Opinion
2:06-cr-00367-HDM 2:16-cv-01271-HDM
12-08-2016
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ELLIOTT DAUGHERTY, Defendant.
ORDER
Defendant has filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion seeking relief based on Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Johnson held that the residual clause in the ACCA's definition of "violent felony" is unconstitutionally vague. Defendant was not charged or sentenced under the ACCA. Rather, he was found to be a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Under § 4B1.1, a defendant qualifies as a career offender if:
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of
conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.At sentencing, the court determined that defendant qualified as a career offender because he had two prior crimes of violence and his instant offense was a crime of violence. The definition of "crime of violence" for purposes of the career offender guideline includes a residual clause that is identical to that in the ACCA. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Defendant argues that Johnson also invalidated this residual clause, that his instant offense could have qualified as a "crime of violence" only under the residual clause, and that he is therefore entitled to relief.
Whether Johnson applies to the Guidelines, and if so, whether it applies retroactively on collateral review, are threshold issues in this case that have not been answered by either the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court. However, the issues are pending before the United States Supreme Court in Beckles v. United States, No. 15-8544. Beckles presents the following issues:
1. Whether Johnson applies retroactively to collateral cases challenging federal sentences enhanced under the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)?
2. Whether Johnson's constitutional holding applies to the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), thereby rendering challenges to sentences enhanced under it cognizable on collateral review?
3. Whether mere possession of a sawed-off shotgun, an
offense listed as a "crime of violence" only in the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, remains a "crime of violence" after Johnson?As Beckles will likely decide threshold issues in this case, the government seeks a stay of defendant's petition pending the Supreme Court's decision in that case.
"[H]abeas proceedings implicate special considerations that place unique limits on a district court's authority to stay a case in the interests of judicial economy." Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit has "never authorized, in the interests of judicial economy, an indefinite, potentially lengthy stay in a habeas case. . . . although considerations of judicial economy are appropriate, they cannot justify [an] indefinite, and potentially lengthy, stay." Id. at 1120-21. Thus, in deciding whether to stay this case, the court should consider whether a stay is likely to resolve the case without inordinate delay; whether Beckles is likely to conclusively resolve issues in this case; and the potential prejudice to the defendant. See United States v. Beane, 2016 WL 4045392, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2016).
The Supreme Court will likely decide Beckles by the end of this term. Accordingly, a stay would not be indefinite.
Further, Beckles is likely to decide whether defendant has any Johnson claim at all based on his status as a career offender, including whether that claim can be raised on collateral review. If either of those questions is answered in the negative, defendant will not be entitled to relief based on Johnson. In addition, the Supreme Court may decide whether crimes listed solely in the commentary of the Guidelines qualify as crimes of violence. The answer to this question may be relevant to defendant's claims, should the court reach the merits of defendant's petition.
Finally, defendant has argued that he would be eligible for immediate release if the court were to grant his § 2255 petition. However, on balance, the relatively short duration of a stay and the fact that Johnson will decide important threshold - and possibly merits - issues in this case outweighs any prejudice that the defendant might suffer from a temporary stay. Accordingly, the court concludes that under the considerations set forth in Yong, a short stay of the defendant's petition in this case is appropriate.
In accordance with the foregoing, proceedings on the defendant's § 2255 petition are hereby STAYED until April 9, 2016, or until further order of the court. Either party may move to lift the stay at any time on a showing of good cause.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: This 8th day of December, 2016.
/s/_________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE