(6) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. United States v. Melvin, 978 F.3d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Davies, 746 Fed.Appx. 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2018)). As long as it indicates that it has considered the § 3353(a) factors, “a district court enjoys discretion to consider a wide range of circumstances when determining whether to grant early termination.
(6) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. United States v. Melvin, 978 F.3d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Davies, 746 Fed.Appx. 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2018)). As long as it indicates that it has considered the § 3353(a) factors, “a district court enjoys discretion to consider a wide range of circumstances when determining whether to grant early termination.”
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the defendant's history and characteristics; (2) the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and provide him with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentence and sentencing range established for the defendant's crimes; (4) pertinent policy statements issued by the United States Sentencing Commission; (5) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (6) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. Melvin , 978 F.3d at 52 (quoting United States v. Davies , 746 F. App'x 86, 88-89 (3d Cir. 2018) ). A district court need not make specific findings of fact for each factor.
It adopted the government's view that the applicable legal standard requires a showing of new, unforeseen, or extraordinary or exceptional circumstances: Early termination is warranted "only when the sentencing judge is satisfied that something exceptional or extraordinary warrants it," United States v. Laine , 404 F. App'x 571, 573–74 (3d Cir. 2010), or upon a showing of "new or unforeseen circumstances," United States v. Davies , 746 F. App'x 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2018). Compliance with the conditions of supervised release is expected, not exceptional; without more, compliance is not enough to warrant early termination.
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the defendant's history and characteristics; (2) the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and provide him with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentence and sentencing range established for the defendant's crimes; (4) pertinent policy statements issued by the United States Sentencing Commission; (5) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (6) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. United States v. Melvin, 978 F.3d 49, 53 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Davies, 746 Fed.Appx. 86, 88-89 (3d Cir. 2018)).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has clarified that the general rule is that early termination of a term of supervised release under § 3583(e)(1) “will be proper ‘only when the sentencing judge is satisfied that new or unforeseen circumstances' warrant it.” Id. at 53 (quoting United States v. Davies, 746 Fed.Appx. 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 1275, 203 L.Ed.2d 280 (2019)). The court of appeals in Melvin explained:
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has clarified that the general rule is that early termination of a term of supervised release under § 3583(e)(1) “will be proper ‘only when the sentencing judge is satisfied that new or unforeseen circumstances' warrant it.” Id. at 53 (quoting United States v. Davies, 746 Fed.Appx. 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 1275, 203 L.Ed.2d 280 (2019)). The court of appeals in Melvin explained:
United. States v. lvfe/vin, 978 F.3d 49, 53 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Davies, 746 Fed App'x 86, 88-89 (3d Cir. 2018)).
authorizes a district court to terminate supervised release at any time after the expiration of one year if, after considering the factors set forth in Section 3553(a), “it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1); accord United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59-60 (2000); United States v. Peters, 856 Fed.Appx. 230, 233 (11th Cir. 2021); Herndon v. Upton, 985 F.3d 443, 446 n.5 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Melvin, 978 F.3d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Cochran, 815 Fed.Appx. 361, 363 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Davies, 746 Fed.Appx. 86, 88-89 (3d Cir. 2018). “Early termination of supervised release is not an entitlement.”
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has clarified that the general rule is that early termination of a term of supervised release under § 3583(e)(1) “will be proper ‘only when the sentencing judge is satisfied that new or unforeseen circumstances' warrant it.” Id. at 53 (quoting United States v. Davies, 746 Fed.Appx. 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 1275, 203 L.Ed.2d 280 (2019)). The court of appeals in Melvin explained: