United States v. Davis

Full title: United States v. Len Davis, et al

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

Date published: Nov 27, 2000

Criminal Action No. 94-381, Section "C"(4) (E.D. La. Nov. 27, 2000)

Opinion

Criminal Action No. 94-381, Section "C"(4)

November 27, 2000.

HELEN G. BERRIGAN, United States District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant Paul Hardy's Motion for Production of Exculpatory Evidence (Rec. Doc. 756). The Court heard oral argument on this motion on November 20, 2000, and took the matter under submission. After reviewing the arguments of counsel, the record, and the applicable law, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion is PARTIALLY GRANTED and PARTIALLY DENIED, as described below.

As a preliminary matter, the Court wishes to clarify one general point about Defendant's motion. Defendant lodges eighteen requests for information, to which the Government initially objected as overly broad and burdensome. At oral argument, however, Defendant clarified that his language on the second page of his Motion is intended to limit the requests to exculpatory or impeaching evidence which may be contained in the various materials listed in the eighteen requests. To the extent that this phrase considerably narrows the scope of the requests to exculpatory and impeachment evidence, the Court believes that the Motion is not overly broad.

The Court also recognizes that there is inherently some conflict between the Government's obligation to produce pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), and the statutory limitations of the Jencks Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500. Brady andGiglio set forth a rule of fairness and the minimum prosecutorial obligation demanded of the Government's attorneys by the Constitution.See United States v. Beasley, 576 F.2d 626, 630 (5^th Cir. 1978). AnyBrady, Giglio and Agurs information must be made available to the defense in time for its "effective" use at trial. See United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3rd Cir. 1984). In fact, the constitutional mandate ofBrady may even override the specific provisions of the Jeneks Act "where lack of pretrial discovery result[s] in prejudice to the defendant `of substantial Due Process character.'" United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 860 (5^th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670, 677 (5^th Cir. 1972)); cf. United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 1070, 1079 (4^th Cir. 1993) (noting that the Jencks Act "in no way impairs the government's constitutional obligations under Brady v. Maryland"), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 926 (1994). While most courts have only viewed this issue through an ex post lens, whereby they examine whether the harm caused by any violation was material, some courts have specified ex ante that the Government provide information within a particular amount of time so as to affirmatively protect a defendant's rights.

This Court, likewise, takes its obligation seriously to ensure that the constitutional minimum is observed in this case. Therefore, the Court urges the Government to release any Brady, Giglio, or Agurs information, which might otherwise be covered by the Jencks Act at this time or at least well before the three business days prior to the commencement of the sentencing proceedings. This will avoid any necessity to delay the penalty phase further because of insufficient preparation time by the defense.

With regard to Defendant's other requests, the Court makes the following determinations:

Request I, II, III and IV are hereby GRANTED. Any favorable information that is not contained in exclusively Jencks Act material should be disclosed at this time.

Request V is GRANTED. The Supreme Court has clearly held that the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable information known to the others acting on the government's behalf in this case, including the police and any other law enforcement agency. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995) (noting that "procedures and regulations can be established to carry the prosecutor's burden and to insure communication of all relevant information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it."); see also United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 569-70 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding that knowledge of a state official functioning as part of a joint federal-state investigation could be imputed to federal officials).

Request VI is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Any grants of immunity to prospective government witnesses should be disclosed at this time, unless the Government provides good cause to delay the disclosure. Any other grants of immunity shall be made known to the Court, who will determine in camera whether the grant is of the kind that should be disclosed underBrady (i.e., immunity given to a spouse or family member of a witness).See, e.g., United States v. Burroughs, 830 F.2d 1574, 1579-80 (11^th Cir. 1987) (discussing the possibility that a witness's testimony might be influenced by the government's offer of immunity to his wife in exchange for his testimony). See also United States v. Frank, 11 F. Supp.2d 322, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding it appropriate in a capital case to conduct an in camera review of potential Brady material, even though there was no indication that the Government had violated itsBrady obligations). Any favorable information obtained through an immunity grant should be disclosed under I-IV.

Request VII is GRANTED insofar as the records current defense counsel obtained from prior counsel are incomplete and to the extent the Government can provide copies of the missing documents.

Request VIII is GRANTED. The Supreme Court has clearly held that the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable information known to the others acting on the government's behalf in this case, including the police and any other law enforcement agency. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995) (noting that "procedures and regulations can be established to carry the prosecutor's burden and to insure communication of all relevant information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it.").

Requests IX, X, XI and XII are GRANTED. This information should be disclosed at this time unless the Government provides good cause to delay disclosure.

Request XIII is DENIED insofar as the request extends beyond the disclosure of Jencks Act material.

Request XIV is DENIED insofar as the request extends beyond the disclosure of Jencks Act material.

Request XV is GRANTED insofar as such material contains favorable information. Any favorable information not contained in exclusively Jencks Act material should be disclosed at this time.

Request XVI is GRANTED. The Court construes this request as asking for favorable information that is contained in purely documentary material as opposed to the notes or statements of individuals.

Request XVII is GRANTED.

Request XVIII is DENIED. The Court assume the Government recognizes and will comply with its affirmative obligations under the law.