The conclusion cannot be avoided that when relator was married on December 17, 1927, his wife remained an "alien" notwithstanding her marriage with him. In United States ex rel. Markin v. Curran, 9 F.2d 900, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit said: "Under this act, the naturalization of the husband did not naturalize the wife, since she was outside of the United States when he was naturalized, which was 6 months before her application for admission. It is evident, from the foregoing section, that a woman whose husband is naturalized after the passage of the act does not become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage or naturalization, but to become a citizen she must be naturalized after complete compliance with the requirements of the naturalization laws."
This action was induced by reason of an affidavit presented to him, made by the appellants' daughter, and stated that the applicants were domiciled in the United States. The facts disclosed that the one domicile they did have was not in the United States. U.S. v. Tod (C.C.A.) 297 F. 214. After a full investigation, where no error of law or a manifest abuse of discretion is displayed, the courts will not disturb the action of the immigration officials. U.S. ex rel. Markin v. Curran (C.C.A.) 9 F.2d 900; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 32 S. Ct. 734, 56 L. Ed. 1165. The appellants have been released on bail by a judge of this court during the pendency of this appeal. A motion was heard with this appeal for a vacation of this order of release.
This conclusion, which seems obvious from a consideration of the statutes, also finds support in prior decisions. In United States v. Curran, 9 F.2d 900 (C.C.A. 2), this court held that the wife of a naturalized citizen was excludable under the desirability test of section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917. It is true that that opinion notes that the wife was not in this country when her husband was naturalized, and appellant draws the inference that the decision would have been different, had the case been one of deportation rather than exclusion. Any such distinction would be illogical; no valid reason has been, nor in our opinion can be, assigned for it.
It is well settled that administrative action by the immigration officials may not be upset by the courts, unless no fair investigation was had, or there was a manifest abuse of discretion, or some error of law was committed. Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 32 S. Ct. 734, 56 L. Ed. 1165; United States ex rel. Markin v. Curran, 9 F.2d 900 (C.C.A. 2). That the court itself might have reached an opposite conclusion upon the evidence is not enough to justify its interference. United States v. Rodgers, 191 F. 970, 974 (C.C.A. 3); Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 44 S. Ct. 260, 68 L. Ed. 590.
The Court there stated as follows: "It is well settled that administrative action by the immigration officials may not be upset by the courts, unless no fair investigation was had, or there was a manifest abuse of discretion, or some error of law was committed. Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 32 S.Ct. 734, 56 L.Ed. 1165; United States ex rel. Markin v. Curran, 9 F.2d 900 (C.C.A.2). That the court itself might have reached an opposite conclusion upon the evidence is not enough to justify its interference.