An identical argument was rejected in Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710, 715 (3d Cir. 1965), certiorari denied, 384 U.S. 975, 86 S.Ct. 1868, 16 L.Ed.2d 685, where the court stated: We cited the Rigney opinion with approval in United States v. D'Argento, 373 F.2d 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1967), certiorari denied sub nom. Tomaszck v. United States, 389 U.S. 833, 88 S.Ct. 31, 19 L. Ed.2d 93. "Here we cannot find an invidious discrimination for the different methods employed by the police in securing the identification of a suspected criminal are made necessary because of the difference in circumstances in which those free on bail and those detained find themselves.

Query: whether the scope of Rule 5(a) extends to barring identification testimony or is limited to excluding communications from a defendant obtained during a period of "unnecessary delay?" See, United States v. D'Argento, 373 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1967); Lovelace v. United States, 357 F.2d 306, 310 (5th Cir. 1966); Kennedy v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 291, 353 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Williams v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 244, 345 F.2d 733, 736 (1965) (concurring opinion): Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1964); 4 Barron Holtzoff Federal Practice and Procedure § 1871 at 28 (Supp. 1964).

We hold that the agents here acted "without unnecessary delay," and this meets the legal requirement. United States v. D'Argento, 373 F.2d 307, 313 (7 Cir., 1967). Smith's final authority for his challenge of the ruling on his motion to suppress is Canon 9 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, because in each event interviews were conducted in absence of appointed counsel and without their permission.

In the cases where delay in presentment to the magistrate was at issue, Rule 5(a) has been construed to allow the following procedures to be completed before the accused was taken before the judicial officer: questioning the suspect,United Statesv. Brown, 459 F.2d 319, 325 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 864, 93 S.Ct. 155, 34 L.Ed.2d 111 (1972); taking handwriting samples, Granza v. United States, 377 F.2d 746 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 939, 88 S.Ct. 291, 19 L.Ed.2d 292 (1967); tracking down a codefendant, Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916, 85 S.Ct. 265, 13 L.Ed.2d 186 (1964); fingerprinting and photographing, United States v. D'Argento, 373 F.2d 307 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 833, 88 S.Ct. 31, 19 L.Ed.2d 93 (1967); completing a search of the premises where the arrest was effected, Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951, 80 S.Ct. 862, 4 L.Ed.2d 868 (1960); checking the suspect's story or alibi, United States v. Middleton, 344 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1965). Indeed, officers have an obligation to question the suspect to learn pertinent information.

he government, the stage of the proceedings, whether a professional bondsman or merely a friend of the defendant is involved, willfulness of the default, expenses of the surety, whether the surety surrendered the principal, whether the surety knew of a planned default, whether the defendant or the surety were aware of conditions that were subsequently violated, whether the defendant was required by law to make a court appearance in another state, whether the defendant was imprisoned at the scheduled time of appearance, whether the government was informed that the principal would not be able to appear, whether the forfeiture appeared to be an attempt to punish the defendant, the face amount of the bond and justifications for setting the original amount, the degree of blatancy or extenuating circumstances in defendant's default, and the inability of sureties to prevent the defendant from conspiring with others to avoid trial.United States v. D'Argento, 339 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir. 1964), 373 F.2d 307, cert. den. sub nom. Tomaszck v. United States, 389 U.S. 833 (1967), United States v. Kirkman, 426 F.2d 747, 752 (4th Cir. 1970), United States v. Bass, 573 F.2d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1978), United States v. Foster, 417 F.2d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1969).