:00:41-0:01:14.)
Schneider testified that Sierotnik ran the "driver's license inquiries or the warrant checks," which Schneider also referred to as "file checks," on both Dehoyos and the driver. (Tr. at 56.) This is consistent with Sierotnik's role, which was to write any tickets arising out of the stop. (Id. at 5, 29.) However, it was Schneider who determined that Dehoyos was on parole: video evidence clearly shows Schneider, who had possession of Dehoyos's identification card, using the patrol car's computer immediately before calling and while on the phone with his supervisor to report Dehoyos's parole status. (BWC #1, at 0:02:05-0:02:23; BWC #2, at 0:02:44-0:02:45, 0:03:02-0:03:07; BWC #3, at 0:00:02-0:00:18; Dkt. No. 20-2, ¶ 5.)
During this time, Sierotnik spoke with another officer, NYSP Trooper Muller, about an independent concern involving a different vehicle in the parking lot from 8:47:07 p.m. to 8:47:32 p.m. (BWC #3, at 0:00:28-0:00:54; BWC #2, at 0:03:16-0:03:43.) At that point, Sierotnik believed that Schneider had contacted parole. (Tr. at 11, 21.)
At 8:47:33 p.m., Sierotnik said, "I'm gonna run the other dude," referring to the driver of the Chrysler, and he began using the computer at 8:47:34 p.m. (BWC #2, at 0:03:43; BWC #3, at 0:00:54-0:00:57.) At 8:47:53 p.m., the Chrysler pulled out of the entryway to the Byrne Dairy and into a parking spot while Sierotnik pulled his patrol car out of the road and into the entryway of the Byrne Dairy. (BWC # 3, at 0:01:15; CCTV at 47:55; BWC #2, at 0:04:05.) By that point, there were six law enforcement officers on the scene: five NYSP officers and one FBI agent. (CCTV at 47:55-48:05; BWC #3, at 0:01:10-0:01:20; Tr. at 43-45.) Sierotnik began using the patrol car's computer again at 8:48:08 p.m. (BWC #2, at 0:04:17.)
Byrne Dairy closed-circuit surveillance camera footage, which was admitted into evidence at the hearing, (Dkt. No. 19), is cited as "CCTV." The Byrne Dairy closed-circuit surveillance camera footage runs from 8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., and the timestamp of the Byrne Dairy closed-circuit surveillance camera footage correlates to the time of day included in the body-worn camera footage. For example, 47:56 (that is, forty-seven minutes and fifty-six seconds) on the Byrne Dairy closed-circuit surveillance camera footage is concurrent with 20:47:56, or 8:47:56 p.m., on BWC #2.
Schneider approached Dehoyos in the Chrysler, while still in possession of Dehoyos's identification card, and began questioning him again at 8:48:23 p.m. (CCTV at 48:23; Tr. at 57.) Schneider asked Dehoyos about his parole status and what he was on parole for. (Tr. at 40, 79; Dkt. No. 18-2, ¶ 12.) Dehoyos told Schneider that he was on parole. (Dkt. No. 18-2, ¶ 12.) Schneider asked Dehoyos to get out of the Chrysler, and Dehoyos asked why but did not get out of the vehicle. (Tr. at 62, 78-79.) Schneider acknowledged that asking Dehoyos to get out of the vehicle did not "have anything to do with the seat belt ticket" but was instead a tactic "to further investigate other crimes." (Id. at 42, 60.) Schneider's "ultimate goal [was] to search the vehicle" to find guns or drugs, (id. at 55, 42), or at least facilitate a plain-view look into the vehicle, (id. at 60). Schneider understood that he did not have a right to search the Chrysler and could not ask whether there were firearms or drugs in the vehicle. (Id. at 53.) But Schneider testified that asking an individual to get out of a vehicle can be tactically beneficial because occupants who have stepped out of a vehicle might have been "sitting on contraband or drugs." (Id. at 55.) Schneider also testified that "ask[ing] occupants to step out of the vehicle . . . [is] a tactic we use to develop conflicting stories . . . as to where they're coming from, where they're going, to raise [the] level of suspicion to ask the driver for consent to search the vehicle." (Id. at 41, 55.) There is no indication that either of the two other individuals in the vehicle—the driver or the front-seat passenger, (id. at 8, 78)—was asked to step out of the vehicle. Schneider testified that he was, through his questioning of Dehoyos, attempting to develop a heightened level of suspicion of criminal activity that could justify extending the stop and requesting consent to search the Chrysler. (Tr. at 31, 41, 55, 61.)
Schneider testified that "[he's] sure [he] did" ask Dehoyos more questions after asking about his parole status but that he did not recall what those additional questions were. (Tr. at 40-41.) Schneider later testified that "[maybe] [he] asked [Dehoyos] more about his seat belt and why he wasn't wearing it." (Id. at 62.) Dehoyos testified that he never told Schneider, or any other officer, why he was not wearing a seatbelt. (Id. at 78.) He testified that he was not wearing a seatbelt because he had unbuckled it after the vehicle stopped. (Id. at 78; Dkt. No. 18-2, ¶ 3.) Because Schneider did not recall asking Dehoyos any questions about the seatbelt and because there is no evidence of any response by Dehoyos, the Court finds that Schneider did not ask any questions about Dehoyos's seatbelt during this interaction.
At the time Schneider walked back to the Chrysler, he had not decided whether to issue Dehoyos a ticket for a seatbelt violation. (Id. at 52, 59.) Schneider only decided to give Dehoyos the ticket for a seatbelt violation after Dehoyos refused to get out of the car. (Id. at 60.) Schneider explained that he "was sure" he would give the seatbelt ticket then because he "could take no more further investigative steps" regarding contraband in the Chrysler. (Id. at 57, 60-61.) When asked whether he delayed the decision to issue a ticket for the seatbelt violation until he "pursued further unrelated investigatory leads," Schneider answered, "possibly[,] I don't want to give a definitive answer. Maybe I asked him more about his seat belt and why he wasn't wearing it." (Id. at 62.) Schneider remained at the Chrysler after this questioning. (CCTV at 48:22-49:05.)
Sierotnik finished his investigation into the driver of the Chrysler at 8:48:38 p.m. (BWC #2, at 0:04:47.) He got out of the patrol car with the Chrysler's registration and the driver's identification card at 8:48:40 p.m., and walked to the rear of the Chrysler, where Schneider handed him Dehoyos's identification card at 8:49:05 p.m. (Id. at 0:04:46-0:05:14.) Sierotnik handed Schneider the Chrysler's registration card, and Schneider immediately handed it back to Sierotnik. (Id. at 0:05:17-0:05:19.) At that point, Schneider told Sierotnik to issue a ticket for Dehoyos. (Tr. at 25.) Sierotnik returned to the patrol car with the Chrysler's registration card, the driver's identification card, and Dehoyos's identification card and began using the patrol car's computer again at 8:49:28 p.m. to write tickets for Dehoyos and the driver. (BWC #2, at 0:05:36.) At 8:50:32 p.m., Sierotnik moved the patrol car further out of the entryway of the parking lot and resumed writing the tickets at 8:50:39 p.m. (CCTV at 50:32-50:39; BWC #2, at 0:06:41-0:06:48.) Sierotnik finished printing Dehoyos's ticket by 8:52:13 p.m., then folded it and set it in his lap to complete the driver's ticket. (Id. at 0:08:26; Tr. 18.)
DOCCS parole officers were part of the gun interdiction detail and were in the area of the stop. (Dkt. No. 20-3, ¶¶ 2-3; Tr. at 34, 63.) Nine minutes and twelve seconds into the stop, at 8:53:33 p.m., Parole Officer Bennett and another parole officer arrived at the scene and parked their car. (CCTV at 53:26-53:33; Tr. at 50, 72-73.) The parole officers got out of their car at 8:53:34 p.m. and walked over to and started looking into the Chrysler at 8:53:53 p.m. (CCTV at 53:34-53:53.) They asked Dehoyos to get out of the vehicle, which he did at 8:54:05 p.m. (Id. at 53:26-54:05; Tr. at 65, 70.) Schneider, who had left the Chrysler at 8:53:58 p.m. to get Dehoyos's ticket from Sierotnik, returned to the Chrysler at 8:54:08 p.m. and placed Dehoyos's ticket in his own pocket at 8:54:11 p.m. (CCTV at 53:58-54:02, 54:08-54:11; BWC #2, at 0:10:10; Tr. at 72-73.) Sierotnik completed printing the driver's ticket by 8:54:15 p.m., walked to the Chrysler, and handed the driver the ticket at 8:54:56 p.m. (BWC #2, at 0:10:23-0:11:05.)
Upon arriving at the Chrysler, Bennett observed that Dehoyos was wearing beads around his neck that Bennett believed "were consistent with the appearance of beads worn commonly by members of the Latin Kings, which is a violent street gang." (Dkt. No. 20-3, ¶ 6; Tr. at 67-68.) Bennett was aware that the Latin Kings are active in the area of the stop and that there is a "heav[y] gang" presence and "a lot of high [ ] crime" in the area. (Tr. at 67-68, 70.) Based on the beads and his knowledge of the area of the stop, Bennett requested supervisory approval to search Dehoyos and the back of the Chrysler since Dehoyos was the only passenger in the back seats. (Dkt. No. 20-3, ¶ 7.) Bennett received approval. (Id.; Tr. at 77.) A parole officer handcuffed Dehoyos, and Bennett searched the rear seats of the Chrysler and found a handgun at around 8:57:25 p.m. (Tr. at 71; BWC # 2, at 0:13:34.) At 8:59:07 p.m., Sierotnik retrieved the handgun from a backpack. (BWC #2, at 0:15:16.) Sierotnik then put the handgun back in the backpack and placed the backpack in his patrol car at 9:02:27 p.m. (Id. at 0:15:16-0:18:38.) Schneider placed Dehoyos in the back of the patrol car at 9:14:43 p.m. (Id. at 0:30:52.)
Schneider testified that he did not intentionally delay the traffic stop and the issuance of the tickets. (Tr. 55.) Schneider testified that the tickets were in fact issued "faster because parole was coming." (Id. at 56.) He explained that if parole were not coming, "[i]t probably would have been more delayed because I would have tried harder to get the driver or Mr. Dehoyos to step out of the vehicle." (Id. at 55-56.) Sierotnik similarly testified that he did not do anything intentionally to delay the traffic stop and that he would not have done anything faster if parole had never been summoned to the scene. (Id. at 24-25.)
III. DISCUSSION
On a motion to suppress, a defendant bears the initial burden of establishing that he was subjected to a warrantless search or seizure. United States v. Herron, 18 F. Supp. 3d 214, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing United States v. Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985, 989 (2d Cir. 1980)). Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the Government to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged search or seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Murphy, 778 F. Supp. 2d 237, 240 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Arboleda, 633 F.2d at 989), aff'd, 703 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2012).
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a 'seizure' of 'persons' within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment]." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). "Therefore, traffic stops must satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness limitation, which 'requires that an officer making a traffic stop have probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the person stopped has committed a traffic violation or is otherwise engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal activity.' " United States v. Gomez, 877 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 551 F.3d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 2009)).
But "[e]ven if lawful at its inception, a traffic stop 'can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution.' " United States v. Wallace, 937 F.3d 130, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005)). Because resolving the issue that gave rise to the seizure "is the purpose of the stop, it may 'last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.' " Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). That is, the duration of a traffic stop cannot exceed "the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made." Id. at 350, 135 S.Ct. 1609; see also United States v. Santillan, 902 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 2018) ("Under Rodriguez, authority for a traffic-stop seizure ends when the tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed, unless the officer develops reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to extend the stop."). The "ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop" typically "involve checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (alteration in original) (first quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S.Ct. 834; and then citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-60, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). These checks "serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly." Id.
While "[a]n officer . . . may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop[,] . . . he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop[ ] absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual." Id.; see also Gomez, 877 F.3d at 90. In determining the lawfulness of pursuing an unrelated investigation, "[t]he critical question . . . is not whether [the unrelated investigation] occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, . . . but whether conducting the [unrelated investigation] 'prolongs'—i.e., adds time to—the stop." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357, 135 S.Ct. 1609; see also Gomez, 877 F.3d at 90-91.
Here, there is no challenge to the lawfulness of the traffic stop at its inception. The parties dispute whether Schneider's conduct consisted of "ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop," Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (alteration in original) (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S.Ct. 834), and, if it did not, whether his conduct " 'prolong[ed]'—i.e., add[ed] time to—the stop," id. at 357, 135 S.Ct. 1609.
A. Ordinary Inquiries Incident to the Traffic Stop
Dehoyos argues that inquiries into parole status are per se outside the scope of a traffic stop or that, if they are not, Schneider's conduct in pursuing inquiries concerning Dehoyos's parole status went beyond the mission of the stop. (Dkt. No. 34, at 7-11.) The Government argues that "running a computer check to determine the parole status of a passenger being investigated for a traffic infraction himself is one of the ordinary incidents of a traffic stop that can be taken as a matter of course and as an officer safety precaution." (Dkt. No. 37, at 9-11.)
The Supreme Court in Rodriguez enumerated a number of ordinary inquiries that are incident to a traffic stop: "checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance." 575 U.S. at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609. The Government argues that this list is not exhaustive and that checking the criminal history and parole status of an individual seized during a traffic stop is similarly incident to the stop or is at least a minimally intrusive task necessary to securing the safety of the officer. (Dkt. No. 37, at 10-11.) In support of this position, the Government cites caselaw from the Eighth Circuit, (id. at 10), which has included running a computerized criminal history check in the set of routine tasks associated with a traffic stop, see United States v. Salkil, 10 F.4th 897, 898 (8th Cir. 2021) ("During a stop, officers may complete 'routine tasks,' such as 'computerized checks of . . . the driver's license and criminal history, and the writing up of a . . . warning.' " (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Englehart, 811 F.3d 1034, 1040 (8th Cir. 2016))).
The Government also cites preRodriguez cases from the Tenth Circuit, (Dkt. No. 37, at 10), that stand for the same general principle, see United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[A] motorist may be detained for a short period while the officer runs a background check to see if there are any outstanding warrants or criminal history pertaining to the motorist even though the purpose of the stop had nothing to do with such prior criminal history."), abrogated in part by Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005); United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1535 n.6 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[Computer] checks are run largely to protect the officer. Considering the tragedy of the many officers who are shot during routine traffic stops each year, the almost simultaneous computer check of a person's criminal record, along with his or her license and registration, is reasonable and hardly intrusive.").
Dehoyos relies on, among others, two post-Rodriguez cases—one from the Third Circuit and one from the Ninth Circuit—in support of his position that a parole check is not incident to a traffic stop. (Dkt. No. 34, at 7-9.) In United States v. Clark, the Third Circuit held that an officer's questioning of a driver concerning his criminal history, after the officer had confirmed through a computer check that the driver was authorized to drive the vehicle and that the driver had a criminal history, impermissibly extended the stop because "[the officer's] inquiry into [the driver's] criminal history was . . . not tied to the traffic stop's mission, and, at that point, 'tasks tied to the traffic infraction . . . reasonably should have been . . . completed.' " 902 F.3d 404, 411 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609). In United States v. Evans, the Ninth Circuit held that an "ex-felon registration check," conducted after completion of the vehicle records and warrants checks, "was wholly unrelated to [the officer's] 'mission' of 'ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.' " 786 F.3d 779, 786 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609). Furthermore, the court found that an ex-felon registration check that took approximately eight minutes was not a "negligibly burdensome precaution[ ] [taken] in order to complete [the] mission safely." Id. at 787 (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356, 135 S.Ct. 1609). Thus, the Ninth Circuit held, "[the officer] violated [the defendant's] Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizures when he prolonged the traffic stop to conduct th[e] [ex-felon registration check], unless he had independent reasonable suspicion justifying this prolongation." Id. The Government dismisses these cases as "out of step with Rodriguez's blessing of typical warrants checks and its acknowledgement of the importance of allowing officers to take routine steps to remain safe." (Dkt. No. 37, at 11.)
The Second Circuit has not decided whether a parole check—or, as both Dehoyos and the Government analogize to, a criminal history check—is an ordinary inquiry incident to a traffic stop under Rodriguez. But even without consideration of this issue, the facts of this case make clear that the inquiries here exceeded the bounds of any task tied to the infractions that gave rise to the traffic stop. The cases the Government cites refer to a brief, computerized criminal history check. See Holt, 264 F.3d at 1221 ("[A] motorist may be detained for a short period while the officer runs a background check to see . . . . criminal history pertaining to the motorist . . ." (emphasis added)); McRae, 81 F.3d at 1535 n.6 ("[T]he almost simultaneous computer check of a person's criminal record . . . is reasonable and hardly intrusive." (emphasis added)); Salkil, 10 F.4th at 898 ("During a stop, officers may complete . . . 'computerized checks of . . . criminal history . . . .' " (quoting Englehart, 811 F.3d at 1040) (emphasis added)). Furthermore, these cases suggest, and the Government agrees, that a criminal history check is allowable because it is an unobtrusive officer safety precaution. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1221 ("[A] motorist expects an officer to take reasonable measures to protect officer safety during the stop. When these measures are not too intrusive, the government's strong interest in officer safety outweighs the motorist's interests." (emphasis added)); McRae, 81 F.3d at 1535 n.6 ("[Computer] checks are run largely to protect the officer. Considering the tragedy of the many officers who are shot during routine traffic stops each year, the almost simultaneous computer check of a person's criminal record . . . is reasonable and hardly intrusive." (emphasis added)).
Neither party addresses the difference between an officer running a computerized parole check and an officer running a computerized criminal history check.
In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court noted that "an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely." 575 U.S. at 356, 135 S.Ct. 1609. But "nothing in Rodriguez suggests that an officer can prolong a car stop to look up a driver's (or passenger's) criminal history, let alone pose questions unrelated to the traffic stop based on that history." United States v. Milton, 621 F. Supp. 3d 421, 431, No. 22-cr-93, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144542, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2022). In fact, Rodriguez makes clear that "[o]n-scene investigation into other crimes . . . detours from th[e] mission [of the traffic stop]." 575 U.S. at 356, 135 S.Ct. 1609. "So too do safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours . . . [since] [h]ighway and officer safety are interests different in kind from the Government's endeavor to detect crime in general . . . ." Id. at 356-57, 135 S.Ct. 1609. Where a measure is not a negligibly burdensome safety precaution, a court must "make a simple inquiry: was the officer pursuing the mission of the traffic stop in some way, or did the officer get side-tracked and abandon the traffic stop's mission?" United States v. Parks, No. 19-cr-87, 2022 WL 1819383, at *9, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99662, at *22-23 (W.D.N.Y. June 3, 2022). "[U]nrelated inquiries that prolong or add time to a traffic stop violate the Fourth Amendment absent reasonable suspicion of a separate crime." Gomez, 877 F.3d at 90. But the "constitutional reasonableness" of an unrelated inquiry does not depend "on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved." Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769. Rather, a court must consider the objective conduct of the officer and "the circumstances, viewed objectively." Id.; see also Hernandez v. Boles, 949 F.3d 251, 257-58 (6th Cir. 2020).
Here, there is no testimony or other evidence that Schneider's inquiries concerning Dehoyos's parole status were conducted for officer safety. Sierotnik, who was responsible for writing any tickets arising out of this stop, conducted the driver's license inquiries and warrants checks—that is, the ordinary inquiries of a traffic stop—on both Dehoyos and the driver because investigators like Schneider "typically do not write traffic tickets." (Tr. at 28, 56-57.) Schneider, however, conducted the parole inquiries. And Schneider's inquiries were not limited to a computer check. While the record does not reflect what Schneider did on the computer that resulted in his discovery that Dehoyos was on parole, his parole inquiries involved three discrete processes. First, Schneider used the patrol car's computer to determine that Dehoyos was on parole. (BWC #1, at 0:02:05-0:02:23; BWC #2, at 0:02:44-0:02:45; BWC #3, at 0:00:02-0:00:18.) Then, Schneider spoke on the phone with his supervisor, informing him that Dehoyos was on parole and discussing what investigative steps, unrelated to the traffic stop or officer safety, the gun interdiction detail would take. (BWC #3, at 0:00:04, 0:00:14, 0:00:41-0:01:14; BWC #2, at 0:02:56; Tr. at 33-34, 39-40, 45, 64; Dkt. No. 20-2, ¶ 7.) During that time, Sierotnik was unable to use the patrol car's computer to initiate the ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop. (BWC #2, at 0:02:51-0:02:57.) Finally, Schneider returned to the Chrysler and spoke to Dehoyos for a second time to ask questions about Dehoyos's parole status. (CCTV at 48:23-49:05; Tr. at 40-42, 55, 57, 60, 62, 79; Dkt. No. 18-2, ¶ 12; BWC #2, at 0:05:14.)
These processes did not flow one uninterruptedly into the next. Rather, they were punctuated by Schneider and Sierotnik's first conference in the patrol car, (Tr. at 25-27), and the Chrysler's movement further into the parking lot, (BWC # 3, at 0:01:15; CCTV at 47:55; BWC #2, at 0:04:05). The time intervals the Court uses to describe Schneider's actions are informed by these interruptions.
On this record the Court cannot find that Schneider's inquiries concerning parole can be fairly characterized as part of the officers' traffic mission or as an officer safety precaution. See Milton, 2022 WL 3334706, at *8, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144542, at *21-23. Schneider's inquiries amounted to an independent investigation into other crimes wholly separate from the mission of the traffic stop. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356-57, 135 S.Ct. 1609; see also Parks, 2022 WL 1819383, at *9, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99662, at 22-23. Schneider had no stop-related reason to call his supervisor to discuss Dehoyos's parole status or to return to the Chrysler to interview Dehoyos a second time. Nor did he have a stop-related reason to ask Dehoyos to get out of the vehicle. Before he took those actions, Schneider believed that he had developed probable cause to issue Dehoyos a ticket for a seatbelt violation. (Tr. at 35-36, 25-27.) Schneider, however, took no further steps to investigate the seatbelt violation but instead focused his efforts solely on his "ultimate goal" of searching the vehicle to find guns as part of the gun interdiction detail. (Tr. at 55, 42.) And while "the constitutional reasonableness" of Schneider's inquiries does not depend on Schneider's "actual motivations[,] . . . the circumstances, viewed objectively," did not justify Schneider's action. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769. Put differently, Schneider's "[o]n-scene investigation into other crimes," when viewed objectively, "detour[ed] from th[e] mission [of the traffic stop]," see Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356-57, 135 S.Ct. 1609, squarely differentiating it from any "ordinary inquiries incident to [the] stop," see id. at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S.Ct. 834). Therefore, the Court must next examine whether Schneider's conduct prolonged the stop.
Officers have a right to order passengers out of a vehicle during a traffic stop, see Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997), "as a precautionary measure" for officer safety, Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). But "safety precautions taken in order to facilitate" an "[o]n-scene investigation into other crimes" are no longer an ordinary incident of the stop. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356-57, 135 S.Ct. 1609; see also United States v. Whitley, 34 F.4th 522, 530 (6th Cir. 2022) ("Although in other contexts officers may require an individual to exit a vehicle as a safety precaution, . . . such 'safety measures taken to facilitate a different investigation . . . are not tasks incident to the initial stop.' " (internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Lott, 954 F.3d 919, 924 (6th Cir. 2020))). Here, there is no testimony or other evidence that Schneider's request was related to officer safety. Schneider acknowledged that asking Dehoyos to get out of the vehicle did not "have anything to do with the seat belt ticket" but was instead a tactic "to further investigate other crimes." (Tr. at 42, 60.)
In light of this ruling, the Court does not address Dehoyos's argument, raised for the first time in his supplemental brief, that probable cause for a seatbelt violation must be based on personal knowledge that the offender was unbuckled while the vehicle was moving. (Dkt. No. 34, at 5-6.)
B. Duration of the Traffic Stop
A police officer "may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop . . . [but] not . . . in a way that prolongs the stop[ ] absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609; see also Gomez, 877 F.3d at 90. "[T]he 'reasonableness of a [traffic-stop] seizure . . . depends on what the police in fact do,' rather than a comparison to the duration of a hypothetically expeditious seizure or the duration of a seizure in similar circumstances." Gomez, 877 F.3d at 90 (omission in original) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357, 135 S.Ct. 1609). In determining the lawfulness of pursuing an unrelated investigation, "[t]he critical question . . . is not whether [the unrelated investigation] occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, . . . but whether conducting the [unrelated investigation] 'prolongs'—i.e., adds time to—the stop." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357, 135 S.Ct. 1609; see also Gomez, 877 F.3d at 90-91. That is, a court must consider whether an investigation into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop "measurably extend[s] the duration of the stop." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009)).
Dehoyos contends that Schneider used "dilatory tactics" that were directly attributable to Schneider's investigation into Dehoyos's parole status to delay the conclusion of the stop. (Dkt. No. 34, at 12-15.) The Government argues that Dehoyos's claims about any delay caused by Schneider's conduct are incorrect, that Schneider's conduct took no more time than it took Sierotnik to write the two tickets, and that, "[t]o the extent there were brief periods where [ ] Schneider's investigation took more time than [ ] Sierotnik would have needed to write the driver a ticket . . . , the additional time was justified because of [ ] Schneider's valid investigation of Dehoyos's seatbelt violation." (Dkt. No. 37, at 12-15.)
The Court notes that an extension of the duration of the traffic stop would have been permissible had Schneider developed "the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual." See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609. But such reasonable suspicion must have been "supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may [have] be[en] afoot," not based on "inchoate suspicion or mere hunch." United States v. Freeman, 735 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The Government has not argued that Schneider developed the reasonable suspicion necessary for extending the duration of the stop.
The Government further suggests that Schneider was engaged in making a discretionary decision about whether to issue Dehoyos a ticket for a seatbelt violation, (Dkt. No. 37, at 13), but the record does not reflect that Schneider conducted any investigation into the seatbelt violation. Schneider determined that he had probable cause to issue Dehoyos a ticket for a seatbelt violation by 8:45:31 p.m. (BWC #1, at 0:01:02-0:01:36; Tr. at 35-36.) Schneider informed Sierotnik that there existed probable cause to issue Dehoyos a ticket for a seatbelt violation by 8:46:41 p.m., before Schneider walked back to the Chrysler to further question Dehoyos. (BWC #2, at 0:01:47-0:02:50; BWC #1, at 0:02:06-0:02:20; Tr. at 25-27.) Schneider then questioned Dehoyos about his parole status, not his seatbelt. (Tr. at 40-41.) Schneider testified that he had discretion whether to issue Dehoyos a ticket for a seatbelt violation and that it was only after his final interaction with Dehoyos that he decided to issue the ticket. (Id. at 52.) The Court agrees that Schneider had that discretion. But Schneider's testimony establishes that the only change between the time he informed Sierotnik that he had probable cause to issue Dehoyos a ticket for a seatbelt violation and ultimately deciding to issue such a ticket was Dehoyos's refusal of Schneider's request that Dehoyos get out of the Chrysler, (Tr. at 62, 79), and that that request did not "have anything to do with the seat belt ticket" but was instead, by Schneider's own admission, a tactic employed solely "to further investigate other crimes," (id. at 42, 60).
During his second encounter with Dehoyos at the Chrysler, Schneider did not take any steps to investigate the seatbelt violation but instead focused his efforts solely on his "ultimate goal" of searching the vehicle to find guns as part of the gun interdiction detail. (Tr. at 55, 42.) Schneider testified that he "was sure" he would issue a ticket for a seatbelt violation "because he could take no more further investigative steps [since Dehoyos] was refusing to get out of the vehicle." (Tr. at 60-61.) By taking these investigative steps—questioning Dehoyos about parole and asking him to get out of the vehicle—Schneider was creating the "bonus time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation" the Supreme Court forbade in Rodriguez. 575 U.S. at 357, 135 S.Ct. 1609 ("The reasonableness of a seizure . . . depends on what the police in fact do . . . . [A]n officer always has to be reasonably diligent . . . . If an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of time reasonably required to complete [the stop's] mission." (citations and quotation marks omitted)); see also Gomez, 877 F.3d at 91-92 ("Just as an officer may not earn bonus time to conduct inquiries for an unrelated criminal investigation by efficiently processing the matters related to the traffic stop, an officer may not consume much of the time justified by the stop with inquiries about offenses unrelated to the reasons for the stop." (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
Thus, the Court must examine whether Schneider's unrelated investigative inquiries "measurably extend[ed] the duration of the stop." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (quoting Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333, 129 S.Ct. 781); see also Gomez, 877 F.3d at 90-91. The Court finds that they did. Schneider undertook two separate investigative steps: First, while maintaining exclusive use of the patrol car's computer, Schneider spoke on the phone with his supervisor about Dehoyos's parole status and subsequent steps of the gun interdiction detail. (BWC #3, at 0:00:04, 0:00:14, 0:00:41-0:01:14; BWC #2, at 0:02:56; Tr. at 33-34, 39-40, 45, 64; Dkt. No. 20-2, ¶ 7.) Second, Schneider returned to the Chrysler and spoke to Dehoyos for a second time to discuss Dehoyos's parole status and to pursue investigative inquiries unrelated to the traffic stop or officer safety. (CCTV at 48:23-49:05; Tr. at 40-42, 55, 57, 60, 62, 79; Dkt. No. 18-2, ¶ 12; BWC #2, at 0:05:14.)
1. Schneider's Phone Call with Grant
After initiating the stop and interviewing the driver, Sierotnik attempted to use the patrol car's computer to conduct a stop-related investigation at 8:46:41 p.m. but, apparently realizing Schneider was still using it for his phone call with Grant, pushed it back toward Schneider. (BWC #2, at 0:02:50-0:02:57.) Schneider was finished with his computerized parole check of Dehoyos by 8:46:43 p.m., at which point he called Grant. (BWC #3, at 0:00:04; Tr. at 39, 45.) Sierotnik's stop-related investigation into the driver could reasonably have begun when he initially attempted to use the computer at 8:46:41 p.m. In fact, Sierotnik was only able to regain use of the computer at 8:47:34 p.m. (BWC #2, at 0:03:43.) Accounting for the independent security concern that Sierotnik addressed with Officer Muller from 8:47:07 p.m. to 8:47:34 p.m., (BWC #2, at 0:03:16-0:03:43; BWC #3, at 0:00:28-0:00:54), Schneider's conduct while on the phone with Grant in pursuit of his investigation into Dehoyos's parole status resulted in an overall delay of twenty-six seconds.
2. Schneider's Second Interview of Dehoyos
Schneider approached Dehoyos in the Chrysler and began questioning him for the second time at 8:48:23 p.m. (CCTV at 48:23; Tr. at 57.) Meanwhile, Sierotnik was conducting his stop-related investigation in the patrol car, which he completed at 8:48:38 p.m. (BWC #2, at 0:04:47.) At that point, Sierotnik got out of the patrol car and walked to the rear of the Chrysler, where Schneider handed him Dehoyos's identification card and told him to write Dehoyos a ticket for a seatbelt violation. (Id. at 0:04:46-0:05:14-0:05:19; Tr. at 25.) Sierotnik returned to the patrol car and began using the patrol car's computer to write the tickets for Dehoyos and the driver at 8:49:28 p.m. (BWC #2, at 0:05:36.) If not for Schneider's second interview of Dehoyos, Sierotnik would not have had to get out of the patrol car, walk to the Chrysler, and return to the patrol before beginning to issue the two traffic tickets. Thus, Schneider's conduct in returning to the Chrysler to question Dehoyos for a second time resulted in a delay of fifty seconds.
3. Measurable Delay of the Traffic Stop
Schneider's conduct while on the phone with Grant and while interviewing Dehoyos for the second time together created a measurable delay of the conclusion of the traffic stop of one minute and sixteen seconds. Sierotnik handed the driver his ticket—therefore completing the mission of the traffic stop—at 8:54:56 p.m. (BWC #2, at 0:11:05.) Had there not been a delay from the unrelated investigation, this would have occurred at 8:53:40 p.m. Parole officers first looked into the Chrysler—the earliest point at which Bennett could have observed Dehoyos, (Dkt. No. 20-3, ¶ 6; Tr. at 67-68)—at 8:53:53 p.m. (CCTV at 53:53.) Thus, if not for the measurable delay caused by Schneider's unrelated investigative inquiries, Dehoyos would have been free to leave—the mission of the traffic stop having been completed—before parole officers ever observed him.
It is unclear when, or if, Dehoyos received his traffic ticket, but if not for the intercession of the parole officers, it would have been by 8:54:11 p.m. (CCTV at 54:02-54:11.)
Because the Court finds that, but for Schneider's delay, parole officers would never have seen or interacted with Dehoyos, the Court need not address arguments related to the legality of Bennett's search.
While this analysis appears to be "splitting hairs" to determine whether the stop was delayed, the Court is compelled by Rodriguez and Gomez to undertake it. Parks, 2022 WL 1819383, at *6-9, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99662, at *15-24 (finding that a traffic stop was unconstitutionally prolonged where an officer "extended the stop by at least two full minutes with questions for the driver"); Milton, 2022 WL 3334706, at *8-9, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144542, at *18-24 (finding that an a delay of "two minutes or so" caused by "investigative inquiries unrelated to motor vehicle violations" unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop); see also Clark, 902 F.3d at 410 n.4 ("The Government's argument that the brevity (20 seconds) of the criminal history questioning does not support it being off-mission also fails given the Supreme Court's explicit rejection of a de minimis exception in Rodriguez."); Gomez, 877 F.3d at 90 ("[U]nrelated inquiries that prolong or add time to a traffic stop violate the Fourth Amendment absent reasonable suspicion of a separate crime."). Thus, the Court concludes that the traffic stop that resulted in the search of Dehoyos was prolonged in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the firearm seized as a result of that search must be suppressed. Accordingly, Dehoyos's motion to suppress is granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant Alexander Dehoyos's motion to suppress, (Dkt. No. 18), is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that all evidence, including physical evidence and any statements attributed to Dehoyos, obtained after the arrival of parole officers on the scene is suppressed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.